

THE ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS. (RESTORED).

A

HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE
GENERATION CONTEMPORARY WITH
ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

BY

GEORGE GROTE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES---VOL. II.



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PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXIX.

LYRIC POETRY.—THE SEVEN WISE MEN.

THE interval between 776-560 B.C. presents to us a remarkable expansion of Grecian genius in the creation of their elegiac, iambic, lyric, choric, and nomic poetry, which was diversified in a great many ways and improved by many separate masters. The creators of all these different styles—from Kallinus and Archilochus down to Stesichorus—fall within the two centuries here included; though Pindar and Simonides, “the proud and high-crested bards,” who carried lyric and choric poetry to the maximum of elaboration consistent with full poetical effect, lived in the succeeding century, and were contemporary with the tragedian Æschylus. The Grecian drama, comic as well as tragic, of the fifth century B.C., combined the lyric and choric song with the living action of iambic dialogue—thus constituting the last ascending movement in the poetical genius of the race. Reserving this for a future time, and for the history of Athens, to which it more particularly belongs, I now propose to speak only of the poetical movement of the two earlier centuries, wherein Athens had little or no part. So scanty are the remnants, unfortunately, of these earlier poets, that we can offer little except criticisms borrowed at second hand, and a few general considerations on their workings and tendency.

Archilochus and Kallinus both appear to fall about the middle of the seventh century B.C., and it is with them that the innovations in Grecian poetry commence. Before them, we are told, there existed nothing but the Epos, or Dactylic Hexameter poetry of which much has been said in my former volume—being legendary stories or adventures narrated, together with addresses or hymns to the gods. We must recollect, too, that this was not only the whole poetry, but the whole literature of the age. Prose composition was altogether unknown. Writing, if beginning to be employed as an aid to a few superior men, was at any rate generally unused, and found no read-

ing public. The voice was the only communicant, and the ear the only recipient, of all those ideas and feelings which productive minds in the community found themselves impelled to pour out; and both voice and ear were accustomed to a musical recitation or chant, apparently something between song and speech, with simple rhythm and a still simpler occasional accompaniment from the primitive four-stringed harp. Such habits and requirements of the voice and ear were, at that time, inseparably associated with the success and popularity of the poet, and contributed doubtless to restrict the range of subjects with which he could deal. The type was to a certain extent consecrated, like the primitive statues of the gods, from which men only ventured to deviate by gradual and almost unconscious innovations. Moreover, in the first half of the seventh century B.C., that genius which had once created an Iliad and an Odyssey was no longer to be found. The work of hexameter narrative had come to be prosecuted by less gifted persons—by those Cyclic poets of whom I have spoken in the preceding volumes.

Such, as far as we can make it out amidst very uncertain evidence, was the state of the Greek mind immediately before elegiac and lyric poets appeared; while at the same time its experience was enlarging by the formation of new colonies, and the communion among various states tending to increase by the free reciprocity of religious games and festivals. There arose a demand for turning the literature of the age (I use this word as synonymous with the poetry) to new feelings and purposes, and for applying the rich, plastic, and musical language of the old epic, to present passion and circumstance, social as well as individual. Such a tendency had become obvious in Hesiod, even within the range of hexameter verse. Now the same causes which led to an enlargement of the subjects of poetry inclined men also to vary the meter. In regard to this latter point, there is reason to believe that the expansion of Greek music was the immediate determining cause. For it has been already stated that the musical scale and instruments of the Greeks, originally very narrow, were materially enlarged by borrowing from Phrygia and Lydia, and these acquisitions seem to have been first realized about the beginning of the seventh century B.C., through the Lesbian harper Terpander—the Phrygian (or Greco-Phrygian) flute-player Olympus—and the Arkadian or Bœotian flute-player Klonas. Terpander made the important advance of exchanging the original four-stringed harp for one of seven strings, embracing the compass of one octave or two Greek tetrachords; while Olympus as well as Klonas taught many new notes or tunes on the flute, to which the Greeks had before been strangers—probably also the use of a flute of more varied musical compass. Terpander is said to have gained the prize at the first recorded celebration of the Lacedæmonian festival of the Karneia, in 676 B.C. This is one of the best-ascertained points among the obscure chronology of the seventh century; and there seem grounds for assigning Olympus

and Klonas to nearly the same period, a little before Archilochus and Kallinus. To Terpander, Olympus, and Klonas are ascribed the formation of the earliest musical nomes known to the inquiring Greek of later times; to the first, nomes on the harp; to the two latter, on the flute—every nome being the general scheme or basis of which the airs actually performed constituted so many variations, within certain defined limits. Terpander employed his enlarged instrumental power as a new accompaniment to the Homeric poems, as well as to certain epic proemia or hymns to the gods of his own composition. But he does not seem to have departed from the hexameter verse and the dactylic rhythm, to which the new accompaniment was probably not quite suitable; and the idea may thus have been suggested of combining the words also according to new rhythmical and metrical laws.

It is certain, at least, that the age (670–600) immediately succeeding Terpander—comprising Archilochus, Kallinus, Tyrtaeus, and Alkman, whose relations of time one to another we have no certain means of determining, though Alkman seems to have been the latest—presents a remarkable variety both of new meters and of new rhythms, superinduced upon the previous Dactylic Hexameter. The first departure from this latter is found in the elegiac verse, employed seemingly more or less by all the four above-mentioned poets, but chiefly by the first two, and even ascribed by some to the invention of Kallinus. Tyrtaeus in his military march-songs employed the Anapestic meter, while in Archilochus as well as in Alkman we find traces of a much larger range of metrical variety—iambic, trochaic, anapestic, Ionic, etc.—sometimes even asynartetic or compound meters, anapestic or dactylic blended with trochaic or iambic. What we have remaining from Mimnermus who comes shortly after the preceding four is elegiac. His contemporaries Alkæus and Sappho, besides employing most of those meters which they found existing, invented each a peculiar stanza, which is familiarly known under a name derived from each. In Solon, the younger contemporary of Mimnermus, we have the elegiac, iambic, and trochaic: in Theognis, yet later, the elegiac only. Arion and Stesichorus appear to have been innovators in this department, the former by his improvement in the dithyrambic chorus or circular song and dance in honor of Dionysus—the latter by his more elaborate choric compositions, containing not only a strophe and antistrophe, but also a third division or epode succeeding them, pronounced by the chorus standing still. Both Anakreon and Ibykus likewise added to the stock of existing metrical varieties. We thus see that within the century and a half succeeding Terpander, Greek poetry (or Greek literature, which was then the same thing) became greatly enriched in matter as well as diversified in form.

To a certain extent there seems to have been a real connection between the two. New forms were essential for the expression of

new wants and feelings—though the assertion that elegiac meter is especially adapted for one set of feelings, trochaic for a second, and iambic for a third, if true at all, can only be admitted with great latitude of exception, when we find so many of them employed by the poets for very different subjects—gay or melancholy, bitter or complaining, earnest or sprightly—seemingly with little discrimination. But the adoption of some new meter, different from the perpetual series of hexameters, was required when the poet desired to do something more than recount a long story or fragment of heroic legend—when he sought to bring himself, his friends, his enemies, his city, his hopes and fears with regard to matters recent or impending, all before the notice of the hearer, and that too at once with brevity and animation. The Greek hexameter, like our blank verse, has all its limiting conditions bearing upon each separate line, and presents to the hearer no predetermined resting-place or natural pause beyond. In reference to any long composition, either epic and dramatic, such unrestrained license is found convenient, and the case was similar for Greek epos and drama—the single-lined iambic trimeter being generally used for the dialogue of tragedy and comedy, just as the dactylic hexameter had been used for the epic. The metrical changes introduced by Archilochus and his contemporaries may be compared to a change from our blank verse to the rhymed couplet and quatrain. The verse was thrown into little systems of two, three, or four lines, with a pause at the end of each; and the halt thus assured to, as well as expected and relished by, the ear, was generally coincident with a close, entire or partial, in the sense which thus came to be distributed with greater point and effect.

The elegiac verse, or common hexameter and pentameter (this second line being an hexameter with the third and sixth thesis, or the last half of the third and sixth foot suppressed, and a pause left in place of it), as well as the epode (or iambic trimeter followed by an iambic dimeter) and some other binary combinations of verse which we trace among the fragments of Archilochus, are conceived with a view to such increase of effect both on the ear and the mind, not less than to the direct pleasures of novelty and variety. The iambic meter, built upon the primitive iambus or coarse and licentious jesting which formed a part of some Grecian festivals (especially of the festivals of Demeter as well in Attica as in Paros, the native country of the poet), is only one amongst many new paths struck out by this inventive genius. His exuberance astonishes us, when we consider that he takes his start from little more than the simple hexameter, in which too he was a distinguished composer—for even of the elegiac verse he is as likely to have been the inventor as Kallinus, just as he was the earliest popular and successful composer of table-songs or Skolia, though Terpander may have originated some such before him. The entire loss of his poems, excepting some few fragments, enables us to recognize little more than

one characteristic—the intense personality which pervaded them, as well as that coarse, direct, and outspoken license, which afterwards lent such terrible effect to the old comedy at Athens. His lampoons are said to have driven Lykambes, the father of Neobule, to hang himself. Neobule had been promised to Archilochus in marriage, but that promise was broken, and the poet assailed both father and daughter with every species of calumny. In addition to this disappointment, he was poor, the son of a slave-mother, and an exile from his country Paros to the unpromising colony of Thosos. The desultory notices respecting him betray a state of suffering combined with loose conduct which vented itself sometimes in complaint, sometimes in libelous assault. He was at last slain by some whom his muse had thus exasperated. His extraordinary poetical genius finds but one voice of encomium throughout antiquity. His triumphal song to Herakles was still popularly sung by the victors at Olympia, near two centuries after his death, in the days of Pindar; but that majestic and complimentary poet at once denounces the malignity, and attests the retributive suffering of the great Parian iambist.

Amidst the multifarious veins in which Archilochus displayed his genius, moralizing or gnomic poetry is not wanting; while his contemporary Simonides of Amorgos devotes the iambic meter especially to this destination, afterward followed out by Solon and Theognis. Kallinus, the earliest celebrated elegiac poet, so far as we can judge from his few fragments, employed the elegiac meter for exhortations of warlike patriotism; and the more ample remains which we possess of Tyrtaeus are sermons in the same strain, preaching to the Spartans bravery against the foe, and unanimity as well as obedience to the law at home. They are patriotic effusions, called forth by the circumstances of the time, and sung by single voice, with accompaniment of the flute, to those in whose bosoms the flame of courage was to be kindled. For though what we peruse is in verse, we are still in the tide of real and present life, and we must suppose ourselves rather listening to an orator addressing the citizens when danger or dissension is actually impending. It is only in the hands of Mimnermus that elegiac verse comes to be devoted to soft and amatory subjects. His few fragments present a vein of passive and tender sentiment, illustrated by appropriate matter of legend, such as would be cast into poetry in all ages, and quite different from the rhetoric of Kallinus and Tyrtaeus.

The poetical career of Alkman is again distinct from that of any of his above-mentioned contemporaries. Their compositions, besides hymns to the gods, were principally expressions of feeling intended to be sung by individuals, though sometimes also suited for the Komos or band of festive volunteers, assembled on some occasion of common interest; those of Alkman were principally choric, intended for the song and accompanying dance of the chorus. He was a native of Sardis in Lydia, or at least his family were so: and he

appears to have come in early life to Sparta, though his genius and mastery of the Greek language discountenance the story that he was brought over to Sparta as a slave. The most ancient arrangement of music at Sparta, generally ascribed to Terpander, underwent considerable alteration, not only through the elegiac and anapestic measures of Tyrtæus, but also through the Kretan Thaletas and the Lydian Alkman. The harp, the instrument of Terpander, was rivaled and in part superseded by the flute or pipe, which had been recently rendered more effective in the hands of Olympus, Klonas, and Polymnestus, and which gradually became, for compositions intended to raise strong emotion, the favorite instrument of the two—being employed as accompaniment both to the elegies of Tyrtæus, and to the hyporchemata (songs or hymns combined with dancing) of Thaletas; also, as the stimulus and regulator to the Spartan military march. These elegies (as has been just remarked) were sung by one person in the midst of an assembly of listeners, and there were doubtless other compositions intended for the individual voice. But in general such was not the character of music and poetry at Sparta; everything done there, both serious and recreative, was public and collective, so that the chorus and its performance received extraordinary development.

It has been already stated, that the chorus, with song and dance combined, constituted an important part of divine service throughout all Greece. It was originally a public manifestation of the citizens generally—a large proportion of them being actively engaged in it, and receiving some training for the purpose as an ordinary branch of education. Neither the song nor the dance under such conditions could be otherwise than extremely simple. But in process of time, the performance at the chief festival tended to become more elaborate and to fall into the hands of persons expressly and professionally trained—the mass of the citizens gradually ceasing to take active part, and being present merely as spectators. Such was the practice which grew up in most parts of Greece, and especially at Athens, where the dramatic chorus acquired its highest perfection. But the drama never found admission at Sparta, and the peculiarity of Spartan life tended much to keep up the popular chorus on its ancient footing. It formed in fact one element in that never-ceasing drill to which the Spartans were subject from their boyhood, and it served a purpose analogous to their military training, in accustoming them to simultaneous and regulated movement—insomuch that the comparison between the chorus, especially in its Pyrrhic or war-dances, and the military enomoty, seems to have been often dwelt upon. In the singing of the solemn pæan in honor of Apollo, at the festival of the Hyakinthia, King Agesilaus was under the orders of the chorus-master, and sang in the place allotted to him; while the whole body of Spartans without exception—the old, the middle-aged, and the youth, the matrons and the virgins—

were distributed in various choric companies, and trained to harmony both of voice and motion, which was publicly exhibited at the solemnities of the *Gymnopædia*. The word *dancing* must be understood in a larger sense than that in which it is now employed, and as comprising every variety of rhythmical, accentuated, conspiring movements, or gesticulations, or postures of the body, from the slowest to the quickest; cheironomy, or the decorous and expressive movement of the hands, being especially practiced.

We see thus that both at Sparta and in Krete (which approached in respect to publicity of individual life most nearly to Sparta) the choric aptitudes and manifestations occupied a larger space than in any other Grecian city. And as a certain degree of musical and rhythmical variety was essential to meet this want, while music was never taught to Spartan citizens individually, we further understand how strangers like Terpander, Polymnestus, Thaletas, Tyrtæus, Alkman, etc., were not only received, but acquired great influence at Sparta, in spite of the preponderant spirit of jealous seclusion in the Spartan character. All these masters appear to have been effective in their own special vocation—the training of the chorus—to which they imparted new rhythmical action, and for which they composed new music. But Alkman did this, and something more. He possessed the genius of a poet, and his compositions were read afterward with pleasure by those who could not hear them sung or see them danced. In the little of his poems which remains we recognize that variety of rhythm and meter for which he was celebrated. In this respect he (together with the Kretan Thaletas, who is said to have introduced a more vehement style both of music and dance, with the Kretic and Pæonic rhythm, into Sparta) surpassed Archilochus, preparing the way for the complicated choric movements of Stesichorus and Pindar. Some of his fragments, too, manifest that fresh outpouring of individual sentiment and emotion which constitutes so much of the charm of popular poetry. Besides his touching address in old age to the Spartan virgins, over whose song and dance he had been accustomed to preside, he is not afraid to speak of his hearty appetite, satisfied with simple food and relishing a bowl of warm broth at the winter tropic. He has attached to the spring an epithet, which comes home to the real feelings of a poor country more than those captivating pictures which abound in verse, ancient as well as modern. He calls it “the season of short fare”—the crop of the previous year being then nearly consumed, the husbandman is compelled to pinch himself until his new harvest comes in. Those who recollect that in earlier periods of our history, and in all countries where there is little accumulated stock, an exorbitant difference is often experienced in the price of corn before and after the harvest, will feel the justice of Alkman’s description.

Judging from these and from a few other fragments of this poet,

Alkman appears to have combined the life and exciting vigor of Archilochus in the song properly so called, sung by himself individually—with a larger knowledge of musical and rhythmical effect in regard to the choric performance. He composed in the Laconian dialect—a variety of the Doric with some intermixture of Æolisms. And it was from him, jointly with those other composers who figured at Sparta during the century after Terpander, as well as from the simultaneous development of the choric muse in Argos, Sikyon, Arcadia, and other parts of Peloponnesus, that the Doric dialect acquired permanent footing in Greece, as the only proper dialect for choric compositions. Continued by Stesichorus and Pindar, this habit passed even to the Attic dramatists, whose choric songs are thus in a great measure Doric, while their dialogue is Attic. At Sparta, as well as in other parts of Peloponnesus, the musical and rhythmical style appears to have been fixed by Alkman and his contemporaries, and to have been tenaciously maintained, for two or three centuries, with little or no innovation; the more so, as the flute-players at Sparta formed an hereditary profession, who followed the routine of their fathers.

Alkman was the last poet who addressed himself to the popular chorus. Both Arion and Stesichorus composed for a body of trained men, with a degree of variety and involution such as could not be attained by a mere fraction of the people. The primitive Dithyrambus was a round choric dance and song in honor of Dionysus, common to Naxos, Thebes, and seemingly to many other places, at the Dionysiac festival—a spontaneous effusion of drunken men in the hour of revelry, wherein the poet Archilochus, “with the thunder of wine full upon his mind,” had often taken the chief part. Its exciting character approached to the worship of the great mother in Asia, and stood in contrast with the solemn and stately pæan addressed to Apollo. Arion introduced into it an alteration such as Archilochus had himself brought about in the scurrilous Iambus. He converted it into an elaborate composition in honor of the god, sung and danced by a chorus of fifty persons, not only sober, but trained with great strictness; though its rhythm and movements, and its equipment in the character of satyrs, presented more or less an imitation of the primitive license. Born at Methymna in Lesbos, Arion appears as a harper, singer, and composer, much favored by Periander at Corinth, in which city he first “composed, denominated, and taught the Dithyramb,” earlier than any one known to Herodotus. He did not, however, remain permanently there, but traveled from city to city exhibiting at the festivals for money—especially to Sicilian and Italian Greece, where he acquired large gains. We may here again remark how the poets as well as the festivals served to promote a sentiment of unity among the dispersed Greeks. Such transfer of the Dithyramb, from the field of spontaneous nature into the garden of art,

constitutes the first stage in the refinement of Dionysiac worship; which will hereafter be found still farther exalted in the form of the Attic drama.

The date of Arion seems about 600 B.C., shortly after Alkman: that of Stesichorus is a few years later. To the latter the Greek chorus owed a high degree of improvement, and in particular the final distribution of its performance into the Strophe, the Antistrophe, and the Epodus: the turn, the return, and the rest. The rhythm and meter of the song during each strophe corresponded with that during the antistrophe, but was varied during the epodus, and again varied during the following strophes. Until this time the song had been monostrophic, consisting of nothing more than one uniform stanza, repeated from the beginning to the end of the composition; so that we may easily see how vast was the new complication and difficulty introduced by Stesichorus—not less for the performers than for the composer, himself at that time the teacher and trainer of performers. Both this poet, and his contemporary the flute-player Sakadas of Argos,—who gained the prize at the first three Pythian games founded after the sacred war,—seem to have surpassed their predecessors in the breadth of subject which they embraced, borrowing from the inexhaustible province of ancient legend, and expanding the choric song into a well-sustained epical narrative. Indeed these Pythian games opened a new career to musical composers just at the time when Sparta began to be closed against musical novelties.

Alkæus and Sappho, both natives of Lesbos, appear about contemporaries with Arion B.C. 610–580. Of their once celebrated lyric compositions, scarcely anything remains. But the criticisms which are preserved on both of them place them in strong contrast with Alkman, who lived and composed under the more restrictive atmosphere of Sparta—and in considerable analogy with the turbulent vehemence of Archilochus, though without his intense private malignity. Both Alkæus and Sappho composed for their own local audience, and in their own Lesbian Æolic dialect; not because there was any peculiar fitness in that dialect to express their vein of sentiment, but because it was more familiar to their hearers. Sappho herself boasts of the pre-eminence of the Lesbian bards; and the celebrity of Terpander, Perikleitas, and Arion permits us to suppose that there may have been before her other popular bards in the island who did not attain to a wide Hellenic celebrity. Alkæus included in his songs the fiercest bursts of political feeling, the stirring alternations of war and exile, and all the ardent relish of a susceptible man for wine and love. The love-song seems to have formed the principal theme of Sappho, who, however, also composed odes or songs on a great variety of other subjects, serious as well as satirical, and is said farther to have first employed the Myxolydian mode in music. It displays the tendency of the age to metrical and rhythmical novelty, that Alkæus and Sappho are said to have each invented the peculiar

stanza, well known under their respective names—combinations of the dactyl, trochee, and iambus, analogous to the asynartetic verses of Archilochus. They by no means confined themselves however to Alcaic and Sapphic meter. Both the one and the other composed hymns to the gods; indeed this is a *thémé* common to all the lyric and choric poets, whatever may be their peculiarities in other ways. Most of their compositions were songs for the single voice, not for the chorus. The poetry of Alkæus is the more worthy of note, as it is the earliest instance of the employment of the Muse in actual political warfare, and shows the increased hold which that motive was acquiring on the Grecian mind.

The nomic poets, or moralists in verse, approach by the tone of their sentiments more to the nature of prose. They begin with Simonides of Amorgos or of Samos, the contemporary of Archilochus. Indeed Archilochus himself devoted some compositions to the illustrative fable, which had not been unknown even to Hesiod. In the remains of Simonides of Amorgos we trace nothing relative to the man personally, though he too, like Archilochus, is said to have had an individual enemy, Orodækides, whose character was aspersed by his Muse. His only considerable poem extant is devoted to a survey of the characters of women, in iambic verse, and by way of comparison with various animals—the mare, the ass, the bee, etc. This poem follows out the Hesiodic vein respecting the social and economical mischief usually caused by women, with some few honorable exceptions. But the poet shows a much larger range of observation and illustration, if we compare him with his predecessor Hesiod; moreover his illustrations come fresh from life and reality. We find in this early iambist the same sympathy with industry and its due rewards, which is observable in Hesiod, together with a still more melancholy sense of the uncertainty of human events.

Of Solon and Theognis I have spoken in former chapters. They reproduce in part the moralizing vein of Simonides, though with a strong admixture of personal feeling and a direct application to passing events. The mixture of political with social morality, which we find in both, marks their more advanced age: Solon bears in this respect the same relation to Simonides, as his contemporary Alkæus bears to Archilochus. His poems, as far as we can judge by the fragments remaining, appear to have been short occasional effusions, with the exception of the epic poem respecting the submerged island of Atlantis; which he began toward the close of his life, but never finished. They are elegiac, trimeter iambic, and trochaic tetrameter; in his hands certainly neither of these meters can be said to have any special or separate character. If the poems of Solon are short, those of Theognis are much shorter, and are indeed so much broken (as they stand in our present collection), as to read like separate epigrams or bursts of feeling, which the poet had not taken the trouble to incorporate in any definite scheme or series. They form a singular

mixture of maxim and passion—of general precept with personal affection toward the youth Kyrnus—which surprises us if tried by the standard of literary composition, but which seems a very genuine manifestation of an impoverished exile's complaints and restlessness. What remains to us of Phokylides, another of the nomic poets nearly contemporary with Solon, is nothing more than a few maxims in verse—couplets with the name of the author in several cases embodied in them.

Amidst all the variety of rhythmical and metrical innovations which have been enumerated, the ancient epic continued to be recited by the rhapsodes as before. Some new epical compositions were added to the existing stock: Eugammon of Kyrene, about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.), appears to be the last of the series. At Athens, especially, both Solon and Peisistratus manifested great solicitude as well for the recitation as for the correct preservation of the Iliad. Perhaps its popularity may have been diminished by the competition of so much lyric and choric poetry, more showy and striking in its accompaniments, as well as more changeful in its rhythmical character. Whatever secondary effect, however, this newer species of poetry may have derived from such helps, its primary effect was produced by real intellectual or poetical excellence—by the thoughts, sentiment, and expression, not by the accompaniment. For a long time the musical composer and the poet continued generally to be one and the same person; and besides those who have acquired sufficient distinction to reach posterity, we cannot doubt that there were many known only to their own contemporaries. But with all of them the instrument and the melody constituted only the inferior part of that which was known by the name of *music*—altogether subordinate to the “thoughts that breathe and words that burn.” Exactness and variety of rhythmical pronunciation gave to the words their full effect upon a delicate ear; but such pleasure of the ear was ancillary to the emotion of mind arising out of the sense conveyed. Complaints are made by the poets, even so early as 500 B.C., that the accompaniment was becoming too prominent. But it was not until the age of the comic poet Aristophanes, toward the end of the fifth century B.C., that the primitive relation between the instrumental accompaniment and the words was really reversed—and loud were the complaints to which it gave rise. The performance of the flute or harp then became more elaborate, showy, and overpowering, while the words were so put together as to show off the player's execution. I notice briefly this subsequent revolution for the purpose of setting forth, by contrast, the truly intellectual character of the original lyric and choric poetry of Greece; and of showing how much the vague sentiment arising from mere musical sound was lost in the more definite emotion, and in the more lasting and reproductive combinations, generated by poetical meaning.

The name and poetry of Solon, and the short maxims or sayings of

Phokylides, conduct us to the mention of the Seven Wise men of Greece. Solon was himself one of the seven, and most, if not all, of them were poets or composers in verse. To most of them is ascribed also an abundance of pithy repartees, together with one short saying or maxim peculiar to each, serving as a sort of distinctive motto. Indeed, the test of an accomplished man about this time was his talent for singing or reciting poetry, and for making smart and ready answers. Respecting this constellation of Wise men—who in the next century of Grecian history, when philosophy came to be a matter of discussion and argumentation, were spoken of with great eulogy—all the statements are confused, in part even contradictory. Neither the number, nor the names, are given by all authors alike. Dikæarchus numbered ten, Hermippus seventeen: the names of Solon the Athenian, Thales the Milesian, Pittakus the Mitylenean, and Bias the Prienean, were comprised in all the lists—and the remaining names as given by Plato were, Kleobulus of Lindus in Rhodes, Myson of Chenæ, and Cheilon of Sparta. We cannot certainly distribute among them the sayings or mottoes, upon which in later days the Amphiktyons conferred the honor of inscription in the Delphian temple—Know thyself—Nothing too much—Know thy opportunity—Suretyship is the precursor of ruin. Bias is praised as an excellent judge; while Myson was declared by the Delphian oracle to be the most discreet man among the Greeks, according to the testimony of the satirical poet Hipponax—this is the oldest testimony (540 B.C.) which can be produced in favor of any of the Seven. But Kleobulus of Lindus, far from being universally extolled, is pronounced by the poet Simonides to be a fool.

Dikæarchus, however, justly observed, that these seven or ten persons were not Wise Men or Philosophers, in the sense which those words bore in his day, but persons of practical discernment in reference to man and society—of the same turn of mind as their contemporary the fabulist Æsop, though not employing the same mode of illustration. Their appearance forms an epoch in Grecian history, inasmuch as they are the first persons who ever acquired an Hellenic reputation grounded on mental competency apart from poetical genius or effect—a proof that political and social prudence was beginning to be appreciated and admired on its own account. Solon, Pittakus, Bias, and Thales, were all men of influence—the first two even men of ascendancy—in their respective cities. Kleobulus was despot of Lindus, and Periander (by some numbered among the seven) of Corinth. Thales stands distinguished as the earliest name in physical philosophy, with which the other contemporary Wise Men are not said to have meddled. Their celebrity rests upon moral, social, and political wisdom exclusively, which came into greater honor as the ethical feeling of the Greeks improved and as their experience became enlarged.

In these celebrated names we have social philosophy in its early

and infantine state—in the shape of homely sayings or admonitions, either supposed to be self-evident, or to rest upon some great authority divine or human, but neither accompanied by reasons nor recognizing any appeal to inquiry and discussion as the proper test of their rectitude. From such incurious acquiescence, the sentiment to which these admonitions owe their force, we are partially liberated even in the poet Simonides of Keos, who (as before alluded to) severely criticises the song of Kleobulus as well as its author. The half-century which followed the age of Simonides (the interval between about 480–430 B.C.) broke down that sentiment more and more, by familiarizing the public with argumentative controversy in the public assembly, the popular judicature, and even on the dramatic stage. And the increased self-working of the Grecian mind, thus created, manifested itself in Sokrates, who laid open all ethical and social doctrines to the scrutiny of reason, and who first awakened among his countrymen that love of dialectics which never left them—an analytical interest in the mental process of inquiring out, verifying, proving and expounding truth. To this capital item of human progress, secured through the Greeks—and through them only—to mankind generally, our attention will be called at a later period of the history. At present it is only mentioned in contrast with the naked, dogmatical, laconism of the Seven Wise Men, and with the simple enforcement of the early poets—a state in which morality has a certain place in the feelings, but no root, even among the superior minds, in the conscious exercise of reason.

The interval between Archilochus and Solon (660–580 B.C.) seems, as has been remarked in my former volume, to be the period in which writing first came to be applied to Greek poems—to the Homeric poems among the number; and shortly after the end of that period, commences the era of compositions without meter or prose. The philosopher Pherekydes of Syros, about 550 B.C., is called by some the earliest prose-writer. But no prose-writer for a considerable time afterward acquired any celebrity—seemingly none earlier than Hekataeus of Miletus, about 510–490 B.C.—prose being a subordinate and ineffective species of composition, not always even perspicuous, and requiring no small practice before the power was acquired of rendering it interesting. Down to the generation preceding Sokrates, the poets continued to be the grand leaders of the Greek mind. Until then, nothing was taught to youth except to read, to remember, to recite musically and rhythmically, and to comprehend, poetical composition. The comments of preceptors addressed to their pupils may probably have become fuller and more instructive, but the text still continued to be epic or lyric poetry. These were the best masters for acquiring a full command of the complicated accent and rhythm of the Greek language, so essential to an educated man in ancient times, and so sure to be detected if not properly acquired. Not to mention the Choliambist Hipponax, who seems to have been possessed with the

devil of Achilochus, and in part also with his genius—Anakreon, Ibykus, Pindar, Bacchylides, Simonides, and the dramatists of Athens, continue the line of eminent poets without intermission. After the Persian war, the requirements of public speaking created a class of rhetorical teachers, while the gradual spread of physical philosophy widened the range of instruction; so that prose composition, for speech or for writing, occupied a larger and larger share of the attention of men, and was gradually wrought up to high perfection, such as we see for the first time in Herodotus. But before it became thus improved, and acquired that style which was the condition of wide-spread popularity, we may be sure that it had been silently used as a means of recording information, and that neither the large mass of geographical matter contained in the *Periegesis* of Hekataeus, nor the map first prepared by his contemporary Anaximander, could have been presented to the world, without the previous labors of unpretending prose writers, who set down the mere results of their own experience. The acquisition of prose-writing, commencing as it does about the age of Peisistratus, is not less remarkable as an evidence of past, than as a means of future, progress.

Of that splendid genius in sculpture and architecture, which shone forth in Greece after the Persian invasion, the first lineaments only are discoverable between 600–500 B.C., in Corinth, Ægina, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, etc.—enough, however, to give evidence of improvement and progress. Glaukus of Chios is said to have discovered the art of welding iron, and Rhoekus or his son Theodorus of Samos the art of casting copper or brass in a mold. Both these discoveries, as far as can be made out, appear to date a little before 600 B.C. The primitive memorial erected in honor of a god did not even pretend to be an image, but was often nothing more than a pillar, a board, a shapeless stone, a post, etc., fixed so as to mark and consecrate the locality, and receiving from the neighborhood respectful care and decoration as well as worship. Sometimes there was a real statue, though of the rudest character, carved in wood; and the families of carvers—who from father to son, exercised this profession, represented in Attica by the name of Dædalus and in Ægina by the name of Smilis—adhered long with strict exactness to the consecrated type of each particular god. Gradually the wish grew up to change the material, as well as to correct the rudeness, of such primitive idols. Sometimes the original wood was retained as the material, but covered in part with ivory or gold—in other cases marble or metal was substituted. Dipœnus and Skyllis of Krete acquired renown as workers in marble about the 50th Olympiad (580 B.C.). From them downward, a series of names may be traced, more or less distinguished; moreover, it seems about the same period that the earliest temple-offerings, in works of art properly so called, commence—the golden statue of Zeus, and the large carved chest, dedicated by the Kypselids of Corinth at Olympia. The pious associations, however, con-

nected with the old type were so strong, that the hand of the artist was greatly restrained in dealing with statues of the gods. It was in statues of men, especially in those of the victors at Olympia and other sacred games, that genuine ideas of beauty were first aimed at and in part attained, from whence they passed afterward to the statues of the gods. Such statues of the athletes seem to commence somewhere between Olympiad 53-58 (568-548 B.C.).

It is not until the same interval of time (between 600-550 B.C.) that we find any traces of these architectural monuments by which the more important cities in Greece afterward attracted to themselves so much renown. The two greatest temples in Greece known to Herodotus were the Artemision at Ephesus, and the Heræon at Samos. Of these the former seems to have been commenced, by the Samian Theodorus, about 600 B.C.—the latter, begun by the Samian Rhœkus, can hardly be traced to any higher antiquity. The first attempts to decorate Athens by such additions proceeded from Peisistratus and his sons, near the same time. As far as we can judge, too, in the absence of all direct evidence, the temples of Pæstum in Italy and Selinus in Sicily seem to fall in this same century. Of painting during these early centuries, nothing can be affirmed. It never at any time reached the same perfection as sculpture, and we may presume that its years of infancy were at least equally rude.

The immense development of Grecian art, subsequently, and the great perfection of Grecian artists, are facts of great importance in the history of the human race; while in regard to the Greeks themselves, these facts not only acted powerfully on the taste of the people, but were also valuable indirectly as the common boast of Hellenism, and as supplying one bond of fraternal sympathy as well as of mutual pride, among its widely-dispersed sections. It is the paucity and weakness of such bonds which renders the history of Greece, prior to 560 B.C, little better than a series of parallel but isolated threads, each attached to a separate city. The increased range of joint Hellenic feeling and action, upon which we shall presently enter, though arising doubtless in great measure from new and common dangers threatening many cities at once—also springs in part from those other causes which have been enumerated in this chapter, as acting on the Grecian mind. It proceeds from the stimulus applied to all the common feelings in religion, art, and recreation—from the gradual formation of national festivals, appealing in various ways to such tastes and sentiments as animated every Hellenic bosom—from the inspirations of men of genius, poets, musicians, sculptors, architects, who supplied more or less in every Grecian city, education for the youth, training for the chorus, and ornament for the locality—from the gradual expansion of science, philosophy, and rhetoric, during the coming period of this history, which rendered one city the intellectual capital of Greece, and

brought to Isokrates and Plato pupils from the most distant parts of the Grecian world. It was this fund of common tastes, tendencies, and aptitudes, which caused the social atoms of Hellas to gravitate toward each other, and which enabled the Greeks to become something better and greater than an aggregate of petty disunited communities like the Thracians or Phrygians. And the creation of such common, extrapolitical Hellenism is the most interesting phenomenon which the historian has to point out in the early period now under our notice. He is called upon to dwell upon it the more forcibly because the modern reader has generally no idea of national union without political union—an association foreign to the Greek mind. Strange as it may seem to find a song-writer put forward as an active instrument of union among his fellow-Hellens, it is not the less true that those poets, whom we have briefly passed in review, by enriching the common language and by circulating from town to town either in person or in their compositions, contributed to fan the flame of Pan-Hellenic patriotism at a time when there were few circumstances to co-operate with them, and when the causes tending to perpetuate isolation seemed in the ascendant.

CHAPTER XXX.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS.

WE now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Cræsus in Lydia.

It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B.C. He died in 527 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B.C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son. These chronological points are settled on good evidence. But the thirty-three years covered by the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile, one of them lasting not less than ten years, the other, five years; and the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers. Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly. Nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterward, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in cir-

cultation, as Thucydides distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian constitution, whereby the annual Senate of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its action as well as aided and regulated by this senate) invested with a power of exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically softened by it. Yet nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment yet had been created. A hundred years hence, we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with "that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Demus of Pnyx"—so Aristophanes calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. But between 560–510 B.C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men, at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command. It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B.C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise.

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter, Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the acropolis. He thus became master of the administration; but he employed his power honorably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary to insure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless we may see by the verses of Solon (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that the prevalent sentiment was by no means favorable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals—Megakles at the head of the Parali or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighboring plain. As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism. But the time came (how soon we cannot tell) when the two rivals who had expelled him quarreled. Megakles made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter. The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem—since the simulated wounds

and pretense of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phye, in the panoply and costume of Athene—surrounded her with the processional accompaniments belonging to the goddess—and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people,—“Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athene has honored above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own acropolis.” The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athene had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus: who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megakles, were powerful enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession. And probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megakles had quarreled.

The daughter of Megakles, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children. It became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæonid family, did not intend that she should become a mother. Megakles was so incensed at this behavior, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus—and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. He retired to Eretria in Eubœa, where he remained no less than ten years, employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and exercising, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He not only lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos in constituting himself despot of that island, but possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering important service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his re-establishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself both with money and with troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country. It was not until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallene on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found

means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal. For the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler.

On this third successful entry, he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent. The Alkmæonidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile: but he seized the children of those who remained and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behavior of their parents, and placed them in Naxos under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people: and he was careful to conciliate the favor of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos. All the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo, were exhumed and reinterred further off. At this time the Delian festival—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot Polykrates, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. Partly from the same feelings which led to the purification of Delos—partly as an act of party revenge—Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæonids to be leveled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country.

This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years, until his death in 527 B.C. It is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the senate of Areopagus; yet as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thucydides affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income tax of five per cent. This is high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thucydides being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family. The judgment of Herodotus is also very favorable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favorable, yet qualified, since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenon or the temple of Athene Polias; both

of which, nevertheless, were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover Peisistratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival,—a proceeding for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets—called by Aulus Gellius, in language not well suited to the sixth century B.C., a library thrown open to the public. The service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day,—Simonides, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids, well versed in these prophecies, set great value upon them, and guarded their integrity so carefully, that Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating them, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence. The statues of Hermes, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica, and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called Hipparchus, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony. It is certain, however, that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the state, and ornamented the city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhoe. They are said to have maintained the pre existing forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were, moreover, modest and popular in their personal demeanor, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity in their murder of Kimon by night through the agency of hired assassins. There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. Hence the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind that profound and imperishable

hatred, against the dynasty generally, which Thucydides reluctantly admits: laboring to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus. The general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydides was that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him. Yet the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies upon his own responsibility that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version; but we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato, about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydides recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Of these two Athenian citizens, both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyraei, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeiton, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots, and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the Kanephoraë or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens. But when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.

An insult thus publicly offered Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeiton. Both of them resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the acropolis; this being the only day on which

an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and Aristogeiton undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign body-guard around him, was marshaling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogeiton approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man. They immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus; whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called Leokorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot; while Aristogeiton, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterward taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced toward them,—directing them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed; upon which he ordered his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. Being now undisputed master, he seized the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydides. To possess great power—to be above legal restraint—to inspire extraordinary fear—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. These last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many persons made

the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens—"they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws." So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it. Moreover, we must recollect that the intimate connection between the two, though repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy,—so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeiton were afterward commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honor shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favor of this respected lineage. And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus—the reigning despot—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes, not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

Whatever may have been the previous moderation of Hippias, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety, now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydides and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement noway improbable in itself and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible—that he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeiton, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter. But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens. With this view he sought to connect himself with Darius, king of Persia—a connection full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantides, son of Hippoklus the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favor of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedike in mar-

riage; no small honor to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thucydides. To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbors the Absinthian tribe of Thracians. Opportunity was thus offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, while Miltiades son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian living impatiently under his despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it: his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus—alike pious and picturesque, and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honor of their œkist—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians going to Delphi to crave assistance toward procuring Grecian colonists, were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phokis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation. At length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiades while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly: upon which they apprised him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle, and adjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented; sailing as œkist at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese.

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out, though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambush and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus, king of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to



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the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner. Miltiades had acquired much favor with Cræsus, in what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterward, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens.

The expedition of Miltiades to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Cræsus (546 B.C.). But it was not till much later—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mityleneans: Peisistratus retook it, and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537–527 B.C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykrates and the Samians. Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese and Sigeium. To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiades, nephew of the first ækist, as governor after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of 500 mercenaries, and married Hegesipyle, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus. It must have been about 518 B.C. that this second Miltiades went out to the Chersonese. He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B.C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, however, though Athenian possessions, were now tributary and dependent on Persia. It was to Persia that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantides as well as Darius as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæonids at their head. Believing the favorable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydriou in the mountain range of Parnes, which separates Attica from Bœotia. But their schemes

altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas, king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected maneuver, which, favored by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C., the Delphian temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by such assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Cræsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B.C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was 300 talents (equal probably to about £115,000 sterling)—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length however the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæonids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract. In executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone. As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles (whose property had been confiscated) so amply furnished with money, unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenes inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Here. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus—512 B.C.—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude toward the Alkmæonids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleis-

thenes was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain—"Athens must be liberated." The constant repetition of that mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship toward the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius, son of Aster, was dispatched by sea to Athens at the head of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalerum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by 1,000 horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalerum this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius were driven back to their ships with great loss, and he himself slain. The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenes in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenes marched on without farther resistance to Athens, where he found himself, together with the Alkmæonids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except round the acropolis, into which Hippias retired, with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was no way prepared for a long blockade. Yet, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; in which proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder. It was put down through the aid of foreigners, and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation. An altar was erected in the acropolis, with a column hard

by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.

CHAPTER XXXI.

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS.— REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS.

WITH Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defense as well as for enforcement of authority. Kleomenes with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian constitution. The nine archons, and the probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people—or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the *gentes*, *phratries*, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist—but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality. There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders—on one side, Isagoras, son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent—on the other, Kleisthenes, the Alkmæonid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenes had the worst of it, and in consequence of his defeat (says the historian) “he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded

from everything." His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy; it was a real and important revolution.

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families—the *gentes* and the *phratries*. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers. Moreover they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where immigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenes, breaking down the existing wall of privilege, imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new *gentes* or *phratries*, created in addition to the old. For the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling which in the existing state of the Greek mind could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers. It could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the *gentes* which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly Kleisthenes abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the *gentes* and *phratries*. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of *demes* or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The *demes* taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves. Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes; Kleisthenes, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities; deriving their names from the four sons of Ion—just as his grandfather, the Sikyonian Kleisthenes, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyon. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians, and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence.

But the scope of Kleisthenes was something far more extensive. He abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic,

but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And, indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the Senate of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were probably attended only by a few partisans. Under such circumstances, the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified—between members of the four old tribes and men not members—became during this period practically effaced. This in fact was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism ever seems to have done. It confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency; but had they been continued on the old footing, including none but members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been re-invested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If in addition we consider the political excitement of the moment—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms by the corruption of which the despot had reigned—we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenes had learnt some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenes may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel (and no other ground is mentioned) between him and Isagoras. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing senate and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people. His

opposition to it, moreover, is not difficult to understand; for necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, of gentes—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles. It thus broke up those associations, religious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome who composed the gentes and curiæ—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations—formed for a long time two separate and opposing fractions in the same city, each with its own separate organization. Only by slow degrees did the plebs gain ground, while the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So, too, in the Italian and German cities of the middle ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance. But the reform of Kleisthenes effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots. The Athenian people, politely considered, thus became one homogeneous whole distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which composed them were left untouched, continuing to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called—Erechtheis, Ægeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Akamantis, Ceneis, Kekropis, Hippothoontis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetriais, afterward designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis: the mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that in the time of Polemo (the third century B.C.) it was 174, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenes at first recognized exactly one hundred demes,

distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes. Such construction of the words, however, is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and 174, some positive evidence of it would probably be found—partly because Kleisthenes would indeed have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenes, to have subsisted afterward with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain and more important to notice. The demes which Kleisthenes assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other; and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighborhood will appear to have been more especially necessary when we recollect that the quarrels of the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pēdiaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition. Moreover, it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Kleisthenes distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Peiræus and Phalerum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest. Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honor of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice; and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions—a capital amendment, compared with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable in part to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-free-men were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged, in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature. So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute, under the Kleisthenean system, for the Naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The Trittyes and Naukraries, though nominally preserved, and the latter augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenes preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly or Ekklesia—the preconsidering senate composed of members from all the tribes—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the Ekklesia. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean Ekklesia acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: moreover the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved) of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed no less directly the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover, there were

now created, for the first time, ten strategi or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon or polemarch, no strategi then existing. Even after the strategi had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten strategi, but even occupied the post of honor on the right wing. The ten generals annually changed are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by this remodeling of the military force. The functions of the generals became more extensive as the democracy advanced, so that they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the strategi on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency, on the other side, by the rise of the popular dikasteries or numerous jury-courts. We may be sure that these popular dikasteries had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter at the end of their year of office, to an acquiescent Ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature (over and above this annual trial of responsibility) had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenes, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate Heliaea, not less than as voters in the Ekklesia—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or panels for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematized; until at length, in the time of Perikles, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularize the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and whereby the judicial competence of the archon was cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small

fine. But the first steps of it are found in the revolution of Kleisthenes, and it seems to have been consummated after the battle of Plataea. Of the function exercised by the nine archons, as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a dikastery or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial, and presiding over the trial—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony or presidency of a dikastery—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military. The appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called Apodektæ, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. Of this board the first nomination is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenes as a substitute for certain persons called Kolakretæ, who had performed the same function before and who were now retained only for subordinate services. The duties of the Apodektæ were afterward limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess Athene, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenes. From his time forward too, the Senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the Ekklesia. It embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays. The year is distributed into ten portions called Prytanies—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of The Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year of twelve lunar months, or 354 days, six of the prytanies contained thirty-five days, four of them contained thirty-six: in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-senators into five bodies of ten each, was recognized. Each body of ten presided in the senate for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman called Epistates, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining senators, not belonging to the prytanising

tribe, might of course attend if they chose. But the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to insure a constant representation of the collective people.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the Ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required—usually by the senate, though the strategi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their Epistates or chairman. But the nine representatives of the non-prytanising tribes were always present, as a matter of course, and seem indeed in the days of the orators to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the Ekklesia, as first organized by Kleisthenes (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400–330 B.C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more; giving to the senate and the strategi power of convening special meetings if needful but establishing one Ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient Ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus, we cannot exactly say—probably but seldom during the year. Under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality. Hence the re-establishment of it by Kleisthenes, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the Ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men were thus trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarized with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This was an idea new to the Athenian bosom. With it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law—words which no Athenian citizen ever afterward heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact

that the opposing leader, Kleisthenes, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the Ekklesia are both Solonian—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm, altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of Greece, we shall hear presently from the lips of Herodotus, and shall find still more unequivocally marked in the facts of his history.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their Ekklesia, who received from Kleisthenes the real attributes of sovereignty—it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dikasts, or jurors. I have already remarked that this custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here again the building, afterward so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in the elaborate form in which they existed from Perikles downward, were introduced all at once by Kleisthenes, it is impossible to believe. Yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the Heliæa, or Heliasts; private offenses and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the Senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Kleisthenes, which afterward came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the Heliasts, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective Heliæa.

According to the subdivision, as practiced in the times best known, 6,000 citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, 600 from each of the ten tribes: 5,000 of these citizens were arranged in ten panels or decuries of 500 each, the remaining 1000 being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole 6,000 took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words; after which every man received

a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the *Thesmothets* or six inferior archons determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number wanted—next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. In the number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat together. The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is given to us as belonging to those times when the *dikasts* received a regular pay, after every day's sitting; and it can hardly have long continued without that condition, which was not realized before the time of Perikles. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called *the Heliæa*—a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly or *Heliæa* into sections of jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Kleisthenes, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Perikles called forth at last in completeness. Under the last mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon or polemarch withdrawn from all military functions. But this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the strategi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them; nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeides was archon—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeides formed one of the principal foundations of his honorable surname, the Just.

With this question as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenes in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon—next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that in the time of Perikles, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot—moreover all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the *Dokimasy*, or legal examination into their status of citizen and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidency over it when afterward assembled, together with the power of

imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders. Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratic ideas, was that it equalized the chance of office between rich and poor: but so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor. In fact, it would be less democratic than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself. Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, were indispensable—nor was it ever applied throughout the whole history of democratic Athens, to the strategi or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain, that at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dikasts or to the ten elected strategi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity—at least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; while the Dokimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Perikles, though chosen strategus year after year successively, was never archon; and it may be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labor, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offense to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable, either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken with out great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the Dokimasy before, and accountability after office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favor at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalize the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state—without applying it to all or to the most responsible and difficult. Hardly would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been

indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging, disputes and condemning offenders.

I think, therefore, that these three points—1. The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; 2. The choice of archons by lot; 3. The diminished range of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the strategi on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us that the oligarchic, but high-principled, Aristides was himself the proposer of this constitutional change, shortly after the battle of Plataea, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalized as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really "common" to all, and that the archons, strategi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility. No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us, that down to the invasion of Xerxes, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or Thetic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot. Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty; but we thus learn that Kleisthenes in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least. He recognized the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the strategus, etc. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. For his constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, ekklesia, and heliæa or dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined. And we may well suppose that

the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly enfranchised citizens had been before metics and slaves. Indeed it is to be added, that even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.

The choice of the strategi remained ever afterward upon the footing on which Aristeides thus placed it; but the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratic feeling—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was nevertheless not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the *Heliaæ*, or aggregate body of dikasts or jurors, into separate panels or dikasteries for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularized. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Perikles more fully consummated by insuring pay to the dikasts.

But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Plataæ. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens, as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenes. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Perikles to Demosthenes, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution:—1. It still recognized the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon or polemarch as joint military commander along with the strategi. 2. It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot. 3. It still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the *Pentakosiomedimni*) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenes opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeides, assuredly not a rich man, became archon. I am also inclined to believe that the senate of Five Hundred as constituted by Kleisthenes was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes—and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators all at once by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valu-

able; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock therefore to the feelings of semi-democratized Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenes is to be found in the position of the senate of Areopagus. Under the former, that senate had been the principal body in the state, and Solon had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as during the preceding thirty years every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenes and his partisans—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. Now during this important interval, the new-modeled senate of Five Hundred and the popular assembly stepped into that ascendancy which they never afterward lost. From the time of Kleisthenes forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state. Yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Plataea, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B.C.) were all elected by the ekklesia, not chosen by lot—and that the fourth or poorest and most numerous class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Perikles and Ephialtes, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenes, yet remains to be noticed—the ostracism; upon which I have already made some remarks in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much to say that without this protective process none of the other institutions would have reach maturity.

By the ostracism a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defense for a term of ten years—subsequently diminished to

five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise; and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenes, the conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiades fixed it upon Hyperbolus: the two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracizing vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated their own quarrel. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: "It was not against such men as him (said the comic writer Plato) that the shell was intended to be used." The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell or potsherd the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to banish; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote toward the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak—the good as well as the bad, the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded with his mercenary troop. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at pleasure preventive means, much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in my last chapter as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defense as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenes, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum. But we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere, absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any

constitution. Their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megakles, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter; and though Kleisthenes, the son of Megakles, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution, he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians were wise (Aristeides is reported to have said, in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistokles), they would cast both Themistokles and me into the barathrum." And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyraean sedition, in the third book of Thucydides, together with the reflections of the historian upon it, will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenes had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined, too, with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though

there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons; while the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full license of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenes, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the refuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens. But from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected. Accordingly, Kleisthenes had to find the means of eliminating beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterward, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes. Now the security which Kleisthenes provided was to call in the positive judgment of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies not a peculiar favor granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well-defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. “No law shall be made against any single citizen,

without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to 6,000 citizens voting secretly." Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure. If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell or a potsherd with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day the number of votes were summed up, and if 6,000 votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracized; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing. Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra-popular or privileged few. Nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgment of the people (so the Athenians felt), there was no appeal. Their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgment with the best securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy. Meanwhile in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy—the vote of ostracism—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenes, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy. Now the large minimum of votes required (one-fourth of the entire citizen population) went far to insure this effect—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Kleisthenes did not permit the process of ostracizing to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistokles could not invoke it against Aristides, nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader

to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecive hostility which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ekklesia; moreover, after all, the ekklesia did not itself ostracize, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. We must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracizing vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—“Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the state? if so, whom?”—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice—a perversion involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile. This is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence; and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted—evil, too, diminished in the cases of Kimon and Aristides, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer it the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force—a result upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenes could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered. To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing, yet militant democracy it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenes, was the last occasion of its employ-

ment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiades) to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a maneuver have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenes and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism: first of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots; then Aristides, Themistokles, Kimon, and Thucydides, son of Melesias, all of them renowned political leaders: also Alkibiades and Megakles (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiades), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens; lastly, Damon, the preceptor of Perikles in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy. In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenes himself is said to have been ostracized under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority too weak to trust. Miltiades was not ostracized at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

I should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Kleisthenes, if the erroneous accusations against the Athenian democracy, of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a certain amount of supporters, is as a matter of course excluded from the country. The Duke of Bordeaux cannot now reside in France—nor could Napoleon after 1815—nor Charles Edward in England during the last century. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism—with a stronger case in favor of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy, and not from justifiable fears—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenes. It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity on the

part both of the democracy and its best friends—fear perfectly well grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper, the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling that it might safely be dispensed with must have been strengthened by the long ascendancy of Perikles—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; and by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thucydides—aided by numerous partisans, and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since—in their attempts to get him ostracized. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens toward philosophers so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon; but Perikles himself (to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy the comic poet Kratinus) “holds his head as high as if he carried the Odeion upon it, now that the shell has gone by”—i. e. now that he has escaped the ostracism. If Perikles was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracized. Both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the 6,000 citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracized plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dis severed from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose—it lived to be twice dishonored—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos, at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states—the more so as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same

large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism—so the process was denominated at Syracuse.

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthenes and the unfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterward from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, toward the close of the career of Perikles. It was indeed a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshaled in the ranks of hoplites alongside of new companions in arms—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown—he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ekklesia at which he had a right to be present—his ekklesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution—his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribemen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign Demos or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; while to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenes and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favor, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomenes and the Lacedæmonians. Kleomenes listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenes, who, as belong-

ing to the Alkmæonid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megakles, the destroyer of the usurper Kylon. Kleomenes sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion "of the accursed"—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterward, when the same maneuver was practiced by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Perikles. This requisition, recommended by Isagoras, was so well-timed, that Kleisthenes, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily; so that Kleomenes, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile 700 families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenes. His next attempt was to dissolve the new senate of Five Hundred, and to place the whole government in the hands of 300 adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the senate of that day had only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. Now, the new senate of Kleisthenes resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, while the citizens generally, even after the banishment of the chief Kleisthenean partisans, manifested their feelings in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Kleomenes and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the defensive. This symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned, and executed by the people.

Kleisthenes, with the 700 exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernes, the Persian Satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance. He probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernes, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen on their return disavowed them with scorn and indignation.

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Platæa, situated on the northern slope

of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asopus—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this occasion that we first become acquainted with the Bœotians and their politics. In one of my preceding volumes, the Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Plataea had been (so the Thebans affirmed) their latest foundation; it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenes was on his way back from Athens, the Plataeans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craving the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendering their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia, and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Plataeans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they dispatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised. It was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Plataean territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favor of Plataea, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation. The Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and attacked the Athenians on their return, but sustained a complete defeat; a breach of faith which the Athenians avenged by joining to Plataea the portion of Theban territory south of the Asopus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Bœotia—as Kleomenes had foreseen. Their alliance with Plataea, long-continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion, productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

Meanwhile Kleomenes had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force. He summoned allies from all the various states of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted

measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions toward Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Plataea. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenes and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment toward Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favorably disposed rather than otherwise toward that city, resolved to proceed no farther, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, King Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. Two such examples, operating upon the pre-existing sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognized head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance, summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognized in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenes entered it. The former seized Cœnoe and Hysiæ, the frontier demes of Attica on the side toward Plataea; while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenes, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character—killing a large number, and capturing 700 prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in

chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man. Of the sum thus raised, a tenth was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw, too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the acropolis was burnt by Xerxes: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung.

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of 4,000 of their citizens as Kleruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ—proprieters probably in the fertile plain of Lelantum between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic Kleruchs (I can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birth-right as Athenian citizens. They were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name—but they correspond very nearly to the colonies formerly planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city; for though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labor for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct. Yet this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors, for the lands rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance or bequest or intermarriage to other proprietors for the most part in easy circumstances—since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. I shall enter more fully at a future opportunity into this question—the great and serious problem of population, as it affected the Greek communities generally, and as it was dealt with in theory by the powerful minds of Plato and Aristotle—at present it is sufficient to notice that the numerous Kleruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally,

according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to "solicit aid from those nearest to them." "How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbors, of Tanagra, Koroneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power." An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. "Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thebe (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asopus. Let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest. Envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans; who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamon and Peleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; so that the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes, and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens, without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon—then again breaking out—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxes, was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus, a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina—of which he gives the account in a singular narrative blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, etc. But at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalerum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist

them. It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes; but the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenes and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured. Moreover Kleomenes, when shut up in the acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realized—Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenes, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new era in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenes against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learnt the necessity, in order to insure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here then is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece toward a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units; first we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece—power, unrivaled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.: next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless: lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history: the proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in

which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him—their resentment and alarm at the newborn insolence of Athens, already tasted by her immediate neighbors, and menacing to every state represented in the convocation—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation of the past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias—no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now re-appeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosikles protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain. No language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. “Surely heaven and earth are about to change places—the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot. First try what it is for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you by the common gods of Hellas—plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you.”

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosikles in adjuring the Lacedæmonians “not to revolutionize any Hellenic city.” No one listened to Hippias when he replied, and warned the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. “He knew well (says Herodotus) that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man; but no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium; the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies.”

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind; fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies. The idea of a revolution (implying thereby an organic and comprehensive change of

which the party using the word disapproves) consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy; the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, and there prevails neither fear of Athens nor hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The anti-monarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathizing friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thucydides. It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandizement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to; but the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution and after the expulsion of Hippias is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds—“Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is; since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbors, but so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit.” The same comparison reappears a short time afterward, where he tells us that “the Athenians, when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission.”

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or from better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was,

the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign people, composed of free and equal citizens—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference (although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it) is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort. Herodotus, in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy “its most splendid name and promise”—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do; but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do; a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded, and which is even implied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon’s famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the senti-

ment here described only in its least honorable manifestations—in the caricatures of Aristophanes, or in the empty commonplaces of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value of democratic sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Perikles, while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchic Nicias in the harbor of Syracuse, when he is endeavoring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratic patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony. From the time of Kleisthenes downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character; and if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratic constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice toward it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed; the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens. We shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phenomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenes to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labor and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants, to the time of Demosthenes—(I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another)—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative; the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and insuring to him valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties toward it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendancy, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenes contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Charoneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a

source of protection and good government. That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip. Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever when the Macedonians were once organized under an enterprising and semi-Hellenized prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenes; that the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigor. During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratic fervor under Kleisthenes now opening—a feeling, which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

CHAPTER XXXII.

RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.—CYRUS.

IN the preceding chapter I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now revert to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them, at the point in which they were left in my seventeenth chapter.

The concluding facts recounted in that chapter were of sad and serious moment to the Hellenic world. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the

Lydian king Crœsus: "Down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free." Their conqueror, Crœsus, who ascended the throne in 560 B.C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyages, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising, in a south-eastern direction, Persis proper or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the east by the line of Mount Zagros (the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey). Babylon, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Assyrians or Chaldeans, under their king Labynetus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labor, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterward in its decline—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldean dominion under Labynetus reached to the borders of Egypt, including as dependent territories both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favorably disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynetus and with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and, as Astyages was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years, or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion; while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the Persian empire, first the subject and afterward the dethroner of the Median Astyages, corresponds to their general description, as far, at least, as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The *Cyropædia* of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel. That it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history, is only one proof among

many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyages, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambyzes and Mandane and grandson of Astyages, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast. Astyages, alarmed by a dream, condemns the newborn infant of his daughter Mandane to be exposed: Harpagus, to whom the order is given, delivers the child to one of the royal herdsmen, who exposes it in the mountains, where it is miraculously suckled by a bitch. Thus preserved, and afterward brought up as the herdsman's child, Cyrus manifests great superiority, both physical and mental, is chosen king in play by the boys of the village, and in this capacity severely chastises the son of one of the courtiers; for which offense he is carried before Astyages, who recognizes him for his grandson, but is assured by the Magi that the dream is out, and that he has no farther danger to apprehend from the boy—and therefore permits him to live. With Harpagus, however, Astyages is extremely incensed, for not having executed his orders: he causes the son of Harpagus to be slain, and served up to be eaten by his unconscious father at a regal banquet. The father, apprised afterward of the fact, dissembles his feelings, but meditates a deadly vengeance against Astyages for this Thyestean meal. He persuades Cyrus, who has been sent back to his father and mother in Persia, to head a revolt of the Persians against the Medes; whilst Astyages—to fill up the Grecian conception of madness as a precursor to ruin—sends an army against the revolters, commanded by Harpagus himself. Of course the army is defeated—Astyages, after a vain resistance, is dethroned—Cyrus becomes king in his place—and Harpagus repays the outrage which he has undergone by the bitterest insults.

Such are the heads of a beautiful narrative which is given at some length in Herodotus. It will probably appear to the reader sufficiently romantic; though the historian intimates that he had heard three other narratives different from it, and that all were more full of marvels, as well as in wider circulation, than his own, which he had borrowed from some unusually sober-minded Persian informants. In what points the other three stories departed from it we do not hear.

To the historian of Halikarnassus we have to oppose the physician of the neighboring town, Knidus—Ktesias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyages. However indignant we may be with Ktesias for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian, whose work is to us inestimable—we must nevertheless admit that, as surgeon in actual attendance on king Artaxerxes Mnemon, and healer of the wound

inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger, he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories. Herodotus himself was in fact compelled to choose one out of four. So rare and late a plant is historical authenticity.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural, and four nomadic tribes—all of them rude, hardy, and brave—dwelling in a mountainous region clothed in skins, ignorant of wine, or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another. First in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the first phratry or clan among the Pasargadæ were the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila, which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the empire, after the Persians, properly so called; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called “the Mede” as well as “the Persian.” The Median Ekbatana too remained as one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia; Susa on the Choaspes, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The vast space of country comprised between the Indus on the east, the Oxus and Caspian Sea to the north, the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the south, and the line of Mount Zagros to the west, appears to have been occupied in these times by a great variety of different tribes and people, yet all or most of them belonging to the religion of Zoroaster, and speaking dialects of the Zend language. It was known amongst its inhabitants by the common name of Iran or Aria: it is, in its central parts at least, a high, cold plateau, totally destitute of wood, and scantily supplied with water; much of it indeed is a salt and sandy desert, unsusceptible of culture. Parts of it are eminently fertile, where water can be procured and

Irrigation applied. Scattered masses of tolerably dense population thus grew up; but continuity of cultivation is not practicable, and in ancient times, as at present, a large proportion of the population of Iran seems to have consisted of wandering or nomadic tribes with their tents and cattle. The rich pastures, and the freshness of the summer climate, in the region of mountain and valley near Ekbatana, are extolled by modern travelers, just as they attracted the Great King in ancient times during the hot months. The more southerly province called Persis proper (Farsistan) consists also in part of mountain land interspersed with valley and plain, abundantly watered, and ample in pasture, sloping gradually down to low grounds on the sea-coast which are hot and dry: the care bestowed both by Medes and Persians, on the breeding of their horses, was remarkable. There were doubtless material differences between different parts of the population of this vast plateau of Iran. Yet it seems that along with their common language and religion, they had also something of a common character, which contrasted with the Indian population east of the Indus, the Assyrians west of Mount Zagros, and the Massagetæ and other Nomads of the Caspian and the Sea of Aral—less brutish, restless and blood-thirsty than the latter—more fierce, contemptuous, and extortionate, and less capable of sustained industry, than the two former. There can be little doubt, at the time of which we are now speaking, when the wealth and cultivation of Assyria were at their maximum, that Iran also was far better peopled than ever it has been since European observers have been able to survey it; especially the north-eastern portion, Baktria and Sogdiana; so that the invasions of the Nomads from Turkestan and Tartary, which have been so destructive at various intervals since the Mohammedan conquest, were before that period successfully kept back.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. If we may believe Ktesias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings. At first it resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyages, as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority.

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Cræsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyages, and before the conquest of Baktria. Cræsus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions. His more prudent councilors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son.

To ask advice of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit. But in the present perilous question, Cræsus did more—he took a précaution so extreme, that if his piety had not been placed beyond all doubt by his extraordinary munificence to the temples, he might have drawn upon himself the suspicion of a guilty scepticism. Before he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles—Delphi, Dodona, Branchidæ near Miletus, Amphiaraus at Thebes, Trophonius at Lebadeia, and Ammon in Libya. His envoys started from Sardis on the same day, and were all directed on the hundredth day afterward to ask at the respective oracles how Cræsus was at that precise moment employed. This was a severe trial: of the manner in which it was met by four out of the six oracles consulted we have no information, and it rather appears that their answers were unsatisfactory. But Amphiaraus maintained his credit undiminished, while Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision, as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. No sooner had the envoys put the question to the Delphian priestess, on the day named, “What is Cræsus now doing?” than she exclaimed in the accustomed hexameter verse, “I know the number of grains of sand, and the measures of the sea: I understand the dumb, and I hear the man who speaks not. The smell reaches me of a hardskinned tortoise boiled in a copper with lamb’s flesh—copper above and copper below.” Cræsus was awe-struck on receiving this reply. It described with the utmost detail that which he had been really doing, so that he accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaraus the only trustworthy oracles on earth—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favor of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver; besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in gold and silver—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, etc., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi. Nor was Cræsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaraus, whose answer had been creditable, though less triumphant than that of the Pythian priestess. He sent to Amphiaraus a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterward seen at Thebes by Herodotus: this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask at the same time, whether Cræsus should undertake an expedition against the Persians—and if so, whether he should solicit any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo

and of Amphiaraus was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question, their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity: they told Cræsus that if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Cræsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified promise of success: he sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable "When a mule shall become king of the Medes (replied the priestess) then must thou run away—be not ashamed."

More assured than ever by such an answer, Cræsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandrides and Aristo, to tender presents and solicit their alliance. His propositions were favorably entertained—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics; and that too without any of the generous Hellenic sympathy which afterward induced Athens to send her citizens across the Ægean. At this time Cræsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, whose contingents seem to have formed part of his army for the expedition now contemplated; an army consisting principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires: and Cræsus, marching across that river into the territory of the Syrians or Assyrians of Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria, with many of its surrounding dependencies, inflicting damage and destruction upon these distant subjects of Ekbatana. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defense considerably larger than that of Cræsus; trying at the same time, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result: after which Cræsus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, and collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis he dispatched envoys to Labynetus, king of Babylon; to Amasis, king of Egypt; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth month. In the mean time he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success. And on the part of the Lacedæmonians at least, there was no tardiness; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Cræsus was already ruined. Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive plan of his enemy. Pushing on with his army to Sardis

without delay, he obliged the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favorable to Lydian cavalry, which at that time (Herodotus tells us) was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus, employing a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable, placed in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold. The horsemen of Cræsus were thus obliged to dismount; nevertheless they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Cræsus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he sent pressing envoys of acceleration. For Sardis was considered impregnable—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmolus; it was well fortified everywhere except toward the mountain; and on that side the rock was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought unnecessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible in that quarter. But Hyrcæades, a Persian soldier, having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable; others followed his example, the stronghold was thus seized first, and the whole city speedily taken by storm.

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Cræsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle; the captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood. We are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktesias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought. It is certain that Cræsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambyses: Ktesias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barene, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The prudent counsel and remarks as to the relations between Persians and Lydians, whereby Cræsus is said by Herodotus to have first earned this favorable treatment, are hardly worth repeating; but the indignant remonstrance sent by Cræsus to the Delphian god is too characteristic to be passed over. He obtained permission from Cyrus

to lay upon the holy pavement of the Delphian temple the chains with which he had at first been bound. The Lydian envoys were instructed, after exhibiting to the god these humiliating memorials, to ask whether it was his custom to deceive his benefactors, and whether he was not ashamed to have encouraged the king of Lydia in an enterprise so disastrous? The god, condescending to justify himself by the lips of the priestess, replied—"Not even a god can escape his destiny. Cræsus has suffered for the sin of his fifth ancestor (Gyges), who, conspiring with a woman, slew his master and wrongfully seized the scepter. Apollo employed all his influence with the Mœræ (Fates) to obtain that this sin might be expiated by the children of Cræsus, and not by Cræsus himself; but the Mœræ would grant nothing more than a postponement of the judgment for three years. Let Cræsus know that Apollo has thus procured for him a reign three years longer than his original destiny, after having tried in vain to rescue him altogether. Moreover he sent that rain which at the critical moment extinguished the burning pile. Nor has Cræsus any right to complain of the prophecy by which he was encouraged to enter on the war; for when the god told him that he would subvert *a great empire*, it was his duty to have again inquired which empire the god meant; and if he neither understood the meaning, nor chose to ask for information, he has himself to blame for the result. Besides, Cræsus neglected the warning given to him, about the acquisition of the Median kingdom by a mule: Cyrus was that mule—son of a Median mother of royal breed, by a Persian father at once of different race and of lower position.

This triumphant justification extorted even from Cræsus himself a full confession that the sin lay with him, and not with the god. It certainly illustrates in a remarkable manner the theological ideas of the time. It shows us how much, in the mind of Herodotus, the facts of the centuries preceding his own, unrecorded as they were by any contemporary authority, tended to cast themselves into a sort of religious drama; the threads of the historical web being in part put together, in part originally spun, for the purpose of setting forth the religious sentiment and doctrine woven in as a pattern. The Pythian priestess predicts to Gyges that the crime which he had committed in assassinating his master would be expiated by his fifth descendant, though, as Herodotus tells us, no one took any notice of this prophecy until it was at last fulfilled: we see thus the history of the first Mermaid king is made up after the catastrophe of the last. There was something in the main facts of the history of Cræsus profoundly striking to the Greek mind. a king at the summit of wealth and power—pious in the extreme and munificent toward the gods—the first destroyer of Hellenic liberty in Asia—then precipitated, at once and on a sudden, into the abyss of ruin. The sin of the first parent helped much toward the solution of this perplexing problem as well as to exalt the credit of the oracle, when made to assume the shape of

an unnoticed prophecy. In the affecting story (discussed in a former chapter) of Solon and Cræsus, the Lydian king is punished with an acute domestic affliction because he thought himself the happiest of mankind—the gods not suffering any one to be arrogant except themselves; and the warning of Solon is made to recur to Cræsus after he has become the prisoner of Cyrus, in the narrative of Herodotus. To the same vein of thought belongs the story, just recounted, of the relations of Cræsus with the Delphian oracle. An account is provided, satisfactory to the religious feelings of the Greeks, how and why he was ruined—but nothing less than the overruling and omnipotent Mœræ could be invoked to explain so stupendous a result. It is rarely that these supreme goddesses—or hyper-goddesses, since the gods themselves must submit to them—are brought into such distinct light and action. Usually they are kept in the dark, or are left to be understood as the unseen stumbling-block in cases of extreme incomprehensibility; and it is difficult clearly to determine (as in the case of some complicated political constitutions) where the Greeks conceived sovereign power to reside, in respect to the government of the world. But here the sovereignty of the Mœræ, and the subordinate agency of the gods, are unequivocally set forth. The gods are still extremely powerful, because the Mœræ comply with their requests up to a certain point, not thinking it proper to be wholly inexorable; but their compliance is carried no farther than they themselves choose; nor would they, even in deference to Apollo, alter the original sentence of punishment for the sin of Gyges in the person of his fifth descendant—a sentence, moreover, which Apollo himself had formerly prophesied shortly after the sin was committed; so that, if the Mœræ had listened to his intercession on behalf of Cræsus, his own prophetic credit would have been endangered. Their unalterable resolution has predetermined the ruin of Cræsus, and the grandeur of the event is manifested by the circumstance, that even Apollo himself cannot prevail upon them to alter it, or to grant more than a three years' respite. The religious element must here be viewed as giving the form—the historical element as giving the matter only, and not the whole matter—of the story. These two elements will be found conjoined more or less throughout most of the history of Herodotus, though as we descend to later times, we shall find the latter element in constantly increasing proportion. His conception of history is extremely different from that of Thucydides, who lays down to himself the true scheme and purpose of the historian, common to him with the philosopher—to recount and interpret the past, as a rational aid toward prevision of the future.

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B.C. Sorely did the Ionic Greeks now repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Cræsus—though at the time when these

propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Cræsus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted. why this favorable exception was extended to them, we do not know.

The other continental Ionians and Æolians (exclusive of Miletus, and exclusive also of the insular cities which the Persians had no means of attacking), seized with alarm, began to put themselves in a condition of defense. It seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls; and the Phokæans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthonius, king of Tartessus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from Sparta. They doubtless were not unapprised that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Cræsus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phokæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succor against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer; nevertheless they dispatched to Phokæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs—who, perhaps persuaded by the Phokæans, sent Lakrines, one of their number, to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas—for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. “Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?” Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed—“I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and forswear themselves. If I live they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians.” To buy or sell appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice: for they carried out consistently one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.

This blank menace of Lakrines, an insulting provocation to the enemy rather than a real support to the distressed, was the only benefit which the Ionic Greeks derived from Sparta. They were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently however quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquest in the

East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning the large treasure captured, with authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Cræsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops. On hearing this news, Cyrus addressed himself to Cræsus (according to Herodotus) in terms of much wrath against the Lydians, and even intimated that he should be compelled to sell them all as slaves. Upon which Cræsus, full of alarm for his people, contended strenuously that Paktyas alone was in fault and deserving of punishment; but he at the same time advised Cyrus to disarm the Lydian population, and to enforce upon them both effeminate attire and habits of playing on the harp and shopkeeping. "By this process (he said) you will soon see them become women instead of men." This suggestion is said to have been accepted by Cyrus, and executed by his general Mazares. The conversation here reported, and the deliberate plan for enervating the Lydian character supposed to be pursued by Cyrus, is evidently a hypothesis imagined by some of the contemporaries or predecessors of Herodotus, to explain the contrast between the Lydian whom they saw before them, after two or three generations of slavery, and the old irresistible horsemen of whom they heard in fame, at the time when Cræsus was lord from the Halys to the Ægean Sea.

To return to Paktyas—he had commenced his revolt, come down to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabalus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazares was approaching at the head of an army dispatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kyme for protection as a suppliant. Presently arrived a menacing summons from Mezares, demanding that he should be given up forthwith, which plunged the Kymæans into profound dismay. The idea of giving up a suppliant to destruction was shocking to Grecian sentiment. They sent to solicit advice from the holy temple of Apollo at Branchidæ near Miletus; and the reply directed that Paktyas should be surrendered. Nevertheless, so ignominious did such a surrender appear, that Aristodikus and some other Kymæan citizens denounced the messengers as liars, and required that a more trustworthy deputation should be sent to consult the god. Aristodikus himself, forming one of the second body, stated the perplexity to the oracle, and received a repetition of the same answer; whereupon he proceeded to rob the birds' nests which existed in abundance in and about the temple. A voice from the inner oracular chamber

speedily arrested him, exclaiming—"Most impious of men, how darest thou do such things? Wilt thou snatch my suppliants from the temple itself?" Unabashed by the rebuke, Aristodikus replied—"Master, thus dost *thou* help suppliants thyself: and dost thou command the Kymæans to give up a suppliant?" "Yes, I do command it" (rejoined the god forthwith), in order that the crime may bring destruction upon you the sooner, and that you may not in future come to consult the oracle upon the surrender of suppliants."

The ingenuity of Aristodikus thus completely nullified the oracular response, and left the Kymæans in their original perplexity. Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylene, whither the envoys of Mazares followed and demanded him; offering a reward so considerable, that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios, where he took refuge in the temple of Athene Poliuchus. But here again the pursuers followed. The Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos, as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture, hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit. But it appears that the territory of Atarneus was considered as having been ignominiously acquired by the Chians: none even of their own citizens would employ any article of its produce for holy or sacrificial purposes.

Mazares next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. The Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced one after the other. With all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Cræsus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Miletus, and because they had since given additional offense by aiding the revolt of Paktyas. The inhabitants of Priene were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazares, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.

Among these unfortunate towns thus changing their master and passing into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice—Teos and Phokæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdera—others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria: a portion of them, however, must have remained to take the

chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic.

The fate of Phokæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the west. I have already described their adventurous exploring voyages of former days into the interior of the Adriatic, and along the whole northern and western coasts of the Mediterranean as far as Tartessus (the region around and adjoining to Cadiz)—together with the favorable reception given to them by old Arganthonius, king of the country, who invited them to immigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phokæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; and he then manifested his good will toward them by a large present to defray the expense of constructing fortifications round their town. The walls, erected in part by this aid, were both extensive and well built. Yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with offers of a moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed. The Phokæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that during that day Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating at the same time that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phokæans, having determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on shipboard their wives and children as well as their furniture and the movable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios. At least when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighboring islands of Cænussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement; while Arganthonius, their protector, being now dead, Tartessus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phokæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phokæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phokæa, surprised the Persian gar-

riſon whom Harpagus had left in the town, and ſlew them. They then ſunk in the harbor a great lump of iron, binding themſelves by a ſolemn and unanimous oath never again to ſee Phokæa until that iron ſhould come up to the ſurface. Nevertheless, in ſpite of the oath, the voyage of exile had been ſcarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having ſo bound themſelves—and became homesick. They broke their vow and returned to Phokæa. Yet ſince Herodotus does not mention any divine judgment as having been conſequent on the perjury, we may perhaps ſuſpect that ſome gray-headed citizen, to whom transportation to Corsica might be little leſs than a ſentence of death, both perſuaded himſelf, and certified to his companions, that he had ſeen the ſunken lump of iron raiſed up and floating for a while buoyant upon the waves. Harpagus muſt have been induced to pardon the previous ſlaughter of his Perſian garrifon, or at leaſt to believe that it had been done by thoſe Phokæans who ſtill perſiſted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying ſubjects, not an empty military poſt, and the repentant home-ſeekers were allowed to number themſelves among the ſlaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the ſmaller but more reſolute half of the Phokæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in ſixty pentekonters or armed ſhips, and eſtabliſhed themſelves along with the previous ſettlers. They remained there for five years, during which time their indifcriminate piracies had become ſo intolerable (even down to this time, piracy committed againſt a foreign veſſel ſeems to have been practiced frequently and without much diſrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian ſea-poſts along the Mediterranean coaſt of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There ſubſiſted particular treaties between theſe two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preſerved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B.C.) may be conſidered as a ſpecimen. Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuſcan ſhips, attacking the ſixty Phokæan ſhips near Alalia, deſtroyed forty of them, yet without ſuch ſevere loſs to themſelves that the victory was ſaid to be on the ſide of the latter; who, however, in ſpite of this Kadmeian victory (ſo a battle was denominated in which the victors loſt more than the vanquiſhed), were compelled to carry back their remaining twenty veſſels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in ſo far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At laſt theſe unhappy exiles found a permanent home by eſtabliſhing the new ſettlement of Elea or Velia in the Gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coaſt (then called CEnotrian) ſouthward from Poſeidonia or Pæſtium. It is probable that they were here joined by other exiles from Ionia, in particular by the Kolophonian philoſopher and poet Xenophanes, from whom what was afterward called the Eleatic ſchool of philoſophy, diſtinguiſhed both for bold conſiſtency and

dialectic acuteness, took its rise. The Phokæan captives, taken prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death. But a divine judgment overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterward, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.

Such was the fate of the Phokæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks, except Samos and Miletus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enroll themselves as Persian subjects both of them possessing strips of the main-land which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykrates, a higher degree of power than ever: perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favored the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency. One of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priene, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom (he urged) was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbors. The proposition found no favor; the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phokæan majority. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation and regrets that it was not acted upon. Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle. Neither Karians nor Kaunians offered any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate

defense. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands; consuming in the flames their women, children, and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy. Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defense and easy submission of the Greeks of Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. The want of steadfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or rather upon that mixture of indigenious with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Cræsus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria, of which I shall speak in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GROWTH OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE.

IN the preceding chapter an account has been given, the best which we can pick out from Herodotus, of the steps by which the Asiatic Greeks became subject to Persia. If his narrative is meager, on a matter which vitally concerned not only so many of his brother Greeks, but even his own native city, we can hardly expect that he should tell us much respecting the other conquests of Cyrus. He seems to withhold intentionally various details which had come to his knowledge, and merely intimates in general terms that while Harpagus was engaged on the coast of the Ægean, Cyrus himself assailed and subdued all the nations of Upper Asia "not omitting any one of them." He alludes to the Baktrians and the Sakæ, who are also named by Ktesias as having become subject partly by force, partly by capitulation. But he deems only two of the exploits of Cyrus worthy of special notice—the conquest of Babylon, and the final expedition against the Massagetæ. In the short abstract which we now possess of the lost work of Ktesias, no mention appears of the

important conquest of Babylon. His narrative, indeed, as far as the abstract enables us to follow it, diverges materially from that of Herodotus, and must have been founded on data altogether different.

“I shall mention (says Herodotus) those conquests which gave Cyrus most trouble, and are most memorable: after he had subdued all the rest of the continent, he attacked the Assyrians.” Those who recollect the description of Babylon and its surrounding territory, as given in a former chapter, will not be surprised to learn that the capture of it gave the Persian aggressor much trouble. Their only surprise will be, how it could ever have been taken at all—or indeed how a hostile army could have even reached it. Herodotus informs us that the Babylonian queen Nitokris (mother of that very Laby-netus who was king when Cyrus attacked the place) apprehensive of invasion from the Medes after their capture of Nineveh, had executed many laborious works near the Euphrates for the purpose of obstructing their approach. Moreover there existed what was called the wall of Media (probably built by her, but certainly built prior to the Persian conquest), one hundred feet high and twenty feet thick, across the entire space of seventy-five miles which joined the Tigris with one of the canals of the Euphrates: while the canals themselves, as we may see by the march of the Ten Thousand Greeks after the battle of Kunaxa, presented means of defense altogether insuperable by a rude army such as that of the Persians. On the east, the territory of Babylonia was defended by the Tigris, which cannot be forded lower than the ancient Nineveh or the modern Mosul. In addition to these ramparts, natural as well as artificial, to protect the territory—populous, cultivated, productive, and offering every motive to its inhabitants to resist even the entrance of an enemy—we are told that the Babylonians were so thoroughly prepared for the inroad of Cyrus that they had accumulated within their walls a store of provisions for many years. Strange as it may seem, we must suppose that the king of Babylon, after all the cost and labor spent in providing defenses for the territory, voluntarily neglected to avail himself of them, suffered the invader to tread down the fertile Babylonia without resistance, and merely drew out the citizens to oppose him when he arrived under the walls of the city—if the statement of Herodotus is correct. And we may illustrate this unaccountable omission by that which we know to have happened in the march of the younger Cyrus to Kunaxa against his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon. The latter had caused to be dug, expressly in preparation for this invasion, a broad and deep ditch (thirty feet wide and eight feet deep) from the wall of Media to the river Euphrates, a distance of twelve parasangs or forty-five English miles, leaving only a passage of twenty feet broad close alongside of the river. Yet when the invading army arrived at this important pass, they found not a man there to defend it, and all of them marched without resistance through the narrow inlet. Cyrus the younger, who had up to that moment felt assured that his

brother would fight, now supposed that he had given up the idea of defending Babylon: instead of which, two days afterward, Artaxerxes attacked him on an open plain of ground where there was no advantage of position on either side; though the invaders were taken rather unawares in consequence of their extreme confidence arising from recent unopposed entrance within the artificial ditch. This anecdote is the more valuable as an illustration, because all its circumstances are transmitted to us by a discerning eye-witness. And both the two incidents here brought into comparison demonstrate the recklessness, changefulness, and incapacity of calculation belonging to the Asiatic mind of that day—as well as the great command of hands possessed by these kings, and their prodigal waste of human labor. We shall see, as we advance in this history, farther evidences of the same attributes, which it is essential to bear in mind, for the purpose of appreciating both Grecian dealing with Asiatics, and the comparative absence of such defects in the Grecian character. Vast walls and deep ditches are an inestimable aid to a brave and well-commanded garrison; but they cannot be made entirely to supply the want of bravery and intelligence.

In whatever manner the difficulties of approaching Babylon may have been overcome, the fact that they were overcome by Cyrus is certain. On first setting out for this conquest, he was about to cross the river Gyndes (one of the affluents from the east which joins the Tigris near the modern Bagdad, and along which lay the high road crossing the pass of Mount Zagros from Babylon to Ekbatana), when one of the sacred white horses, which accompanied him, entered the river in pure wantonness and tried to cross it by himself. The Gyndes resented this insult and the horse was drowned: upon which Cyrus swore in his wrath that he would so break the strength of the river as that women in future should pass it without wetting their knees. Accordingly he employed his entire army, during the whole summer season, in digging three hundred and sixty artificial channels to disseminate the unity of the stream. Such, according to Herodotus, was the incident which postponed for one year the fall of the great Babylon. But in the next spring Cyrus and his army were before the walls, after having defeated and driven in the population who came out to fight. These walls were artificial mountains (three hundred feet high, seventy-five feet thick, and forming a square of fifteen miles to each side), within which the besieged defied attack, and even blockade, having previously stored up several years' provision. Through the midst of the town, however, flowed the Euphrates. That river, which had been so laboriously trained to serve for protection, trade and sustenance to the Babylonians, was now made the avenue of their ruin. Having left a detachment of his army at the two points where the Euphrates enters and quits the city, Cyrus retired with the remainder to the higher part of its course, where an ancient Babylonian queen had prepared one of the great lateral reser-

voirs for carrying off in case of need the superfluity of its water. Near this point Cyrus caused another reservoir and another canal or communication to be dug, by means of which he drew off the water of the Euphrates to such a degree it became not above the height of a man's thigh. The period chosen was that of a great Babylonian festival, when the whole population were engaged in amusement and revelry. The Persian troops left near the town, watching their opportunity, entered from both sides along the bed of the river, and took it by surprise with scarcely any resistance. At no other time, except during a festival, could they have done this (says Herodotus) had the river been ever so low, for both banks throughout the whole length of the town were provided with quays, with continuous walls, and with gates at the end of every street which led down to the river at right angles; so that if the population had not been disqualified by the influences of the moment, they would have caught the assailants in the bed of the river "as in a trap," and overwhelmed them from the walls alongside. Within a square of fifteen miles to each side, we are not surprised to hear that both the extremities were already in the power of the besiegers before the central population heard of it, and while they were yet absorbed in unconscious festivity.

Such is the account given by Herodotus of the circumstances which placed Babylon—the greatest city of Western Asia—in the power of the Persians. To what extent the information communicated to him was incorrect or exaggerated, we cannot now decide. The way in which the city was treated would lead us to suppose that its acquisition cannot have cost the conquerer either much time or much loss. Cyrus comes into the list as king of Babylon, and the inhabitants with their whole territory become tributary to the Persians, forming the richest satrapy in the empire; but we do not hear that the people were otherwise ill-used, and it is certain that the vast walls and gates were left untouched. This was very different from the way in which the Medes had treated Nineveh, which seems to have been ruined and for a long time absolutely uninhabited, though re-occupied on a reduced scale under the Parthian empire; and very different also from the way in which Babylon itself was treated twenty years afterward by Darius, when reconquered after a revolt.

The importance of Babylon, marking as it does one of the peculiar forms of civilization belonging to the ancient world in a state of full development, gives an interest even to the half-authenticated stories respecting its capture. The other exploits ascribed to Cyrus—his invasion of India, across the desert of Arachosia—and his attack upon the Massagetæ, Nomads ruled by queen Tomyris and greatly resembling the Scythians, across the mysterious river which Herodotus calls Araxes—are too little known to be at all dwelt upon. In the latter he is said to have perished, his army being defeated in a bloody battle. He was buried at Pasargadæ, in his native province of Persis proper, where his tomb was honored and watched until the

breaking up of the empire, while his memory was held in profound veneration among the Persians. Of his real exploits we know little or nothing, but in what we read respecting him there seems, though amidst constant fighting, very little cruelty. Xenophon has selected his life as the subject of a moral romance, which for a long time was cited as authentic history, and which even now serves as an authority, express or implied, for disputable and even incorrect conclusions. His extraordinary activity and conquests admit of no doubt. He left the Persian empire extending from Sogdiana and the rivers Jaxartes and Indus eastward, to the Hellespont and the Syrian coast westward, and his successors made no permanent addition to it except that of Egypt. Phenicia and Judæa were dependencies of Babylon, at the time when he conquered it, with their princes and grandees in Babylonian captivity. As they seem to have yielded to him, and became his tributaries, without difficulty; so the restoration of their captives was conceded to them. It was from Cyrus that the habits of the Persian kings took commencement, to dwell at Susa in the winter, and Ekbatana during the summer; the primitive territory of Persis, with its two towns of Persepolis and Pasargadæ, being reserved for the burial-place of the kings and the religious sanctuary of the empire. How or when the conquest of Susiana was made, we are not informed. It lay eastward of the Tigris, between Babylonia and Persis proper, and its people, the Kissians, as far as we can discern, were of Assyrian and not of Arian race. The river Choaspes near Susa was supposed to furnish the only water fit for the palate of the Great King, and it is said to have been carried about with him wherever he went.

While the conquests of Cyrus contributed to assimilate the distinct types of civilization in Western Asia—not by elevating the worse, but by degrading the better—upon the native Persians themselves they operated as an extraordinary stimulus, provoking alike their pride, ambition, cupidity, and warlike propensities. Not only did the territory of Persis proper pay no tribute to Susa or Ekbatana—being the only district so exempted between the Jaxartes and the Mediterranean—but the vast tributes received from the remaining empire were distributed to a great degree among its inhabitants. Empire to them meant—for the great men, lucrative satrapies or pachalics, with powers altogether unlimited, pomp inferior only to that of the Great King, and standing armies which they employed at their own discretion sometimes against each other—for the common soldiers, drawn from their fields or flocks, constant plunder, abundant maintenance, and an unrestrained licence, either in the suite of one of the satraps, or in the large permanent troop which moved from Susa to Ekbatana with the Great King. And if the entire population of Persis proper did not migrate from their abodes to occupy some of those more inviting spots which the immensity of the imperial dominion furnished—a dominion extending (to use the language of Cyrus the

younger before the battle of Kunaxa) from the region of insupportable heat to that of insupportable cold—this was only because the early kings discouraged such a movement, in order that the nation might maintain its military hardihood and be in a situation to furnish undiminished supplies of soldiers. The self-esteem and arrogance of the Persians were no less remarkable than their avidity for sensual enjoyment. They were fond of wine to excess: their wives and their concubines were both numerous; and they adopted eagerly from foreign nations new fashions of luxury as well as of ornament. Even to novelties in religion, they were not strongly averse. For though disciples of Zoroaster, with Magi as their priests and as indispensable companions of their sacrifices, worshiping Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, etc., and recognizing neither image, temple, nor altar—yet they had adopted the voluptuous worship of the goddess Mylitta from the Assyrians and Arabians. A numerous male offspring was the Persian's boast. His warlike character and consciousness of force were displayed in the education of these youths, who were taught, from five years old to twenty, only three things—to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth. To owe money, or even to buy and sell, was accounted among the Persians disgraceful—a sentiment which they defended by saying that both the one and the other imposed the necessity of telling falsehood. To exact tribute from subjects, to receive pay or presents from the king, and to give away without forethought whatever was not immediately wanted, was their mode of dealing with money. Industrious pursuits were left to the conquered, who were fortunate if by paying a fixed contribution and sending a military contingent when required, they could purchase undisturbed immunity for their remaining concerns. They could not thus purchase safety for the family hearth, since we find instances of noble Grecian maidens torn from their parents for the harem of the satrap.

To a people of this character, whose conceptions of political society went no farther than personal obedience to a chief, a conqueror like Cyrus would communicate the strongest excitement and enthusiasm of which they were capable. He had found them slaves, and made them masters: he was the first and greatest of national benefactors, as well as the most forward of leaders in the field: they followed him from one conquest to another, during the thirty years of his reign, their love of empire growing with the empire itself. And this impulse of aggrandizement continued unabated during the reigns of his three next successors—Kambyses, Darius, and Xerxes—until it was at length violently stifled by the humiliating defeats of Plataea and Salamis; after which the Persians became content with defending themselves at home and playing a secondary game. But at the time when Kambyses son of Cyrus succeeded to his father's scepter, Persian spirit was at its highest point. He was not long in fixing upon a prey both richer and less hazardous than the Massagetae,

at the opposite extremity of the empire. Phenicia and Judæa being already subject to him, he resolved to invade Egypt, then highly flourishing under the long and prosperous reign of Amasis. Not much pretense was needed to color the aggression; so that the various stories which Herodotus mentions as causes of the war, are only interesting inasmuch as they imply a vein of Egyptian party-feeling—affirming that the invasion was brought upon Amasis by a daughter of Apries, and was thus a judgment upon Amasis for having deposed Apries. As to the manner in which the daughter had produced this effect, indeed, the most contradictory stories were circulated.

Kambyses summoned the forces of his empire for this new enterprise, and among them both the Phenicians and the Asiatic Greeks, Æolic as well as Ionic, insular as well as continental—nearly all the maritime force and skill of the Ægean sea. He was apprised by a Greek deserter from the mercenaries in Egypt, named Phanes, of the difficulties of the march, and the best method of surmounting them; especially the three days of sandy desert, altogether without water, which lay between Egypt and Judæa. By the aid of the neighboring Arabians—with whom he concluded a treaty, and who were required for this service with the title of equal allies, free from all tribute—he was enabled to surmount this serious difficulty, and to reach Pelusium at the eastern mouth of the Nile, where the Ionian and Karian troops in the Egyptian service, as well as the Egyptian military, were assembled to oppose him.

Fortunately for himself the Egyptian king Amasis had died during the interval of the Persian preparations, a few months before the expedition took place—after forty-four years of unabated prosperity. His death, at this critical moment, was probably the main cause of the easy conquest which followed; his son, Psammenitus, succeeding to his crown, but neither to his abilities nor his influence. The result of the invasion was foreshadowed, as usual, by a menacing prodigy—rain falling at Thebes in upper Egypt. It was brought about by a single victory, though bravely disputed, at Pelusium—followed by the capture of Memphis with the person of king Psammenitus, after a siege of some duration. Kambyses had sent forward a Mitylenæan ship to Memphis with heralds to summon the city. The Egyptians, in a paroxysm of fury, rushed out of the walls, destroyed the vessel, and tore the crew into pieces—a savage proceeding which drew upon them severe retribution after the capture. Psammenitus, after being at first treated with harshness and insult, was at length released and even allowed to retain his regal dignity as a dependent of Persia. But being soon detected, or at least believed to be concerned, in raising revolt against the conquerors, he was put to death, and Egypt was placed under a satrap.

There yet lay beyond Egypt territories for the Persians to conquer, though Kyrene and Barka, the Greek colonies near the coast of Libya, placed themselves at once out of the reach of danger by send-

ing to Kambyzes tribute and submission at Memphis. He projected three new enterprises: one against Carthage by sea; the other two by land—against the Ethiopians, far to the southward up the course of the Nile—and against the oracle and oasis of Zeus Ammon, amidst the deserts of Libya. Towards Ethiopia he himself conducted his troops but was compelled to bring them back without reaching it, since they were on the point of perishing with famine; while the division which he sent against the temple of Ammon is said to have been overwhelmed by a sand-storm in the desert. The expedition against Carthage was given up for a reason which well deserves to be commemorated. The Phenicians, who formed the most efficient part of his navy, refused to serve against their kinsmen and colonists, pleading the sanctity of mutual oaths as well as the ties both of relationship and traffic. Even the frantic Kambyzes was compelled to accept, and perhaps to respect, this honorable refusal, which was not imitated by the Ionic Greeks when Darius and Xerxes demanded the aid of their ships against Athens—we must add, however, that they were then in a situation much more exposed and helpless than that in which the Phenicians stood before Kambyzes.

Among the sacred animals so numerous and so different throughout the various nomes of Egypt, the most venerated of all was the bull Apis. Such peculiar conditions were required by the Egyptian religion as to the birth, the age, and the marks of this animal, that when he died it was difficult to find a new calf properly qualified to succeed him. Much time was sometimes spent in the search, and when an unexceptionable successor was at last found the demonstrations of joy in Memphis were extravagant and universal. At the moment when Kambyzes returned to Memphis from his Ethiopian expedition, full of humiliation for the result, it so happened that a new Apis was just discovered; and as the population of the city gave vent to their usual festive pomp and delight, he construed it into an intentional insult toward his own recent misfortunes. In vain did the priests and magistrates explain to him the real cause of these popular manifestations. He persisted in his belief, punished some of them with death and others with stripes, and commanded every man seen in holiday attire to be slain. Farthermore—to carry his outrage against Egyptian feeling to the uttermost pitch—he sent for the newly-discovered Apis, and plunged his dagger into the side of the animal, who shortly afterward died of the wound.

After this brutal deed—calculated to efface in the minds of the Egyptian priests the enormities of Cheops and Chephren, and doubtless unparalleled in all the 24,000 years of their anterior history—Kambyzes lost every spark of reason which yet remained to him. The Egyptians found in this visitation a new proof of the avenging interference of their gods. Not only did he commit every variety of studied outrage against the conquered people among whom he was tarrying, as well as their temples and their sepulchers—but he also

dealt his blows against his Persian friends and even his nearest blood-relations. Among these revolting atrocities, one of the greatest deserves peculiar notice, because the fate of the empire was afterward materially affected by it. His younger brother, Smerdis, had accompanied him into Egypt, but had been sent back to Susa because the king became jealous of the admiration which his personal strength and qualities called forth. That jealousy was aggravated into alarm and hatred by a dream portending dominion and conquest to Smerdis, and the frantic Kambyses sent to Susa secretly a confidential Persian, Prexaspes, with the express orders to get rid of his brother. Prexaspes fulfilled his commission effectively, burying the slain prince with his own hands, and keeping the deed concealed from all except a few of the chiefs at the regal residence.

Among these few chiefs, however, there was one, the Median Patizeithes, belonging to the order of the Magi, who saw in it a convenient stepping-stone for his own personal ambition, and made use of it as a means of covertly supplanting the dynasty of the great Cyrus. Enjoying the full confidence of Kambyses, he had been left by that prince on departing for Egypt in the entire management of the palace and treasures, with extensive authority. Moreover he happened to have a brother extremely resembling in person the deceased Smerdis. As the open and dangerous madness of Kambyses contributed to alienate from him the minds of the Persians, Patizeithes resolved to proclaim his brother as king in his room, as if it were the younger son of Cyrus succeeding to the disqualified elder. On one important point, the false Smerdis differed from the true. He had lost his ears, which Cyrus himself had caused to be cut off for an offense; but the personal resemblance, after all, was of little importance, since he was seldom or never allowed to show himself to the people. Kambyses heard of this revolt in Syria on his return from Egypt. He was mounting his horse in haste for the purpose of going to suppress it, when an accident from his sword put an end to his life. Herodotus tells us that before his death he summoned the Persians around him, confessed that he had been guilty of putting his brother to death, and apprised them that the reigning Smerdis was only a Median pretender—conjuring them at the same time not to submit to the disgrace of being ruled by any other than a Persian and an Achæmenid. But if it be true that he ever made known the facts, no one believed him. For Prexaspes on his part was compelled by regard to his own safety, to deny that he had imbrued his hands in the blood of a son of Cyrus; and thus the opportune death of Kambyses placed the false Smerdis without opposition at the head of the Persians, who all, or for the most part, believed themselves to be ruled by a genuine son of Cyrus. Kambyses had reigned for seven years and five months.

For seven months did Smerdis reign without opposition, seconded by his brother Patizeithes. If he manifested his distrust of the haughty Persians around him by neither inviting them into his palace

nor showing himself out of it, he at the same time studiously conciliated the favor of the subject-provinces, by remission of tribute and of military service for three years. Such a departure from the Persian principle of government was in itself sufficient to disgust the warlike and rapacious Achæmenids at Susa; but it seems that their suspicions as to his genuine character had never been entirely set at rest, and in the eighth month those suspicions were converted into certainty. According to what seems to have been the Persian usage, he had taken to himself the entire harem of his predecessor, among whose wives was numbered Phædyme, daughter of a distinguished Persian named Otanes. At the instance of her father, Phædyme undertook the dangerous task of feeling the head of Smerdis while he slept, and thus detected the absence of ears. Otanes, possessed of the decisive information, lost no time in concerting, with five other noble Achæmenids, means for ridding themselves of a king who was at once a Mede, a Magian, and a man without ears; Darius, son of Hystaspes the satrap of Persis proper, arriving just in time to join the conspiracy as the seventh. How these seven noblemen slew Smerdis in his palace at Susa—how they subsequently debated among themselves whether they should establish in Persia a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a democracy—how, after the first of the three had been resolved upon, it was determined that the future king, whichever he might be, should be bound to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators—how Darius became king from the circumstance of his horse being the first to neigh among those of the conspirators at a given spot, by the stratagem of the groom Œbares—how Otanes, standing aside beforehand from this lottery for the throne, reserved for himself as well as for his descendants perfect freedom and exemption from the rule of the future king, whichever might draw the prize—all these incidents may be found recounted by Herodotus with his usual vivacity, but with no small addition of Hellenic ideas as well as of dramatic ornament.

It was thus that the upright tiara, the privileged head-dress of the Persian kings, passed away from the lineage of Cyrus, yet without departing from the great phratry of the Achæmenidæ—to which Darius and his father Hystaspes, as well as Cyrus, belonged. That important fact is unquestionable, and probably the acts ascribed to the seven conspirators are in the main true, apart from their discussions and intentions. But, on this as well as on other occasions, we must guard ourselves against an illusion which the historical manner of Herodotus is apt to create. He presents to us with so much descriptive force the personal narrative—individual action and speech, with all its accompanying hopes, fears, doubts and passions—that our attention is distracted from the political bearing of what is going on; which we are compelled often to gather up from hints in the speeches of performers, or from consequences afterwards indirectly noticed. When we put together all the incidental notices

which he lets drop, it will be found that the change of scepter from Smerdis to Darius was a far larger political event than his direct narrative would seem to announce. Smerdis represents preponderance to the Medes over the Persians, and comparative degradation to the latter; who, by the installation of Darius, are again placed in the ascendant. The Medes and the Magians are in this case identical; for the Magians, though indispensable in the capacity of priests to the Persians, were essentially one of the seven Median tribes. It thus appears that though Smerdis ruled as a son of the great Cyrus, yet he ruled by means of Medes and Magians, depriving the Persians of that supreme privilege and predominance to which they had become accustomed. We see this by what followed immediately after the assassination of Smerdis and his brother in the palace. The seven conspirators, exhibiting the bloody heads of both these victims as an evidence of their deed, instigated the Persians in Susa to a general massacre of the Magians, many of whom were actually slain, and the rest only escaped by flight, concealment, or the hour of night. And the anniversary of this day was celebrated afterward among the Persians by a solemnity and festival, called the Mago-phonia; no Magian being ever allowed on that day to appear in public. The descendants of the Seven maintained a privileged name and rank, even down to the extinction of the monarchy by Alexander the Great.

Furthermore, it appears that the authority of Darius was not readily acknowledged throughout the empire, and that an interval of confusion ensued before it became so. The Medes actually revolted, and tried to maintain themselves by force against Darius, who, however, found means to subdue them: though when he convoked his troops from the various provinces, he did not receive from the satraps universal obedience. The powerful Orœtes especially, who had been appointed by Cyrus satrap of Lydia and Ionia, not only sent no troops to the aid of Darius against the Medes, but even took advantage of the disturbed state of the government to put to death his private enemy Mitrobates satrap of Phrygia, and appropriate that satrapy in addition to his own. Aryandes also, the satrap nominated by Kambyes in Egypt, comported himself as the equal of Darius rather than as his subject. The subject provinces generally, to whom Smerdis had granted remission of tribute and military service for the space of three years, were grateful and attached to his memory, and noway pleased with the new dynasty. Moreover the revolt of the Babylonians, conceived a year or two before it was executed, took its rise from the feelings of this time. But the renewal of the old conflict between the two principal sections of the empire, Medes and Persians, is doubtless the most important feature in this political revolution. The false Smerdis with his brother, both of them Medes and Magians, had revived the Median nationality to a state of supremacy over the Persian, recalling the memory of what it had been under

Astyages; while Darius—a pure Persian, and not (like the mule Cyrus) half Mede and half Persian—replaced the Persian nationality in its ascendant condition, though not without the necessity of suppressing by force a rebellion of the Medes.

It has already been observed that the subjugation of the reculant Medes was not the only embarrassment of the first years of Darius. Orætes, satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, ruling seemingly the entire western coast of Asia Minor—possessing a large military force and revenue, and surrounded by a body-guard of 1000 native Persians—maintained a haughty independence. He secretly made away with couriers sent to summon him to Susa, and even wreaked his vengeance upon some of the principal Persians who had privately offended him. Darius, not thinking it prudent to attack him by open force, proposed to the chief Persians at Susa the dangerous problem of destroying him by stratagem. Thirty among them volunteered to undertake it, and Bagæus, son of Artontes, to whom on drawing lots the task devolved, accomplished it by a maneuver which might serve as a lesson to the Ottoman government in its embarrassments with contumacious Pashas. Having proceeded to Sardis furnished with many different royal ordinances, formally set forth and bearing the seal of Darius, he was presented to Orætes in audience, with the public secretary of the satrapy close at hand, and the Persian guards standing around. He presented his ordinances to be read aloud by the secretary, choosing first those which related to matters of no great importance; but when he saw that the guards listened with profound reverence, and that the king's name and seal imposed upon them irresistibly, he ventured upon the real purport of his perilous mission. An ordinance was handed to the secretary, and read by him aloud, as follows: "Persians, king Darius forbids you to serve any longer as guards to Orætes." The obedient guards at once delivered up their spears, when Bagæus caused the final warrant to be read to them: "King Darius commands the Persians in Sardis to kill Orætes." The guards drew their swords and killed him on the spot: his large treasure was conveyed to Susa: Darius became undisputed master, and probably Bagæus satrap.

Another devoted adherent, and another yet more memorable piece of cunning, laid prostrate before Darius the mighty walls and gates of the revolted Babylon. The inhabitants of that city had employed themselves assiduously—both during the lax provincial superintendence of the false Smerdis and during the period of confusion and conflict which elapsed before Darius became firmly established and obeyed—in making every preparation both for declaring and sustaining their independence. Having accumulated a large store of provisions and other requisites for a long siege, without previous detection, they at length proclaimed their independence openly. Such was the intensity of their resolution to shake off the yoke, that they had recourse to a proceeding, which, if correctly reported by Herodo-

tus, forms one of the most frightful enormities recorded in his history. To make their provisions last out longer, they strangled all the women in the city, reserving only their mothers, and one woman to each family for the purpose of baking. We cannot but suppose that this has been magnified from a partial into a universal destruction; but taking it even with such allowance, it illustrates that ferocious force of will—and that predominance of strong nationality, combined with antipathy to foreigners, over all the gentler sympathies—which seems to mark the Semitic nations, and which may be traced so conspicuously in the Jewish history of Josephus.

Darius, assembling all the forces in his power, laid siege to the revolted city, but could make no impression upon it either by force or by stratagem. He tried to repeat the proceeding by which Cyrus had taken it at first; but the besieged were found this time on their guard. The siege had lasted twenty months without the smallest progress, and the Babylonians derided the besiegers from the height of their impregnable walls, when a distinguished Persian nobleman, Zopyrus—son of Megabyzus, who had been one of the seven conspirators against Smerdis—presented himself one day before Darius in a state of frightful mutilation. His nose and ears were cut off, and his body misused in every way. He had designedly thus maimed himself, “thinking it intolerable that Assyrians should thus laugh the Persians to scorn,” in the intention, which he presently intimated to Darius, of passing into the town as a deserter, with the view of betraying it—for which purpose measures were concerted. The Babylonians, seeing a Persian of the highest rank in so calamitous a condition, readily believed his assurance that he had been thus punished by the king’s order, and that he came over to them as the only means of procuring for himself signal vengeance. Intrusted by them with the command of a detachment, he gained several advantages in different sallies, according to previous concert with Darius, until at length the Babylonians, grateful and confident, placed under his charge the principal gates. At the critical moment these gates were thrown open, and the Persians became masters of the city.

Thus was the impregnable Babylon a second time reduced. Darius took precautions on this occasion to put it out of condition for resisting a third time. He caused the walls and gates to be demolished, and three thousand of the principal citizens to be crucified. The remaining inhabitants were left in the dismantled city, fifty thousand women being levied by assessment upon the neighboring provinces, to supply the place of the women strangled when it first revolted. Zopyrus was appointed satrap of the territory for life, with enjoyment of its entire revenues, receiving besides every additional reward which it was in the power of Darius to bestow, and generous assurances from the latter that he would rather have Zopyrus without wounds than the possession of Babylon. I have already intimated in a former chapter that the demolition of the walls here

mentioned is not to be regarded as complete and continuous, nor was there any necessity that it should be so. Partial demolition would be quite sufficient to leave the city without defense; and the description given by Herodotus of the state of things as they stood at the time of his visit, proves that portions of the walls yet subsisted. One circumstance is yet to be added in reference to the subsequent condition of Babylon under the Persian empire. The city, with the territory belonging to it, constituted a satrapy, which not only paid a larger tribute (one thousand Euboic talents of silver) and contributed a much larger amount of provisions in kind for the maintenance of the Persian court, than any other among the twenty satrapies of the empire, but furnished besides an annual supply of five hundred eunuch youths. We may presume that this was intended in part as a punishment for the past revolt, since the like obligation was not imposed upon any other satrapy.

Thus firmly established on the throne, Darius occupied it for thirty-six years. His reign was one of organization, different from that of his two predecessors; a difference which the Persians well understood and noted, calling Cyrus the father, Kambyses the master, and Darius the retail-trader or huckster. In the mouth of the Persians this latter epithet must be construed as no insignificant compliment, since it intimates that he was the first to introduce some methodical order into the imperial administration and finances. Under the two former kings there was no definite amount of tribute levied upon the subject provinces. They furnished what were called presents, subject to no fixed limit except such as might be satisfactory to the satrap in each district. But Darius—succeeding as he did to Smerdis, who had rendered himself popular with the provinces by large financial exemptions, and having farther to encounter jealousy and dissatisfaction from Persians, his former equals in rank—probably felt it expedient to relieve the provinces from the burden of undefined exactions. He distributed the whole empire into twenty departments, imposing upon each a fixed annual tax, and a fixed contribution for the maintenance of the court. This must doubtless have been a great improvement, though the limitation of the sum which the Great King at Susa would require, did not at all prevent the satrap in his own province from indefinite requisitions beyond it. The satrap was a little king, who acted nearly as he pleased in the internal administration of his province, subject only to the necessity of sending up the imperial tribute, of keeping off foreign enemies, and of furnishing an adequate military contingent for the foreign enterprises of the Great King. To every satrap was attached a royal secretary or comptroller of the revenue, who probably managed the imperial finances in the province, and to whom the court of Susa might perhaps look as a watch upon the satrap himself. It is not to be supposed that the Persian authorities in any province meddled with the details of taxation or contribution, as they bore upon indi-

viduals. The court having fixed the entire sum payable by the satrapy in the aggregate, the satrap or the secretary apportioned it among the various component districts, towns, or provinces, leaving to the local authorities in each of these latter the task of assessing it upon individual inhabitants. From necessity, therefore, as well as from indolence of temper and political incompetence, the Persians were compelled to respect the authorities which they found standing both in town and country, and to leave in their hands a large measure of genuine influence, frequently overruled indeed by oppressive interference on the part of the satrap, whenever any of his passions prompted—but never entirely superseded. In the important towns and stations, Persian garrisons were usually kept, and against the excesses of the military there was probably little or no protection to the subject people. Yet still the provincial governments were allowed to continue, and often even the petty kings who had governed separate districts during their state of independence prior to the Persian conquest, retained their title and dignity as tributaries to the court of Susa. The empire of the Great King was thus an aggregate of heterogeneous elements, connected together by no tie except that of common fear and subjection—noway coherent nor self-supporting, nor pervaded by any common system or spirit of nationality. It resembled in its main political features, the Turkish and Persian empires of the present day, though distinguished materially by the many differences arising out of Mohammedanism and Christianity, and perhaps hardly reaching the same extreme of rapacity, corruption, and cruelty in detail.

Darius distributed the Persian empire into twenty satrapies, each including a certain continuous territory, and one or more nations inhabiting it, the names of which Herodotus sets forth. The amount of tribute payable by each satrapy was determined; payable in gold, according to the Euboic talent, by the Indians in the easternmost satrapy—in silver, according to the Babylonian or larger talent, by the remaining nineteen. Herodotus computes the ratio of gold to silver as 13 : 1. From the nineteen satrapies which paid in silver, there was levied annually the sum of 7,740 Babylonian talents, equal to something about £2,964,000 sterling: from the Indians, who alone paid in gold, there was received a sum equal (at the rate of 1 : 13) to 4,680 Euboic talents of silver, or to about £1,290,000 sterling. To explain how it happened that this one satrapy was charged with a sum equal to two-fifths of the aggregate charge on the other nineteen, Herodotus dwells upon the vast population, the extensive territory, and the abundant produce in gold, among those whom he calls Indians—the easternmost inhabitants of the earth, since beyond them there was nothing but uninhabitable sand—reaching, as far as we can make it out, from Bactria southward along the Indus to its mouth, but how far eastward we cannot determine. Darius is said to have undertaken an expedition against them and subdued them. Moreover, he

is affirmed to have constructed and dispatched vessels down the Indus, from the city of Kaspatyri and the territory of the Paktyes, in its upper regions, all the way down to its mouth: then into the Indian Ocean, round the peninsula of Arabia, and up the Red Sea to Egypt. The ships were commanded by a Greek—Skylax, of Karyanda on the south-western coast of Asia Minor; who, if this statement be correct, executed a scheme of nautical enterprise not only one hundred and seventy years earlier, but also far more extensive than the famous voyage of Nearchus, admiral of Alexander the Great, who only went from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. The eastern portions of the Persian empire remained so unknown and unvisited until the Macedonian invasion, that we are unable to criticise the isolated statements of Herodotus. None of the Persian kings subsequent to Darius appear to have visited them, and whether the prodigious sum demandable from them according to the Persian rent-roll was ever regularly levied, may reasonably be doubted. At the same time, we may readily believe that the mountains in the northern parts of Persian India (Cabul and Little Thibet) were at that time extremely productive in gold, and that quantities of that metal, such as now appear almost fabulous, may have been often obtained. It seems that the produce of gold in all parts of the earth, as far as hitherto known, is obtained exclusively near the surface; so that a country once rich in that metal may well have been exhausted of its whole supply, and left at a later period without any gold at all.

Of the nineteen silver-paying satrapies, the most heavily imposed was Babylonia, which paid 1000 talents. The next in amount of charge was Egypt, paying 700 talents, besides the produce of the fish from the lake of Mæris: the remaining satrapies varied in amount, down as low as 170 talents, which was the sum charged on the seventh satrapy (in the enumeration of Herodotus) comprising the Sattagydæ, the Gandarii, the Dodikæ, and the Aparytæ. The Ionians, Æolians, Magnesians on the Mæander and on Mount Sipylus, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians—including the coast of Asia Minor southward of Kane, and from thence round the southern promontory to Phaselis—were rated as one division, paying 400 talents. Yet we may be sure that much more than this was really taken from the people, when we read that Magnesia alone afterward paid to Themistokles a revenue of 50 talents annually. The Mysians and Lydians were included, with some others, in another division; and the Hellespontine Greeks in a third, with Phrygians, Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, and Syrians, paying 360 talents—nearly the same as was paid by Syria proper, Phenicia and Judæa, with the island of Cyprus. Independent of this regular tribute, with the undefined sums extorted over and above it, there were some dependent nations, which, though exempt from tribute, furnished occasional sums called presents. Further contri-

butions were exacted for the maintenance of the vast suite who always personally attended the king. One entire third of this last burden was borne by Babylonia alone in consequence of its exuberant fertility: it was paid in produce, as indeed the peculiar productions of every part of the empire seem to have been sent up for the regal consumption.

However imperfectly we are now able to follow the geographical distribution of the subject nations as given by Herodotus, it is extremely valuable as the only professed statistics remaining, of the entire Persian empire. The arrangement of satrapies, which he describes, underwent modification in subsequent times; at least it does not harmonize with various statements in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, and in other authors who recount Persian affairs belonging to the fourth century B.C. But we find in no other author except Herodotus any entire survey and distribution of the empire. It is indeed a new tendency which now manifests itself in the Persian Darius, compared with his predecessors; not simply to conquer, to extort, and to give away—but to do all this with something like method and system, and to define the obligations of the satraps towards Susa. Another remarkable example of the same tendency is to be found in the fact, that Darius was the first Persian king who coined money. His coin both in gold and silver, the *Daric*, was the earliest produce of a Persian mint. The revenue, as brought to Susa in metallic money of various descriptions, was melted down separately, and poured in a fluid state in jars or earthenware vessels. When the metal had cooled and hardened, the jar was broken, leaving a standing solid mass from which portions were cut off as the occasion required. And in addition to these administrative, financial, and monetary arrangements, of which Darius was the first originator, we may probably ascribe to him the first introduction of that system of roads, resting-places, and permanent relays of couriers, which connected both Susa and Ekbatana with the distant portions of the empire. Herodotus describes in considerable detail the imperial road from Sardis to Susa, a journey of ninety days, crossing the Halys, the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Greater and Lesser Zab, the Gyndes, and the Choaspes. In his time it was kept in excellent order, with convenience for travelers.

It was Darius also who first completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of the important island of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Harpagus effected the conquest of Ionia, and even when Chios and Lesbos submitted. The Persians had no fleet to attack it; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed the depression which overtook the other cities of Ionia tended rather to the aggrandizement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykrates. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly

between 536-532 B.C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnotus and Syloson, and a small band of conspirators. At first the three brothers shared the supreme power; but presently Polykrates put to death Pantagnotus, banished Syloson, and made himself despot alone. In this station, his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighboring islands, and even some towns on the mainland: he carried on successful war against Miletus, and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Miletus: he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pentekonters, and one thousand mercenary bowmen—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world. He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis, king of Egypt, who however ultimately broke with him. Considering his behavior towards allies, this rupture is not at all surprising; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykrates—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of the envious gods. Indeed, Herodotus—deeply penetrated with this belief in an ever present Nemesis, which allows no man to be very happy, or long happy, with impunity—throws it into the form of an epistolary warning from Amasis to Polykrates, advising him to inflict upon himself some seasonable mischief or suffering; in order, if possible, to avert the ultimate judgment—to let blood in time, so that the plethora of happiness might not end in apoplexy. Pursuant to such counsel, Polykrates threw into the sea a favorite ring of matchless price and beauty; but unfortunately, in a few days, the ring re-appeared in the belly of a fine fish, which a fisherman had sent to him as a present. Amasis, now forewarned that the final apoplexy was inevitable, broke off the alliance with Polykrates without delay. This well-known story, interesting as evidence of ancient belief, is not less to be noted as showing the power of that belief to beget fictitious details out of real characters, such as I have already touched upon in the history of Solon and Cræsus, and elsewhere.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykrates, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis; finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambyses, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykrates deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambyses eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean; upon

which forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape; very contradictory stories have reached Herodotus. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykrates at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.

We may here notice the gradual increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognize Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Cræsus against Cyrus; next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter: the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already recounted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

On reaching Sparta, the Samian exiles, borne down with despondency and suffering, entered at large into the particulars of their case. Their long speaking annoyed instead of moving the Spartans, who said, or are made to say—"We have forgotten the first part of the speech, and the last part is unintelligible to us." Upon which the Samians appeared the next day simply with an empty wallet, saying—"Our wallet has no meal in it." "Your wallet is superfluous" (said the Spartans); i.e. the words would have been sufficient without it. The aid which they implored was granted.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians, which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykrates as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed the only facts which we know, to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykrates and Hippias: there may have been other cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykrates in the city: they did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success. "The city would have been taken," says Herodotus, "if all the Lacedæmonians had acted like Archias and Lykopas"—who, pressing closely upon the retreat,

ing Samians, were shut within the town gates, and perished. The historian had heard this exploit in personal conversation with Archias, grandson of the person above-mentioned, in the deme Pitana at Sparta—whose father had been named Samius, and who respected the Samians above any other Greeks, because they had bestowed upon the two brave warriors, slain within their town, an honorable and public funeral. It is rarely that Herodotus thus specifies his informants. had he done so more frequently, the value as well as the interest of his history would have been materially increased.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines,—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple. Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly-furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival. The Samians, landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents. Upon refusal, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them 100 talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermione, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighboring island of Hydrea, famous in modern Greek warfare. Yet it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Træzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydonia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place; but after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery.

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykrates. Meanwhile that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos under him was “the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric.” The great works admired by Herodotus in the island—an aqueduct for the city, tunneled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs—a mole to protect the harbor, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep—and the vast temple of Here—may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykrates as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects. The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats, or sea-kings—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo the

neighboring island of Rheneia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandizement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin; and that too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Orætes, on the neighboring main-land, conceived an implacable hatred against him: no one could tell why—for he had no design of attacking the island; and the trifling reasons conjecturally assigned, only prove that the real reason, whatever it might be, was unknown. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykrates, Orætes sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambyses, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykrates a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykrates, was sent over to Magnesia on the Mæander to make inquiries. He there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold—or rather apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top—tied up ready for departure. The cupidity of Polykrates was not proof against so rich a bait. He crossed over to Magnesia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Orætes, in spite of the warnings of his prophets and the agony of his terrified daughter, to whom his approaching fate had been revealed in a dream. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners. The death of Orætes himself, which ensued shortly afterward, has already been described: it is considered by Herodotus as a judgment for his flagitious deed in the case of Polykrates.

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykrates filled him with surprise and consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. "He wished (says the historian in a remarkable phrase) to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so." His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar, in honor of Zeus Eleutherius, and to inclose a piece of ground as precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus; he next convened an assembly of the

Samians. "You know (said he) that the whole power of Polykrates is now in my hands, and that there is nothing to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless what I condemn in another I will not do myself, and I have always disapproved of Polykrates, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykrates has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim among you equal law; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykrates—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants forever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you."

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them, Telesarchus, exclaimed with the applause of the rest, "*You* rule us, low-born and scoundrel as you are! you are not worthy to rule: don't think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling."

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards, which he resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis under pretense of preparing his money accounts for examination, he sent for Telesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one—intimating that the accounts were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykrates. After a short hour of insane boastfulness, the Samians found themselves again enslaved. "It seemed (says Herodotus) that they were not willing to be free."

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterward, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favorable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government; since they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it. They passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame by heroic effort forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other, we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians—a

difference partly referable, doubtless, to the pure Hellenism of the former, contrasted with the half-Asiatized Hellenism of the latter—but also traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykaretus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the scepter. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as despot for a year or two. It was however a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykrates. In this untoward condition the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their scepter and acropolis—and what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

Syloson, the brother of Polykrates, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykrates, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykrates. He happened to be at Memphis in Egypt during the time when Kambyses was there with his conquering army, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Syloson was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Syloson to reply, "I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it to you for nothing, if it must be yours." Darius thanked him and accepted the cloak; and for some years the donor accused himself of a silly piece of good nature. But as events came round, Syloson at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as a Greek, the benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius had forgotten his person, but perfectly remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favors, though small, rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Syloson in profusion, but he rejected them—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanes, the originator of the conspiracy against Smerdis, was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Syloson over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the

Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanes, whereby he agreed to make way for Syloson, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however, for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures, of the acropolis, which had a separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykrates. Otanes willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Syloson seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man, looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention: it seems that these were the chief officers whose rank gave them the privilege of being carried about on their seats. The sight inflamed both his wrath and his insane ambition. He clamored for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. "Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of bonds; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards: I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith."

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos for ever, had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honorable intentions after the death of Polykrates, nor was he displeased to hand over to Syloson an odious and blood-stained scepter, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother's mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got together; but at length Otanes collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to Syloson, stripped of its

male inhabitants. Of Charilaus and the acropolis we hear no farther: perhaps he and his guards may have escaped by sea. Lykaretus, the other brother of Mæandrius, must have remained either in the service of Syloson or in that of the Persians; for we find him some years afterward intrusted by the latter with an important command.

Syloson was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children: we may however presume, that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems, nevertheless, to have set heavily on the conscience of Otanes, who was induced some time afterward, by a dream and by a painful disease, to take measures for re-peopling the island. From whence the new population came, we are not told; but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykrates, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of re-establishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce king Kleomenes by the display of his treasures and finely wrought gold plate. The king however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephors to send Mæandrius away.

Syloson seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent: some years afterward we find his son Æakes reigning in the island. Strabo states that it was the harsh rule of Syloson which caused the depopulation of the island. But the cause just recounted out of Herodotus is both very different, and sufficiently plausible in itself; and as Strabo seems in the main to have derived his account from Herodotus, we may suppose that on this point he has incorrectly remembered his authority.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEMOKEDES.—DARIUS INVADES SCYTHIA.

DARIUS had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Orcetes, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had moreover completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor with its neighboring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent

upon their king, and whose king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage: he had married Atossa and Artystone, daughters of Cyrus—and Parnys, daughter of Smerdis, the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambyses; next, of the Magian Smerdis, his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children. Of those children the eldest was Xerxes, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Atossa, mother of the only Persian king who ever set foot in Greece—the Sultana Validi of Persia during the reign of Xerxes—was a person of commanding influence in the reign of her last husband, as well as in that of her son, and filled no inconsiderable space even in Grecian imagination, as we may see both by Æschylus and Herodotus. Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least so Herodotus assures us. The grand object of that historian is to set forth the contentions of Hellas with the barbarians or non-Hellenic world. Accordingly with an art truly epical, which manifests itself everywhere to the careful reader of his nine books, he preludes to the real dangers which were averted at Marathon and Plataea by recounting the first conception of an invasion of Greece by the Persians—how it originated and how it was abandoned. For this purpose—according to his historical style, wherein general facts are set forth as subordinate and explanatory accompaniments to the adventures of particular persons—he gives us the interesting, but romantic history, of the Krotoniate surgeon Demokedes.

Demokedes, son of a citizen of Kroton, named Kalliphon, had turned his attention in early youth to the study and practice of medicine and surgery (for that age, we can make no difference between the two), and had made considerable progress in it. His youth coincides nearly with the arrival of Pythagoras at Kroton (550–520); a time when the science of the surgeon as well as the art of the gymnastic trainer were prosecuted in that city more actively than in any part of Greece. Kalliphon, the father of Demokedes, was a man of such severe temper, that the son ran away from him and resolved to maintain himself by his talents elsewhere. Retiring to Ægina, he there began to practice in his profession. So rapid was his success even in the first year—though very imperfectly equipped with instruments and apparatus—that the citizens of the island made a contract with him to remain there for one year, at a salary of one talent (about £383 sterling, an Æginæan talent). The year afterward he was invited to come to Athens, then under the Peisistratids, at a salary of 100 minæ or $1\frac{2}{3}$ talent; and in the following year, Polykrates of Samos tempted him by the offer of two talents. With that despot he remained, and accompanied him in his last calamitous visit

to the satrap Oroetes; on the murder of Polykrates, being seized among the slaves and foreign attendants, he was left to languish with the rest in imprisonment and neglect. When again, soon after, Oroetes himself was slain, Demokedes was numbered among his slaves and chattels, and sent up to Susa.

He had not been long at that capital, when Darius, leaping from his horse in the chase, sprained his foot badly, and was carried home in violent pain. The Egyptian surgeons, supposed to be the first men in their profession whom he habitually employed, did him no good, but only aggravated his torture. For seven days and nights he had no sleep, and he as well as those around him began to despair. At length, some one who had been at Sardis accidentally recollected that he had heard of a Greek surgeon among the slaves of Oroetes. Search was immediately made, and the miserable slave was brought, in chains as well as in rags, into the presence of the royal sufferer. Being asked whether he understood surgery, he affected ignorance; but Darius, suspecting this to be a mere artifice, ordered out the scourge and the pricking instrument to overcome it. Demokedes now saw that there was no resource, admitted that he had acquired some little skill, and was called upon to do his utmost in the case before him. He was fortunate enough to succeed perfectly, in alleviating the pain, in procuring sleep for the exhausted patient, and ultimately in restoring the foot to a sound state. Darius, who had abandoned all hopes of such a cure, knew no bounds to his gratitude. As a first reward, he presented him with two sets of chains in solid gold—a commemoration of the state in which Demokedes had first come before him. He next sent him into the harem to visit his wives. The conducting eunuchs introduced him as the man who had restored the king to life, upon which the grateful sultanas each gave to him a saucer full of golden coins called staters; in all so numerous, that the slave Skiton, who followed him, was enriched by merely picking up the pieces which dropped on the floor. This was not all. Darius gave him a splendid house and furniture, made him the companion of his table, and showed him every description of favor. He was about to crucify the Egyptian surgeons who had been so unsuccessful in their attempts to cure him. But Demokedes had the happiness of preserving their lives, as well as of rescuing an unfortunate companion of his imprisonment—an Eleian prophet, who had followed the fortunes of Polykrates.

But there was one favor which Darius would on no account grant; yet upon this one Demokedes had set his heart—the liberty of returning to Greece. At length accident, combined with his own surgical skill, enabled him to escape from the splendor of his second detention, as it had before extricated him from the misery of the first. A tumor formed upon the breast of Atossa: at first she said nothing to any one, but it became too bad for concealment, and she was forced

to consult Demokedes. He promised to cure her, but required from her a solemn oath that she would afterward do for him anything which he should ask—pledging himself at the same time to ask nothing indecent. The cure was successful, and Atossa was required to repay it by procuring his liberty. Knowing that the favor would be refused, even to her, if directly solicited, he taught her a stratagem for obtaining under false pretenses the consent of Darius. She took an early opportunity (Herodotus tells us, in bed) of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power and splendor of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it and to turn his forces first against Greece—"I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—(we may conceive the smile of triumph with which the sons of those who had conquered at Plataea and Salamis would hear this part of the history read by Herodotus)—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece—that Greek who cured your foot." Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with Demokedes. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Demokedes, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him. He next sent for Demokedes himself, explained to him what he wanted, and enjoined him imperatively to return as soon as the business had been completed. He farther desired him to carry away all the ample donations which he had already received, as presents to his father and brothers, promising that on his return fresh donations of equal value should make up the loss. Lastly, he directed that a store-ship, "filled with all manner of good things," should accompany the voyage. Demokedes undertook the mission with every appearance of sincerity. The better to play his part, he declined to take away what he already possessed at Susa—saying that he should like to find his property and furniture again on coming back, and that the store-ship alone, with its contents, would be sufficient both for the voyage, and for all necessary presents.

Accordingly he and the fifteen Persian envoys went down to Sidon in Phœnicia, where two armed triremes were equipped, with a large store-ship in company. The voyage of survey into Greece was commenced. They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda of everything worthy of note which they saw. Such a Periplus, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 518 B.C.

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As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Demokedes—now within a short distance of his own home, Kroton—found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request, Aristophilides, the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians and detained them as spies, at the same time taking the rudders from off their ships—while Demokedes himself made his escape to Kroton. As soon as he had arrived there, Aristophilides released the Persians; who, pursuing their voyage, went on to Kroton, found Demokedes in the market-place, and laid hands upon him. But his fellow-citizens rescued him, not without opposition from some who were afraid of provoking the Great King—and in spite of remonstrances, energetic and menacing, from the Persians themselves. Indeed the Krotoniates not only protected the restored exile, but even robbed the Persians of their store-ship. The latter, disabled from proceeding farther as well by this loss as by the secession of Demokedes, commenced their voyage homeward, but unfortunately suffered shipwreck near the Iapygian cape, and became slaves in that neighborhood. A Tarentine exile, named Gillus, ransomed them and carried them up to Susa—a service for which Darius promised him any recompense that he chose. Restoration to his native city was all that Gillus asked; and that too, not by force, but by the mediation of the Asiatic Greeks of Knidus, who were on terms of intimate alliance with the Tarentines. This generous citizen—an honorable contrast to Demokedes, who had not scrupled to impel the stream of Persian conquest against his country in order to procure his own release—was unfortunately disappointed of his anticipated recompense. For though the Knidians, at the injunction of Darius, employed all their influence at Tarentum to procure a revocation of the sentence of exile, they were unable to succeed, and force was out of the question. The last words addressed by Demokedes at parting to his Persian companions, exhorted them to acquaint Darius that he (Demokedes) was about to marry the daughter of the Krotoniate Milo—one of the first men in Kroton, as well as the greatest wrestler of his time. The reputation of Milo was very great with Darius—probably from the talk of Demokedes himself: moreover, gigantic muscular force could be appreciated by men who had no relish either for Homer or Solon. And thus did this clever and vain-glorious Greek, sending back his fifteen Persian companions to disgrace and perhaps to death, deposit in their parting ears a braggart message calculated to create for himself a factitious name at Susa. He paid a large sum to Milo as the price of his daughter, for this very purpose.

Thus finishes the history of Demokedes, and of the “first Persians (to use the phrase of Herodotus) who ever came over from Asia into Greece.” It is a history well deserving of attention, even looking only to the liveliness of the incidents, introducing us as they do into the full movement of the ancient world—incidents which I see no reason for doubting, with a reasonable allowance for the dramatic

amplification of the historian. Even at that early date, Greek medical intelligence stands out in a surpassing manner, and Demokedes is the first of those many able Greek surgeons who were seized, carried up to Susa, and there detained for the Great King, his court, and harem.

But his history suggests in another point of view far more serious reflections. Like the Milesian Histiaeus (of whom I shall speak hereafter), he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. Now the influence which he originated was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516-514 B.C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids. What she was under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defense, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots. Moreover, Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than twenty years afterward, in 490 B.C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; besides which, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defense was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxes had listened to the best of his own counselors. But had Darius—at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force—landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C., he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts, like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. Fortunately, Darius, while bent on invading some country, had set his mind on the attack of Scythia, alike perilous and unprofitable. His personal

ardor was wasted on those unconquerable regions, where he narrowly escaped the disastrous fate of Cyrus—nor did he ever pay a second visit to the coasts of the Ægean. Yet the amorous influences of Atossa, set at work by Demokedes, might well have been sufficiently powerful to induce Darius to assail Greece instead of Scythia—a choice in favor of which all other recommendations concurred; and the history of free Greece would then probably have stopped at this point, without unrolling any of the glories which followed. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500–300 B.C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur. When we read the wailings of Atossa in the *Persæ* of Æschylus, for the humiliation which her son Xerxes had just undergone in his flight from Greece, we do not easily persuade ourselves to reverse the picture, and to conceive the same Atossa twenty years earlier, numbering as her slaves at Susa the noblest Herakleid and Alkmæonid maidens from Greece. Yet the picture would really have been thus reversed—the wish of Atossa would have been fulfilled and the wailings would have been heard from enslaved Greek maidens in Persia—if the mind of Darius had not happened to be preoccupied with a project not less insane even than those of Kambyses against Ethiopia and the Lybian desert. Such, at least, is the moral of the story of Demokedes.

That insane expedition across the Danube into Scythia comes now to be recounted. It was undertaken by Darius for the purpose of avenging the inroad and devastation of the Scythians in Media and Upper Asia, about a century before. The lust of conquest imparted unusual force to this sentiment of wounded dignity, which in the case of the Scythians could hardly be connected with any expectation of plunder or profit. In spite of the dissuading admonition of his brother Artabanus, Darius summoned the whole force of his empire, army and navy, to the Thracian Bosphorus—a force not less than 700,000 horse and foot and 600 ships, according to Herodotus. On these prodigious numbers we can lay no stress. But it appears that the names of all the various nations composing the host were inscribed on two pillars, erected by order of Darius on the European side of the Bosphorus, and afterward seen by Herodotus himself in the city of Byzantium—the inscriptions were bilingual, in Assyrian characters as well as Greek. The Samian architect Mandrokles had been directed to throw a bridge of boats across the Bosphorus, about half-way between Byzantium and the mouth of the Euxine. So peremptory were the Persian kings that their orders for military service should

be punctually obeyed, and so impatient were they of the idea of exemptions, that when a Persian father named Gobazus entreated that one of his three sons, all included in the conscription, might be left at home, Darius replied that all three of them should be left at home—an answer which the unsuspecting father heard with delight. They were indeed all left at home—for they were all put to death. A proceeding similar to this is ascribed afterward to Xerxes; whether true or not as matters of fact, they illustrate the wrathful displeasure with which the Persian kings were known to receive such petitions for exemption.

The naval force of Darius seems to have consisted entirely of subject Greeks, Asiatic and insular; for the Phœnician fleet was not brought into the Ægean until the subsequent Ionic revolt. At this time all or most of the Asiatic Greek cities were under despots, who leaned on the Persian government for support, and who appeared with their respective contingents to take part in the Scythian expedition. Of Ionic Greeks were seen—Strattis, despot of Chios; Æakes, son of Syloson, despot of Samos; Laodamas, of Phokæa; and Histæus, of Miletus. From the Æolic towns, Aristagoras of Kyme; from the Hellespontine Greeks, Daphnis of Abydos, Hippoklus of Lampsakus, Herophantus of Parium, Metrodorus of Prokonnesus, Aristagoras of Kyzikus, and Miltiades of the Thracian Chersonese—all these are mentioned, and there were probably more. This large fleet, assembled at the Bosphorus, was sent forward into the Euxine to the mouth of the Danube—with orders to sail up the river two days' journey, above the point where its channel begins to divide, and to throw a bridge of boats over it. Darius, having liberally recompensed the architect Mandrokles, crossed the bridge over the Bosphorus, and began his march through Thrace, receiving the submission of various Thracian tribes in his way, and subduing others—especially the Getæ north of Mount Hæmus, who were compelled to increase still farther the numbers of his vast army. On arriving at the Danube, he found the bridge finished and prepared for his passage by the Ionians. We may remark, here as on so many other occasions, that all operations requiring intelligence are performed for the Persians either by Greeks or by Phœnicians—more usually by the former. He crossed this greatest of all earthly rivers—for so the Danube was imagined to be in the fifth century B.C.—and directed his march into Scythia.

As far as the point now attained, our narrative runs smoothly and intelligibly: we know that Darius marched his army into Scythia, and that he came back with ignominy and severe loss. But as to all which happened between his crossing and recrossing the Danube, we find nothing approaching to authentic statement, nor even what we can set forth as the probable basis of truth on which exaggerating fancy has been at work—all is inexplicable mystery. Ktesias indeed says that Darius marched for fifteen days into the Scythian territory—

that he then exchanged bows with the king of Scythia and discovered the Scythian bow to be the largest—and that being intimidated by such discovery, he fled back to the bridge by which he had crossed the Danube, and recrossed the river with the loss of one-tenth part of his army, being compelled to break down the bridge before all had passed. The length of march is here the only thing distinctly stated; about the direction nothing is said; but the narrative of Ktesias, defective as it is, is much less perplexing than that of Herodotus, who conducts the immense host of Darius as it were through fairy-land—heedless of distance, large intervening rivers, want of all cultivation or supplies, destruction of the country (in so far as it could be destroyed) by the retreating Scythians, etc. He tells us that the Persian army consisted chiefly of foot—that there were no roads nor agriculture; yet his narrative carries it over about twelve degrees of longitude from the Danube to the country east of the Tanais, across the rivers Tyras (Dniester), Hypanis (Bog), Borysthènes (Dnieper), Hypakyris, Gerrhos, and Tanais. How these rivers could have been passed in the face of enemies by so vast a host, we are left to conjecture, since it was not winter-time to convert them into ice: nor does the historian even allude to them as having been crossed either in the advance or in the retreat. What is not less remarkable, is, that in respect to the Greek settlement of Olbia or Borysthènes, and the agricultural Scythians and Mix-hellenes between the Hypanis and the Borysthènes, across whose country it would seem that this march of Darius must have carried him—Herodotus does not say anything; though we should have expected that he would have had better means of informing himself about this part of the march than about any other, and though the Persians could hardly have failed to plunder or put in requisition this, the only productive portion of Scythia.

The narrative of Herodotus in regard to the Persian march north of the Ister seems indeed destitute of all the conditions of reality. It is rather an imaginative description, illustrating the desperate and impracticable character of Scythian warfare, and grouping in the same picture, according to that large sweep of the imagination which is admissible in epical treatment, the Scythians with all their barbarous neighbors from the Carpathian mountains to the river Wolga. The Agathyrsi, the Neuri, the Androphagi, the Melanchlæni, the Budini, the Geloni, the Sarmatians, and the Tauri—all of them bordering on that vast quadrangular area of 4,000 stadia for each side, called Scythia, as Herodotus conceives it—are brought into deliberation and action in consequence of the Persian approach. And Herodotus takes that opportunity of communicating valuable particulars respecting the habits and manners of each. The kings of these nations discuss whether Darius is justified in his invasion, and whether it be prudent in them to aid the Scythians. The latter question is decided in the affirmative by the Sarmatians, the Budini, and the Geloni, all eastward of the Tanais—in the negative by the rest.

The Scythians, removing their wagons with their wives and children out of the way northward, retreat and draw Darius after them from the Danube all across Scythia and Sarmatia to the north-eastern extremity of the territory of the Budini, several days' journey eastward of the Tanais. Moreover they destroy the wells and ruin the herbage as much as they can, so that during all this long march (says Herodotus) the Persians "found nothing to damage, inasmuch as the country was barren." We can hardly understand therefore what they found to live upon. It is in the territory of the Budini, at this easternmost terminus on the borders of the desert, that the Persians perform the only positive acts which are ascribed to them throughout the whole expedition. They burn the wooden wall before occupied, but now deserted, by the Geloni; and they build, or begin to build, eight large fortresses near the river Oarus. For what purposes these fortresses could have been intended Herodotus gives no intimation, but he says that the unfinished work was yet to be seen even in his day.

Having thus been carried all across Scythia and the other territories above-mentioned in a north-easterly direction, Darius and his army are next marched back a prodigious distance in a north-westerly direction, through the territories of the Melanchlæni, the Androphagi, and the Neuri, all of whom flee affrighted into the northern desert, having been thus compelled against their will to share in the consequences of the war. The Agathyrsi peremptorily require the Scythians to abstain from drawing the Persians into *their* territory on pain of being themselves treated as enemies. Accordingly the Scythians, avoiding the boundaries of the Agathyrsi, direct their retreat in such a manner as to draw the Persians again southward into Scythia. During all this long march backward and forward, there are partial skirmishes and combats of horse, but the Scythians steadily refuse any general engagement. And though Darius challenges them formally by means of a herald, with taunts of cowardice, the Scythian king Idanthysus not only refuses battle, but explains and defends his policy, and defies the Persian to come and destroy the tombs of their fathers—it will then (he adds) be seen whether the Scythians are cowards or not. The difficulties of Darius have by this time become serious, when Idanthysus sends to him the menacing presents of a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows: the Persians are obliged to commence a rapid retreat toward the Danube, leaving, in order to check and slacken the Scythian pursuit, the least effective and the sick part of their army encamped, together with the asses which had been brought with them—animals unknown to the Scythians, and causing great alarm by their braying. However, notwithstanding some delay thus caused, as well as the anxious haste of Darius to reach the Danube, the Scythians, far more rapid in their movements, arrive at the river before him, and open a negotiation with the Ionians left in guard of the bridge, urging them to break it down and

leave the Persian king to his fate—inevitable destruction with his whole army.

Here we re-enter the world of reality, at the north bank of the Danube, the place where we before quitted it. All that is reported to have passed in the interval, if tried by the tests of historical matter of fact, can be received as nothing better than a perplexing dream. It only acquires value when we consider it as an illustrative fiction, including, doubtless, some unknown matter of fact, but framed chiefly to exhibit in action those unattackable Nomads who formed the north-eastern barbarous world of a Greek, and with whose manners Herodotus was profoundly struck. "The Scythians (says he), in regard to one of the greatest of human matters, have struck out a plan cleverer than any that I know. In other respects I do not admire them; but they have contrived this great object, that no invader of their country shall ever escape out of it, or shall ever be able to find out and overtake them, unless they themselves choose. For when men have neither walls nor established cities, but are all house-carriers and horse-bowmen—living, not from the plow, but from cattle, and having their dwellings on wagons—how can they be otherwise than unattackable and impracticable to meddle with?" The protracted and unavailing chase ascribed to Darius—who can neither overtake his game nor use his arms, and who hardly even escapes in safety—embodies in detail this formidable attribute of the Scythian Nomads. That Darius actually marched into the country, there can be no doubt. Nothing else is certain, except his ignominious retreat out of it to the Danube; for of the many different guesses, by which critics have attempted to cut down the gigantic sketch of Herodotus into a march with definite limits and direction, not one rests upon any positive grounds. We can trace the pervading idea in the mind of the historian, but cannot find out what were his substantive data.

The adventures which took place at the passage of that river, both on the out-march and the home-march, wherein the Ionians are concerned, are far more within the limits of history. Here Herodotus possessed better means of information, and had less of a dominant idea to illustrate. That which passed between Darius and the Ionians on his first crossing is very curious: I have reserved it until the present moment, because it is particularly connected with the incidents which happened on his return.

On reaching the Danube from Thrace, he found the bridge of boats ready; and when the whole army had passed over, he ordered the Ionians to break it down, as well as to follow him in his land-march into Scythia, the ships being left with nothing but the rowers and seamen essential to navigate them homeward. His order was on the point of being executed, when, fortunately for him, the Mitylenæan general Koes ventured to call in question the prudence of it, having first asked whether it was the pleasure of the Persian

king to listen to advice. Koes urged that the march on which they were proceeding might prove perilous, and retreat possibly unavoidable; because the Scythians, though certain to be defeated if brought to action, might perhaps not suffer themselves to be approached or even discovered. As a precaution against all contingencies, it was prudent to leave the bridge standing and watched by those who had constructed it. Far from being offended at the advice, Darius felt grateful for it, and desired that Koes would ask him after his return for a suitable reward—which we shall hereafter find granted. He then altered his resolution, took a cord, and tied sixty knots in it. "Take this cord (said he to the Ionians): untie one of the knots in it each day after my advance from the Danube into Scythia. Remain here and guard the bridge until you shall have untied all the knots; but if by that time I shall not have returned, then depart and sail home." With such orders he began his march into the interior. This anecdote is interesting, not only as it discloses the simple expedients for numeration and counting of time then practiced, but also as it illustrates the geographical ideas prevalent. Darius did not intend to come back over the Danube, but to march round the Mæotis, and to return into Persia on the eastern side of the Euxine. No other explanation can be given of his orders. At first, confident of success, he orders the bridge to be destroyed forthwith: he will beat the Scythians, march through their country, and re-enter Media from the eastern side of the Euxine: when he is reminded that possibly he may not be able to find the Scythians, and may be obliged to retreat, he still continues persuaded that this must happen within sixty days, if it happens at all; and that should he remain absent more than sixty days, such delay will be a convincing proof that he will take the other road of return instead of repassing the Danube. The reader who looks at a map of the Euxine and its surrounding territories may be startled at so extravagant a conception; but he should recollect that there was no map of the same or nearly the same accuracy before Herodotus, much less before the contemporaries of Darius. The idea of entering Media by the north from Scythia and Sarmatia over the Caucasus, is familiar to Herodotus in his sketch of the early marches of the Scythians and Cimmerians: moreover, he tells us that after the expedition of Darius, there came some Scythian envoys to Sparta, proposing an offensive alliance against Persia, and offering on their part to march across the Phasis into Media from the north, while the Spartans were invited to land on the shores of Asia Minor, and advance across the country to meet them from the west. When we recollect that the Macedonians and their leader, Alexander the Great, having arrived at the river Jaxartes, on the north of Sogdiana and on the east of the Sea of Aral, supposed that they had reached the Tanais and called the river by that name—we shall not be astonished at the erroneous estimation of distance implied in the plan conceived by Darius.

The Ionians had already remained in guard of the bridge beyond the sixty days commanded, without hearing anything of the Persian army, when they were surprised by the appearance, not of that army, but of a body of Scythians; who acquainted them that Darius was in full retreat and in the greatest distress, and that his safety with the whole army depended upon that bridge. They endeavored to prevail upon the Ionians, since the sixty days included in their order to remain had now elapsed, to break the bridge and retire; assuring them that if this were done, the destruction of the Persians was inevitable—of course the Ionians themselves would then be free. At first the latter were favorably disposed toward the proposition, which was warmly espoused by the Athenian Miltiades, despot or governor of the Thracian Chersonese. Had he prevailed, the victor of Marathon (for such we shall hereafter find him) would have thus inflicted a much more vital blow on Persia than even that celebrated action, and would have brought upon Darius the disastrous fate of his predecessor Cyrus. But the Ionian princes, though leaning at first toward his suggestion, were speedily converted by the representations of Histiaeus of Miletus, who reminded them that the maintenance of his own ascendancy over the Milesians and that of each despot in his respective city, was assured by means of Persian support alone—the feeling of the population being everywhere against them: consequently, the ruin of Darius would be their ruin also. This argument proved conclusive. It was resolved to stay and maintain the bridge, but to pretend compliance with the Scythians, and prevail upon them to depart, by affecting to destroy it. The northern portion of the bridge was accordingly destroyed, for the length of a bow-shot; while the Scythians departed, under the persuasion that they had succeeded in depriving their enemies of the means of crossing the river. It appears that they missed the track of the retreating host, which was thus enabled, after the severest privation and suffering, to reach the Danube in safety. Arriving during the darkness of the night, Darius was at first terrified to find the bridge no longer joining the northern bank. An Egyptian herald, of stentorian powers of voice, was ordered to call as loudly as possible the name of Histiaeus the Milesian. Answer being speedily made, the bridge was re-established, and the Persian army passed over before the Scythians returned to the spot.

There can be no doubt that the Ionians here lost an opportunity eminently favorable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, by whom the determination was made, especially the Milesian Histiaeus, were not induced to preserve the bridge by any honorable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good

evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekataëus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterward, and who may perhaps have been personally engaged in this expedition. He will be found reviewing with prudence and sobriety the chances of that unfortunate revolt, and distrusting its success from the beginning; while Histiaëus of Miletus will appear on the same occasion as the fomentor of it, in order to procure his release from an honorable detention at Susa near the person of Darius. The selfishness of this despot, having deprived his countrymen of that real and favorable chance of emancipation which the destruction of the bridge would have opened to them, threw them into revolt a few years afterward against the entire and unembarrassed force of the Persian king and empire.

Extricated from the perils of the Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance, but was at length subdued; after which all the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute. Near the lower Strymon was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histiaëus of Miletus; for both this Milesian, and Koes of Mitylene, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube. Koes requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylene, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiaëus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histiaëus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis; it offered great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well-wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argentiferous mountains.

It seems, however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta, proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia, from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiades, who was despot or governor of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these Nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiades could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the deadly enmity of

Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube.

The conquests of Megabazus did not stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius; whose fancy had been struck by seeing at Sardis a beautiful Pæonian woman carrying a vessel on her head, leading a horse to water, and spinning flax, all at the same time. This woman had been brought over (we are told) by her two brothers Piges and Mantyes for the express purpose of arresting the attention of the Great King. They hoped by this means to be constituted despots of their countrymen; and we may presume that their scheme succeeded, for such part of the Pæonians as Megabazus could subdue were conveyed across to Asia and planted in some villages in Phrygia. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian government.

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by the strangers: at length the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. Dismissing the women under pretense that they should return after a bath, he brought back in their place youths in female attire, armed with daggers. Presently the Persians, proceeding to repeat their caresses, were all put to death. Their retinue, and the splendid carriages and equipment which they had brought, disappeared at the same time, without any tidings reaching the Persian army. And when Bubares, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gigæa in marriage.

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the Strymon. Having become alarmed at the progress of Histiaeus with his new city of Myrkinus, he communicated his apprehensions to Darius; who was prevailed upon to send for Histiaeus, retaining him about his person, and carrying him to Susa as counselor and friend, with every mark of honor, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histiaeus at Susa became in the sequel an important event.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernes satrap of Sardis, and Otanes general of the forces on the coast in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely

with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkedon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lamponium. With the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all. These Pelasgi were of cruel and piratical character, if we may judge by the tenor of the legends respecting them; Lemnian misdeeds being cited as a proverbial expression for atrocities. They were distinguished also for ancient worship of Hephæstus, together with mystic rites in honor of the Kabeiri, and even human sacrifices to their Great Goddess. In their two cities—Hephæstias on the east of the island and Myrina on the west—they held out bravely against Otanes, and did not submit until they had undergone long and severe hardship. Lykaretus, brother of that Mæandrius whom we have already noticed as despot of Samos, was named governor of Lemnos; but he soon after died. It is probable that the Pelasgic population of the islands was greatly enfeebled during this struggle, and we even hear that their king Hermon voluntarily emigrated from fear of Darius.

Lemnos and Imbros thus became Persian possessions, held by a subordinate prince as tributary. A few years afterward their lot was again changed—they passed into the hands of Athens, the Pelasgic inhabitants were expelled, and fresh Athenian settlers introduced. They were conquered by Miltiades from the Thracian Chersonese; from Elæus at the south of that peninsula to Lemnos being within one day's sail with a north wind. The Hephæstieans abandoned their city and evacuated the island with little resistance; but the inhabitants of Myrina stood a siege, and were not expelled without difficulty: both of them found abodes in Thrace, on and near the peninsula of Mount Athos. Both these islands, together with that of Skyros (which was not taken until after the invasion of Xerxes), remained connected with Athens in a manner peculiarly intimate. At the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.)—which guaranteed universal autonomy to every Grecian city, great and small—they were specially reserved, and considered as united with Athens. The property in their soil was held by men, who, without losing their Athenian citizenship, became Lemnian Kleruchs, and as such were classified apart among the military force of the state; while absence in Lemnos or Imbros seems to have been accepted as an excuse for delay before the courts of justice, so as to escape the penalties of contumacy or departure from the country. It is probable that a considerable number of poor Athenian citizens were provided with lots of land in these islands, though we have no direct information of the fact, and are even obliged to guess the precise time at which Miltiades made the conquest. Herodotus, according to his usual manner, connects the

conquest with an ancient oracle, and represents it as the retribution for ancient legendary crime committed by certain Pelasgi, who, many centuries before, had been expelled by the Athenians from Attica, and had retired to Lemnos. Full of this legend, he tells us nothing about the proximate causes or circumstances of the conquest, which must probably have been accomplished by the efforts of Athens jointly with Miltiades from the Chersonese, during the period that the Persians were occupied in quelling the Ionic revolt, between 502-494 B.C.—since it is hardly to be supposed that Miltiades would have ventured thus to attack a Persian possession during the time that the satraps had their hands free. The acquisition was probably facilitated by the fact, that the Pelasgic population of the islands had been weakened, as well by their former resistance to the Persian Otanes, as by some years passed under the deputy of a Persian satrap.

In mentioning the conquest of Lemnos by the Athenians and Miltiades, I have anticipated a little on the course of events, because that conquest—though coinciding in point of time with the Ionic revolt (which will be recounted in the following chapter), and indirectly caused by it in so far as it occupied the attention of the Persians—lies entirely apart from the operations of the revolted Ionians. When Miltiades was driven out of the Chersonese by the Persians, on the suppression of the Ionic revolt, his fame, derived from having subdued Lemnos, contributed both to neutralize the enmity which he had incurred as governor of the Chersonese, and to procure his election as one of the ten generals for the year of the Marathonian combat.

CHAPTER XXXV.

IONIC REVOLT.

HITHERTO the history of the Asiatic Greeks has flowed in a stream distinct from that of the European Greeks. The present chapter will mark the period of confluence between the two.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histiaëus, he left Artaphernes his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Miletus especially, in the absence of Histiaëus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly about 512 B.C.,

from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for eight or ten years—"a respite from suffering," to use the significant phrase of the historian.

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernes at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantides of Lampsakus, whose favor with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernes was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians dispatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety. Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here too, as in the case of Hippias; the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians. It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of dominion for himself in the island, provided he could induce Artaphernes to embark in the project along with him—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighboring islands of Paros, Andros, Tenos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernes entertained the proposition with eagerness, loaded him with praise, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers dispatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the

Persian Megabates, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Miletus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbor of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. No suspicion was entertained in that island of its real purpose, nor was any preparation made for resistance; so that the success of Aristagoras would have been complete, had it not been defeated by an untoward incident ending in dispute. Megabates, with a solicitude which we are surprised to discern in a Persian general, personally made a tour of his fleet, to see that every ship was under proper watch. He discovered a ship from Myndus (an Asiatic Dorian city near Halikarnassus) left without a single man on board. Incensed at such neglect, he called before him Skylax, the commander of the ship, and ordered him to be put in chains, with his head projecting outward through one of the apertures for oars in the ship's side. Skylax was a guest and friend of Aristagoras, who on hearing of this punishment, interceded with Megabates for his release; but finding the request refused, took upon him to release the prisoner himself. He even went so far as to treat the remonstrance of Megabates with disdain, reminding him that according to the instructions of Artaphernes, he was only second—himself (Aristagoras) being first. The pride of Megabates could not endure such treatment: as soon as night arrived, he sent a private intimation to Naxos of the coming of the fleet, warning the islanders to be on their guard. The warning thus fortunately received was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet, probably delayed by the dispute between its leaders, at length arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles. After a large cost incurred, not only by the Persians, but also by Aristagoras himself, the unsuccessful armament was brought back to the coast of Ionia.

The failure of this expedition threatened Aristagoras with entire ruin. He had incensed Megabates, deceived Artaphernes, and incurred an obligation, which he knew not how to discharge, of indemnifying the latter for the costs of the fleet. He began to revolve in his mind the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law Histæus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histæus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then dispatched him as soon as his hair had grown, to Miletus, with a

verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined. Histiaeus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. His message arriving at so critical a moment, determined the faltering resolution of Aristagoras, who convened his principal partisans at Miletus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekataeus of Miletus; who opposed it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighboring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, was listened to. Probably the seizures of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekataeus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial: perhaps indeed Hekataeus himself may have urged it with the indirect view of stifling the whole project. We may remark that he seems to have argued the question as if Miletus were to stand alone in the revolt; not anticipating, as indeed no prudent man could then anticipate, that the Ionic cities generally would follow the example.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favor throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendancy, as Histiaeus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favorable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Aristagoras was dispatched from Miletus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Aristagoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiaeus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians), Koes of Mitylene, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kyme. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the

people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Koes, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans.

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character; much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekataeus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea; and would in fact have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defense, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of king Kleomenes; to whom he addressed himself, "holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers." Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus. Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breast-plate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian. He then traced out on his brazen plan the road from Ephesus to Susa, indicating the intervening nations, all of them affording a booty more or less rich. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—"Instead of fighting your neighbors (he concluded), Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourself rulers of all Asia, a prize not less easy than lucrative?" Kleomenes replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that it

was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenes interrupted him—"Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea." In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenes, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgo, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenes to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, "Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away." The exclamation so struck Kleomenes, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450—440 B.C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 502 B.C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face. To talk about an easy march up to the treasures of Susa and the empire of all Asia, at the time of the Ionic revolt, would have been considered as a proof of insanity. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B.C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognized and passing into the habitual feelings of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Cræsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war.

The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favor by the Athenians; who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, “the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians”—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the *Iliad* of Homer. Herodotus further remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenes, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens. But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Miletus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succor of the Ionians; the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay the assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus with others. The ships were left at Koressus, a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmolus to Sardis. Artaphernes had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Miletus, and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighboring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus: who found himself moreover obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in a flame. Obligated to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount

Tmolus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the seacoast. The troops of Artaphernes pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them completely. Eualkides the Eretrian general, a man of eminence and celebrated victor at the solemn games, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristogoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle; a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396, B.C. Unless such was the case, they seem open to censure rather for having too soon withdrawn their aid, than for having originally lent it.

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybebe, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristogoras dispatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him; the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathus, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest. Onesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathus. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterward to have continued, under the government of despots; who however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia.

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other; and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. After a year spent in getting together forces, the Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army; while the force under Artaphernes at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the

Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favor of the sea-fight, and they engaged with a degree of courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory; the Samians being especially distinguished. But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn. Onesilus and the Salaminians brought into the field, after the fashion of Orientals rather than of Greeks, a number of scythed chariots, destined to break the enemy's ranks; while on the other hand the Persian general Artybius was mounted on a horse, trained to rise on his hind-legs and strike out with his fore-legs against an opponent on foot. In the thick of the fight, Onesilus and his Karian shield-bearer came into personal conflict with this general and his horse. By previous concert, when the horse so reared as to get his fore-legs over the shield of Onesilus, the Karian with a scythe severed the legs from his body, while Onesilus with his own hand slew Artybius. But the personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stesenor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army, along with Aristokyprus despot of Soli on the north coast of the island: this latter was son of that Philokyprus who had been immortalized more than sixty years before in the poems of Solon. No farther hopes now remaining for the revolvers, the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken; not without a resolute defense, however, since Soli alone held out five months.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurises, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurises attacked the towns near the Hellespont—Abydus, Perkote, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernes and Otanes attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenæ, the latter Kyme.

There remained Karia, which, with Miletus in its neighborhood,

offered a determined resistance to Daurises. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Pixodarus, one of their chiefs, recommended the desperate expedient of fighting with the river at their back, so that all chance of flight might be cut off; but most of the chiefs decided in favor of a contrary policy—to let the Persians pass the river, in hopes of driving them back into it and thus rendering their defeat total. Victory however, after a sharp contest, declared in favor of Daurises, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the flight in the grove of noble plane-trees consecrated to Zeus Stratius near Labranda, were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian re-enforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians. The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleides of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurises with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honor to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Miletus.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success, and to meditate a mean desertion of the companions and countrymen whom he had himself betrayed into danger. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Miletus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histæus had begun some time before to fortify, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons consulted was Hekataëus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighboring island of Leros; a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Miletus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered. Such an opinion must doubtless have been founded on the assumption, that they would be able to maintain superiority at sea. It is important to note such confident reliance upon this superiority in the mind of a sagacious man, not given to sanguine hopes, like Hekataëus—even under circumstances very unprosperous on land. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by

Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon. Nevertheless the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighboring Thracian town. Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears however, that the Milesians, glad to get rid of a leader who had brought them nothing but mischief, paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession. The desertion of Aristagoras with the citizens whom he carried away, must have seriously damped the spirits of those who remained. Nevertheless it seems that the cause of the Ionic revolters was quite as well conducted without him.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histæus of Miletus his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomentor of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Miletus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed (so the news reached him) by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. “The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they*?” On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could toward the heavens, saying—“Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians.” He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—“Master, remember the Athenians;” for as to the Ionians he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough.

This Homeric incident deserves notice as illustrating the epical handling of Herodotus. His theme is, the invasions of Greece by Persia: he has now arrived at the first eruption, in the bosom of Darius, of that passion which impelled the Persian forces toward Marathon and Salamis—and he marks the beginning of a new phase by act and word both alike significant. It may be compared to the libation and prayer addressed by Achilles in the Iliad to Zeus, at the moment when he is sending forth Patroklus and the Myrmidons to the rescue of the despairing Greeks.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histæus, whom he called into his presence and questioned. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and

even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiaeus) had been at Miletus instead of being detained at Susa. "Send me down to the spot (he asseverated), and I engage not merely to quell the revolt and put into your hands the traitor who heads it—but also not to take off this tunic from my body, before I shall have added to your empire the great island of Sardinia." An expedition to Sardinia, though never realized, appears to have been among the favorite fancies of the Ionic Greeks of that day. By such boasts and assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them. But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernes better informed than the Great King at Susa. Though Histiaeus, when questioned as to the causes which had brought on the outbreak, affected nothing but ignorance and astonishment, Artaphernes detected his evasions, and said—"I will tell you how the facts stand, Histiaeus: it is you that have stitched this shoe, and Aristagoras has put it on." Such a declaration promised little security to the suspected Milesian who heard it; and accordingly, as soon as night arrived, he took to flight, went down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count, as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt; and he farther added, in order to increase his popularity, that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiaeus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the good-will of the Chians, who carried him back to Miletus; but before he departed, he dispatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger, Hermippus of Atarneus, betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernes. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers sent to Histiaeus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernes was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him; but Histiaeus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.

On arriving at Miletus, Histiaeus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot; nevertheless he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium, pillaging

and detaining the Ionian merchant-ships as they passed into or out of the Euxine. The few remaining piracies of this worthless traitor, mischievous to his countrymen even down to the day of his death, hardly deserve our notice amid the last struggles and sufferings of the subjugated Ionians, to which we are now hastening.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Miletus, against which city Artaphernes had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phœnician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-operated on the coast. To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint pan-Ionic council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phœnicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Lade—then a little island near Miletus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the center, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priene, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teos—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phokæa, and seventy from Lesbos.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterward, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Lade. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two, and indeed the anticipations of the Persians and Phœnicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxes at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernes, each of these men dispatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavoring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and

by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative. The confederates at Lade seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans, and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Lade, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistokles, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this, was the Phokæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phokæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships, and her ancient maritime spirit survived only in the bosom of her captain. When Dionysius saw the Ionians assembled at Lade, willing, eager, full of talk and mutual encouragement, but untrained and taking no thought of discipline, or nautical practice, or co-operation in the hour of battle—he saw the risk which they ran for want of these precautions, and strenuously remonstrated with them: “Our fate hangs on the razor’s edge, men of Ionia: either to be freemen or slaves,—and slaves, too, caught after running away. Set yourself at once to work and duty. You will then have trouble indeed at first, with certain victory and freedom afterward; but if you persist in this carelessness and disorder, there is no hope for you to escape the king’s revenge for your revolt. Be persuaded and commit yourself to me. I pledge myself, if the gods only hold an equal balance, that your enemies either will not fight, or will be severely beaten.”

The wisdom of this advice was so apparent, that the Ionians, quitting their comfortable tents on the shore of Lade, and going on board their ships, submitted themselves to the continuous nautical labors and manœuvres imposed upon them by Dionysius. The rowers, and the hoplites on the deck, were exercised in their separate functions, and even when they were not so employed, the ships were kept at anchor, and the crews on board, instead of on shore; so that the work lasted all day long, under a hot summer’s sun. Such labor was new to the Ionian crews. They endured it for seven successive

days, after which they broke out with one accord into resolute mutiny and refusal: "Which of the Gods have we offended, to bring upon ourselves such a retribution as this? madmen as we are, to put ourselves into the hands of this Phokæan braggart, who has furnished only three ships! He has now got us and is ruining us without remedy; many of us are already sick, many others are sickening. We had better make up our minds to Persian slavery, or any other mischiefs, rather than go on with these present sufferings. Come, we will not obey this man any longer." And they forthwith refused to execute his orders, resuming their tents on shore, with the enjoyments of shade, rest, and inactive talk, as before.

I have not chosen to divest this instructive scene of the dramatic liveliness with which it is given in Herodotus—the more so as it has all the air of reality, and as Hekataeus the historian was probably present in the Island of Lade, and may have described what he actually saw and heard. When we see the intolerable hardship which these nautical maneuvers and labors, imposed upon the Ionians, though men not accustomed to ordinary ship-work,—and when we witness their perfect incapacity to submit themselves to such a discipline, even with extreme danger staring them in the face—we shall be able to appreciate the severe and unremitting toil whereby the Athenian seaman afterward purchased that perfection of nautical discipline which characterized him at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It will appear, as we proceed with this history, that the full development of the Athenian democracy worked a revolution in Grecian military marine, chiefly by enforcing upon the citizen seaman a strict continuous training, such as was only surpassed by the Lacedæmonian drill on land—and by thus rendering practicable a species of nautical maneuvering, which was unknown even at the time of the battle of Salamis. I shall show this more fully hereafter: at present I contrast it briefly with the incapacity of the Ionians at Lade, in order that it may be understood how painful such training really was. The reader of Grecian history is usually taught to associate only ideas of turbulence and anarchy with the Athenian democracy. But the Athenian navy, the child and champion of that democracy, will be found to display an indefatigable labor and obedience nowhere else witnessed in Greece—of which even the first lessons, as in the case now before us, prove to others so irksome as to outweigh the prospect of extreme and imminent peril. The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Lade, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterward as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire.

Ending in this abrupt and mutinous manner, the judicious suggestions of the Phokæan leader did more harm than good. Perhaps his manner of dealing may have been unadvisedly rude; but we are

surprised to see that no one among the leaders of the larger contingents had the good sense to avail himself of the first readiness of the Ionians, and to employ his superior influence in securing the continuance of a good practice once begun. Not one such superior man did this Ionic revolt throw up. From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmangeable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot—Æakes, son of Syloson. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence; and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters. The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the center of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phokæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest. The defeat of the Ionians at Lade was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykale, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria.—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain. It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophon, or Lebedus, or Eræ.

The Phokæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Lade was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed

to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phokæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury toward Greeks. Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakes. How these Samian emigrants became established in the Sicilian town of Zankle, I shall mention as a part of the course of Sicilian events, which will come hereafter.

The victory of Lade enabled the Persians to attack Miletus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigor, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their resources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampe, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekataeus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily. It is certain, however, that the new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Miletus; for it appears ever afterward as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Miletus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt, carried with it the rapid submission of the neighboring towns in Karia; and during the next summer—the Phenician fleet having wintered at Miletus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnesus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phenician fleet. The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkedon fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiades only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pur-

suers were indeed so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiades had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phenicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king; who, however, when Metiochus, the son of Miltiades, was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Lade were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it. That much of this hard treatment is well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterward as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Lade; while *Æakes*, the despot of that island, was reinstated in his government. It appears that several other despots were reinstated at the same time in their respective cities, though we are not told which.

Amid the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of *Histiæus* excites but little sympathy. He was carrying on his piracies at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Miletus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phokæan *Dionysius*) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of *Histiæus*, and accompanied him to the plunder of *Thasos*. While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Miletus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on *Thasos* unfinished, in order to go and defend *Lesbos*. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around *Atarneus* and in the fertile plain of *Mysia* near the river *Kaikus*. Here

he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernes the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiaëus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honorably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.

We need not wonder that the capture of Miletus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy)—The Capture of Miletus—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience, that they burst into tears in the theater, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as “having recalled to them their own misfortune.” The piece was forbidden to be afterward acted, and has not come down to us. Some critics have supposed that Herodotus has not correctly assigned the real motive which determined the Athenians to impose this fine; for it is certain that the subjects usually selected for tragedy were portions of heroic legend, and not matters of recent history; so that the Athenians might complain of Phrynichus on the double ground—for having violated an established canon of propriety, as well as for touching their sensibilities too deeply. Still, I see no reason for doubting that the cause assigned by Herodotus is substantially the true one. Yet it is very possible that Phrynichus, at an age when tragic poetry had not yet reached its full development, might touch this very tender subject with a rough and offensive hand, before a people who had fair reason to dread the like cruel fate for themselves. Æschylus, in his *Persæ*, would naturally carry with him the full tide of Athenian sympathy, while dwelling on the victories of Salamis and Plataea. But to interest the audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering, was a task in which much greater poets than Phrynichus would have failed—and which no judicious poet would have undertaken. The sack of Magdeburg by Count Tilly, in the Thirty Years’ war, was not likely to be endured as the subject of dramatic representation in any Protestant town of Germany.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

IN the preceding chapter, I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernes the satrap, when he enjoined the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterward converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernes proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoicing deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement; without any material departure, however, for the sums which had been paid before the revolt. Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may, however, assume it as certain that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Miletus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city, with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pedasa. Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterward. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Hekataëus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been

extreme. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernes, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and toward each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities; leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well-founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria; so that the expedition afterward accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had

not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighborhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed 300 ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than 20,000 men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was imputable to him. We shall hear of him again under Xerxes.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defense, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their main-land territory opposite. The mines at Skapte Hyle in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was 200 talents (£46,000, if Attic talents; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbors; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skapte Hyle. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbors often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdera.

Though dissatisfied with Mardonius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians. Orders were dispatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transport for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless, he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected

expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favorable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterward, toward the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between Thebes and Ægina on one side, and Athens on the other—began several years before, and growing out of the connection between Athens and Platœa—had never yet been terminated. The Æginetans had taken part in that war from gratuitous feeling, either of friendship for Thebes or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel, and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506–492 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions toward the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water. The reception given to them at both places was angry in the extreme. The Athenians cast the herald into the pit called the Barathrum, into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans threw the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the

Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Grecian states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared so gross an insult as to banish from their minds for the time all recollection of established obligations. They came subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterward. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general liberties of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader, and placing them with regard to him in the same state of inexpiable hostility as Athens and Eretria. We see at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented “as treason to Hellas,” calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenes, king of Sparta, went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, “for the general benefit of Hellas.”

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference toward her such as was not felt toward any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognized as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Cræsus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Plataeans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of

this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykrates of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenseless against an overpowering Grecian neighbor. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Grecian history, such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognized political union of Greece against the Persian—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Miletus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenes, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavorable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon, and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the sea-port belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sepeia near Tiryns. Kleomenes, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-

reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenes, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner, they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenes having inclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them—Kleomenes set fire to the grove and burned it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword. After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learned that it belonged to the hero Argus. Not less than 6,000 citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenes might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigor. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valor of the Argeian women; who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls. This is probably a myth, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about “the female conquering the male.” Without meaning to deny that the Argeian women might have been capable of achieving so patriotic a deed, if Kleomenes had actually marched to the attack of their city—we are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that he never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to

Sparta, retaining only 1000 choice troops—with whom he marched up to the Heræum, or great temple of Here, between Argos and Mykenæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenes had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athene on the Athenian acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally toward the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenes returned with his remaining forces to Sparta.

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Heræum. There, though his sacrifice was favorable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Here, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm; but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticising this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defense, insuring to Kleomenes an honorable acquittal.

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon; who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of allies who are bound both to her and

to each other. Her title to this honor, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenes had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so. The circumstances of the Kleomonic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that king Kleomenes passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when Krius and some others among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenes in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step, and promised to carry them through it in safety. Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenes, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenes was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him, and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamored of the wife of his friend Agetus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped

him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agetus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agetus, who was thunder-struck at the request, and indignantly complained of having been cheated into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath, "The child cannot be mine." He soon, however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.

Of these suspicions Kleomenes now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychides, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychides was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenes, espousing the pretensions of Leotychides, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kobon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo. Leotychides thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theater, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Stung with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotychides might in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good, to Sparta. So saying he covered his face and retired home from the theater—offered a solemn farewell sacrifice at the altar of Zeus Herkeios, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretense of going to consult the Delphian oracle.

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious

man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenes and Leotychides became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate. Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favors and presents. We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxes, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenes, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychides, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenes made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Krius and another person named Kasambus, the two most powerful men in the island. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbor and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of 600 armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and horses; was brought hither for their embarkation: the

troops were put on board and sailed along the coast of Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median—and Artaphernes son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence. These orders were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistokles and Aristides would be seen among a mournful train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Demokedes.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistokles most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxes) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long *solge*, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabates with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians. Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices, sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Grecian sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking reconquest of Ionia, and by the exhibition of a large Phenician fleet in the Ægean. The strength of Naxos was the same now as it had been before the Ionic revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand Naxian hoplites abandon their towns and their gods without striking a blow, and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for Athens and Eretria!

From Naxos Datis dispatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tenos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding re-enforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory. The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish re-enforcements against their friends and neighbors. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which Datis had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against Eretria, whither he soon arrived.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this fated city, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighboring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such re-enforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians. Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschines was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Oropus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Tamynæ and other places in the territory. As the

Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery. It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth. Evidently this is an idea, illustrating the possible effects of numbers and ruinous conquest, which has been woven into the tissue of historical statements, like so many other illustrative ideas in the writings of Greek authors. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians, and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxes.

Datis had thus accomplished with little or no resistance one of the two express objects commanded by Darius, and his army were elated with the confident hope of soon completing the other. After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighboring islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, he re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenes in the constitution had now existed eighteen or nineteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its constituent demes, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the

citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined decision, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons successively chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenes. Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defense of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But, unfortunately, we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C. nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form, however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiades, Themistokles, and Aristeides.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the œkist Miltiades. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histæus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed: but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt. What part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He availed himself, however, of the period while the Persian satraps were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expel, in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Pelasgic inhabitants from the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. But the extinction of the Ionic revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phenician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Miletus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son, Metiochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phenicians were most eager to capture Miltiades himself, inasmuch as he was personally odious to Darius from his strenuous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phenician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the

Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised. Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of the government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However the people at Athens honorably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Lemnos; and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Attic year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiades is one of great bravery and decision—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenes, like his younger contemporaries Themistokles and Aristeides. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megakles, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistokles and Aristeides, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussion in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Attica disunited and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Diakrii under one man, and the Parali and Pedieis under others—we have now Attica one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding to accountability the magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistokles, Aristeides, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistokles nor Aristeides could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiades. Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeides, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neokles, father of Themistokles, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia; and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistokles must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively defi-

cient in the other. In the description of Themistokles, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydides, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action; when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydides draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistokles probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Perikles especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistokles had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists, and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydides, and whom Aristophanes, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon. There is no evidence in the mind of Thucydides of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistokles as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprung up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Perikles.

The general character given by Plutarch, though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thucydides. Themistokles had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiades acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon

the upholding and aggrandizement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves honorable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeides we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Thucydides. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos, however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeides was inferior to Themistokles in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenes, the first founder of the democracy—as pursuing a straight and a single-handed course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of the Just, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candor in political dispute—and as manifesting throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw, and beyond all suspicion, recognized equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognized as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thucydides ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Perikles; while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeides—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistokles—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity; which procured for him, however, along with

the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracizing vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeides, on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be so boastfully talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the country. The less it is obtruded, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt: and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by absurd encomiasts, or perhaps by insidious enemies under the mask of encomiasts, who trumpeted forth Aristeides as *The Just man of Attica*, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracized during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistokles was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxes brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistokles and Aristeides, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistokles would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeides would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeides and Miltiades were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistokles also was general of his tribe on the same occasion, though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the 4,000 Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their coun-

trymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterward Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. But doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippides the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 48 hours. Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretense on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of an ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history. Indeed their delay in marching to rescue Attica from Mardonius, eleven years afterward, at the imminent hazard of alienating Athens and ruining the Hellenic cause, marks the same selfish dullness. But the reason now given certainly looked very like a pretense, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippides was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiades, with the remaining four, strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defense to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely

march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand. And probably, indeed, Miltiades himself, if debarred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous fleet sailing round to Phalerum, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiades had to await the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiades) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiades; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristides and Themistokles are both recorded to have seconded Miltiades warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiades their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle. Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Herakles near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithæron, and passing through Dekeleia. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this unimportant neighbor, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a lasting feud with Thebes and the Bœotian league. Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian

town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterward in the public prayers of the Athenian herald, and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon its effect must have been unspeakably powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Platæa. This statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed, the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4,000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Eubœa. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered. The aggregate crews on board of all their ships must have been between 150,000 and 200,000 men. Yet what proportion of these were fighting-men, or how many actually did fight at Marathon, we have no means of determining. There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length; the southern—longer but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march.

It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargettus and Pallene, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon, forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while "its plain (says a careful modern observer) extends in a perfect level along this fine bay and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheater of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior."

The position occupied by Miltiades before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Herakles near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. Cornelius Nepos tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshaled them for the battle. The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the center, which they considered as the post of honor, and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plataæans. It was necessary for Miltiades to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. Nor could the Persians have been very strong in this latter force, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the Ægean; but the elevated position of Miltiades enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favorable for bat-

tle. Miltiades, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or pæan which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, astounded the Persian army. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathon, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run. It doubtless operated beneficially in rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the center, where the files were shallow, and where moreover the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistokles and Aristides among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ. Miltiades seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his center. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the center was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished. The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defense here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed. This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6,400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus one of the ten generals, were among the slain; together with Kynegirus, son of Euphorion, who, on laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the

vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe, and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight; to whose imagination this battle at the ships must have emphatically recalled the fifteenth book of the Iliad. Both the slain Athenian generals are said to have perished in the assault of the ships, apparently the hottest part of the combat. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable, but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiades did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiades saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Herakles at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet. Datis soon came off the port of Phalerum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighborhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiades in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalerum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiades so emphatically urged. The running step on the field of Marathon might

cause some disorder in the ranks of the hoplites; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means of preventing disunion and distraction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there, so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalerum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalerum—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phaleric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted, or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiades, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxes impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defense of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the childish insolence of Xerxes led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the prudence of distracting the attention of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for rallying the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighborhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the rapidity of Miltiades so precipitated the

battle that this signal came too late, and was only given "when the Persians were already in their ships," after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiades been as rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiades belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chances all turned out in his favor—for the unexpected junction of the Platæans in the very encampment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and distracting accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find this extraneous encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he could not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amid which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Persæ to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxes, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kynegirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had never yet been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the high handed and cruel extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks. To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And the admirable conduct of the five dissentient generals, when outvoted by the decision of the polemarch against them, in co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the Persian had ever received from Greeks in the

field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterward, could be treated by Themistokles as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon; which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound. It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterward, at the invasion of Xerxes, without faltering in their pan-Hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into commonplace, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations. It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future. Themistokles is said to have been robbed of his sleep by the trophies of Miltiades, and this is cited in proof of his ambitious temperament. Yet without supposing either jealousy or personal love of glory, the rapid transit from extreme danger to unparalleled triumph might well deprive of rest even the most sober-minded Athenian.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus (probably about 450–440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to Alkmæonids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæonids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylo-nian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumors. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Perikles, son of Xanthippus, and Kimon, son of Miltiades, was at its height. Perikles belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæonid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political maneuvers against him by his enemies.

Moreover the enmity between Kimon and Perikles had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiades. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæonid, his marriage with Agariste connected himself indirectly, and his son Perikles directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæonids, on that great occasion which founded the glory of Miltiades; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return march from Marathon to Athens, Aristides with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the 192 Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Plataeans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiades himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalized warriors. Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the sea shore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same. The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshiped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Herakles.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippides on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him, in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a plowshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetlus. Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. "It is dangerous (observes that pious author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter; the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately pried into their secrets.

Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkile, wherein, amid several figures of gods and heroes—Athene, Herakles, Theseus, Echelus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honored and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiades, while the Plataeans were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques. The sixth of the month Boedromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch.

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the third day of their march—a surprising effort when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians; after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernes returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia; stopping for a short time at the island of Mykonos, where discovery was made of a gilt image of Apollo carried off as booty in a Phœnician ship. Datis went himself to restore it to Delos, requesting the Delians to carry it back to the Delium or temple of Apollo on the eastern coast of Bœotia; the Delians however chose to keep the statue until it was reclaimed from them twenty years afterward by the Thebans. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. Though he had been vehemently incensed against them, yet when he saw them in his power, his wrath abated, and he manifested no desire to kill or harm them. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.

Happy would it have been for Miltiades if he had shared the honorable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—"animam exlasset opimam"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch that his head was turned, and he lost

both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go; but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiades knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents on pain of entire destruction. His pretense for this attack was that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive (so Herodotus assures us) was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnes against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Miltiades prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town. Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timo, priestess or attendant in the temple of Demeter, near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near he was seized with a panic-terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on shipboard; the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiades on his return. Of this feeling Xanthippus, father of the great Perikles, became the spokesman. He impeached Miltiades before the popular judicature, as having been guilty of deceiving the people and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defense. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defense, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by

rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his iniquity." Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiades themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take a choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration. Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiades, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant, and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiades did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died. But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment, before absolute execution was resorted to; though the person under sentence became disfranchised, and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now, in the instance of Miltiades, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial. To carry away the suffering general

in his couch, incapable of raising himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the dikasts to a prison—would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Herodotus would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe, therefore, that Miltiades died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If *he* could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to rescue the suffering Miltiades from being sent thither, would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent from the pinnacle of glory to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed, is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiades has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiades; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behavior in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty: he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge: in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt,

such behavior, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem? The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiades, that question must be answered in the affirmative.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiades deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment, upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a license of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterward, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude toward Miltiades. For if all that be meant is, that gratitude for previous services ought to pass, not as a receipt in full for subsequent crime, but as an extenuating circumstance in the measurement of the penalty, the answer is, that it was so reckoned in the Athenian treatment of Miltiades. His friends had nothing whatever to urge, against the extreme penalty proposed by his accuser, except these previous services—which influenced the dikasts sufficiently to induce them to inflict the lighter punishment instead of the heavier. Now the whole amount of punishment inflicted consisted in a fine which certainly was not beyond his reasonable means of paying, or of prevailing upon friends to pay for him—since his son Kimon actually did pay it. Those who blame the Athenians for ingratitude, unless they are prepared to maintain the doctrine, that previous services are to pass as full acquittal for future crime, have no other ground left except to say that the fine was too high; that instead of being fifty talents, it ought to have been

no more than forty, thirty, twenty, or tén talents. Whether they are right in this, I will not take upon me to pronounce: if the amount was named on behalf of the accused party, the dikastery had no legal power of diminishing it; but it is within such narrow limits that the question actually lies, when transferred from the province of sentiment to that of reason. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiades arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of the Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct. That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is, an impression in the minds of the dikasts favorable to his general character and behavior: of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the orators, I shall be prepared to show that such indisposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled dikasts at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiades, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations toward Miltiades such as were never paid toward any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured

admiration unseated his rational judgment. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity;—that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgment startling in its rapidity as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiades been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Demosthenes indeed, in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiades as being noway more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiades might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiades ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—“Give me a fleet of ships: do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you.” Herein we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depravation; while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistokles.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiades did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude toward a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterward to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harbored an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities; but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion,

and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressible Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralized by success: there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiades illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the best grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; inasmuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: Secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathizing circle of neighbors. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, etc.; and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative

bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Demos assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgment; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgments, and to neutralize the contagion of mere sympathizing impulse. There were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people: but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of Perikles, as depicted by Thucydides: his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. “When Perikles (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unreasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence.” We shall find Demosthenes, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honorable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent and forced itself upon every one's notice—being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present. And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.—PYTHAGORAS.—KROTON AND SYBARIS.

THE history of the powerful Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, between the accession of Peisistratus and the battle of Marathon, is for the most part unknown to us. Phalaris, despot of Agrigentum in Sicily, made for himself an unenviable name during this obscure interval. His reign seems to coincide in time with the earlier part of the rule of Peisistratus (about 560–540 B.C.), and the few and vague statements which we find respecting it, merely show us that it was a period of extortion and cruelty, even beyond the ordinary license of Grecian despots. The reality of the hollow bull of brass, which Phalaris was accustomed to heat in order to shut up his victims in it and burn them, appears to be better authenticated than the nature of the story would lead us to presume. For it is not only noticed by Pindar, but even the actual instrument of this torture—the brazen bull itself—which had been taken away from Agrigentum as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the subjugation of Carthage to its original domicile. Phalaris is said to have acquired the supreme command by undertaking the task of building a great temple to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a pretense whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed at the festival of the Thesmophoria to put down the authorities. He afterward disarmed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed cruelties which rendered him so abhorred that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Telemachus (ancestor of the subsequent despot Theron), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.

During the interval between 540–500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fall both the war between Sybaris and Kroton and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connection with this latter name it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Grecian philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterized those distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of them, however, the Milesian Thales, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigators. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs

seemingly to the interval about 640-550 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataeus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he marks an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind as having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Hesiodic theogony, introducing the conception of substances with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as lasting from his time down to that of Sokrates. Writers, ancient as well as modern, have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy in the philosophical vein of Thales, Hippo, Anaximenes, and Diogenes of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Xenophanes of Elea, and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians, Parmenides and Zeno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thales), as well as to Herakleitus, we find them departing in a great degree even from that character which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thales partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a fair proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, indeterminate, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, etc., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge—so also does the received belief supply invisible agents in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in rendering a plausible account of everything which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of these invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as unbegotten and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even this flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thales disengaged

Grecian philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and matters propounded for inquiry. These he retained and transmitted to his successors as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally insoluble, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any impersonal hypothesis such as those of Thales and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to argumentative attack, and of course requiring the like defense. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire when and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of men, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, etc.—to assign some comprehensive reason, why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the destinies of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and set forth with eloquent plausibility; but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free scrutiny.

At the time when the power of scientific investigation was scanty and helpless, the problems proposed were thus such as to lie out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of *quæsitæ*, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones alike unfathomable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the antagonist force of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which it nourished from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanes, continuing to manifest itself seven centuries afterward in *Ænesidemus* and *Sextus Empiricus*, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear an unpopular name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half sceptical, like *Sokrates* and *Plato*, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under *Thales*, because the circumstances were then laid which so soon afterward developed them.

Though the celebrity of Thales in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him: it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkæus was serving in the Babylonian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Milesian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-observatory of the Chaldæan priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanes assures us; and Herakleitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with similar esteem. To him were traced by the Grecian inquirers of the fourth century B. C., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (*φύσις*) first comes into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter) with its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, as distinguished from the *theology* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thales—still less upon the solar eclipse respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the year of occurrence. But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped Oceanus and Tethys, primeval parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and into which everything returned. The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Grecian public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thales supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thales is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very faintly transmitted, are conceived as active powers and causes of changeful manifestation, attached to the primeval substance; the universe being assimilated to an organized body or system.

Respecting Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thales with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century B. C. : but both Anaximau-

der, Xenophanes, and Pherekydes belong to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Praxiades was a native of Miletus—Xenophanes, a native of Kolophon; the former among the earliest expositors of doctrine in prose, while the latter committed his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis, of his predecessor Thales. Instead of the primeval fluid of the latter, he supposed a primeval principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its continually self-changing nature—a principle, which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other—a primeval something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phenomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, or Generation or Destruction—how it happened that one sensible thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquirers were in the habit of setting to themselves. He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the affirmation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primeval Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Grecian philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle, and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of Grecian philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which exists eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature thus conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thales, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to suggest and stimulate observations of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or confuting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by reasonings expressed in general language; reasonings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thales, although deserted by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaximenes and others afterward, and reproduced with many divergences of doctrine—yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Grecian philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thales, but as the author of an hypothesis both new and tending in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought: we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a sun-dial in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic; how far such alleged authorship really belongs to him, we cannot be certain—but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea within his cognizance, and to construct a chart or map founded thereupon—seemingly a tablet of brass. Such a novelty, wondrous even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds and from it may be dated the commencement of Grecian rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Xenophanes of Kolophon, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (seemingly from about 570–480 B.C.), migrated from Kolophon to Zankle and Katana in Sicily and Elea in Italy, soon after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (540–530 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Xenophanes—doubtless with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Perikles, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Kolophon and another on that of Elea; besides his poem on Nature, wherein his philosophical doctrines were set forth. His manner appears to have been controversial and full of asperity toward antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-spoken manner in which he declared himself against the popular religion, and in which he denounced as abominable the descriptions of the gods given by Homer and Hesiod. He is said to have controverted the doctrines both of Thales and Pythagoras: this is probable enough; but he seems to have taken his start from the philosophy of Anaximander—not however to adopt it, but to reverse it—and to set forth an opinion which we may call its contrary. Nature, in the conception of Anaximander, consisted of a Something having no other attribute except the unlimited power of generating and canceling phenomenal changes; in this doctrine the Something or Substratum existed only in and for those changes, and could not be said to exist

at all in any other sense: the Permanent was thus merged and lost in the Variable—the One in the Many. Xenophanes laid down the exact opposite: he conceived nature as one unchangeable and indivisible Whole, spherical, animated, endued with reason, and penetrated by or indeed identical with God. He denied the objective reality of all change, or generation, or destruction, which he seems to have considered as only changes or modifications in the percipient, and perhaps different in one percipient and another. That which exists (he maintained) could not have been generated, nor could it ever be destroyed: there was neither real generation nor real destruction of anything; but that which men took for such was the change in their own feelings and ideas. He thus recognized the Permanent without the Variable—the One without the Many. And his treatment of the received religious creed was in harmony with such physical or metaphysical hypothesis; for while he held the whole of nature to be God, without parts or change, he at the same pronounced the popular gods to be entities of subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if oxen or lions were to become religious (he added), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters. This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expounded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and rudely, by Xenophanes; at least, we may infer thus much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle. But his successors, Parmenides and Zeno, in the succeeding century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary acuteness of dialectics, and even superadded a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Ens—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they will be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanes, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a mournful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge, which the nature of his philosophy was well calculated to suggest, and in which the sillograph Timon of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanes better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathized.

The cosmogony of Pherekydes of Syrus, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism, and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Grecian philosophy. By what has been said of Thales, Anaximander, and Xenophanes, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued farther, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discus-

sion, which Solon, who died about 558 B.C., had never heard of—just as he may probably never have seen the map of Anaximander. But neither of these two distinguished men—Anaximander or Xenophanes—was anything more than a speculative inquirer. The third eminent name of this century, of whom I am now about to speak, Pythagoras, combined in his character disparate elements which require rather a longer development.

Pythagoras was founder of a brotherhood, originally brought together by a religious influence, and with observances approaching to monastic peculiarity—working in a direction at once religious, political, and scientific, and exercising for some time a real political ascendancy,—but afterward banished from government and state affairs into a sectarian privacy with scientific pursuits, not without however still producing some statesmen individually distinguished. Amid the multitude of false and apocryphal statements which circulated in antiquity respecting this celebrated man, we find a few important facts reasonably attested and deserving credence. He was a native of Samos, son of an opulent merchant named Mnesarchus,—or, according to some of his later and more fervent admirers, of Apollo: born, as far as we can make out, about the fiftieth Olympiad, or 580 B.C. On the many marvels recounted respecting his youth it is unnecessary to dwell. Among them may be numbered his wide-reaching travels, said to have been prolonged for nearly thirty years, to visit the Arabians, the Syrians, the Phenicians, the Chaldæans, the Indians, and the Gallic Druids. But there is reason to believe that he really visited Egypt—perhaps also Phenicia and Babylon, then Chaldæan and independent. At the time when he saw Egypt, between 560–540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Amasis, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet unimpaired by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admission during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian habits, the conversation of the priests, and the initiation into various mysteries or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observance, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thales, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydes of Syros: amid the towns of Ionia he would, moreover, have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek navigators who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly toward an imaginative and religious vein of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly toward that active exercise, both of mind and body, which

the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaus and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, though doubtless the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, etc., must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanes of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, desired the striker to desist, saying—"It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognized by his voice." This—together with the general testimony of Herakleitus, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for mischief and destitute of sound judgment—is all that we know about him from contemporaries. Herodotus, two generations afterward, while he conceives the Pythagoreans as a peculiar religious order, intimates that both Orpheus and Pythagoras had derived the doctrine of the metempsychosis from Egypt, but had pretended to it as their own without acknowledgment. Pythagoras combines the character of a sophist (a man of large observation, and clever, ascendent, inventive mind—the original sense of the word Sophist, prior to the polemics of the Platonic school, and the only sense known to Herodotus), with that of an inspired teacher, prophet, and worker of miracles,—approaching to and sometimes even confounded with the gods,—and employing all these gifts to found a new special order of brethren bound together by religious rites and observances peculiar to themselves. In his prominent vocation, analogous to that of Epimenides, Orpheus, or Melampus, he appears as a revealer of a mode of life calculated to raise his disciples above the level of mankind, and to recommend them to the favor of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life, being intended as the exclusive prerogative of the brotherhood—approached only by probation and initiatory ceremonies, which were adapted to select enthusiasts rather than to an indiscriminate crowd—and exacting entire mental devotion to the master. In these lofty pretensions the Agrigentine Empedokles seems to have greatly copied him, though with some varieties, about half a century afterward. While Aristotle tells us that the Krotoniates identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Timon pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech, engaged in fishing for men." This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is, however, no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to contract the same belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by witnesses in and nearest to his own age—Xenophanes, Herakleitus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Isokrates—we find in him chiefly the religious missionary and schoolmaster, with little of the politician. His efficiency in the latter character, originally subordinate, first becomes prominent in those glowing fancies which the later Pythagoreans communicated to Aristoxenus and Dikæarchus. The primitive Pythagoras is inspired by the gods to reveal a new mode of life—the Pythagorean life—and to promise divine favor to a select and docile few as the recompense of strict ritual obedience, of austere self-control, and of laborious training, bodily as well as mental. To speak with confidence of the details of his training, ethical or scientific, and of the doctrines which he promulgated, is impossible; for neither he himself nor any of his disciples anterior to Philolaus (who was separated from him by about one intervening generation) left any memorials in writing. Numbers and lines, studied partly in their own mutual relations, partly under various symbolizing fancies, presented themselves to him as the primary constituent elements of the universe, and as a sort of magical key to phenomena, physical as well as moral. Such mathematical tendencies in his teaching, expanded by Pythagoreans his successors, and coinciding partly also (as has been before stated) with the studies of Anaximander and Thales, acquired more and more development, so as to become one of the most glorious and profitable manifestations of Grecian intellect. Living, as Pythagoras did, at a time when the stock of experience was scanty, the license of hypothesis unbounded, and the process of deduction without rule or verifying test—he was thus fortunate enough to strike into that track of geometry and arithmetic, in which, from data of experience few, simple, and obvious, an immense field of deductive and verifiable investigation may be traveled over. We must at the same time remark, however, that in his mind this track, which now seems so straightforward and well-defined, was clouded by strange fancies which it is not easy to understand, and from which it was but partially cleared by his successors.

Of his spiritual training much is said, though not upon very good authority: we hear of his memorial discipline, his monastic self-scrutiny, his employment of music to soothe disorderly passions, his long novitiate of silence, his knowledge of physiognomy which enabled him to detect, even without trial, unworthy subjects, his peculiar diet, and his rigid care for sobriety as well as for bodily vigor. He is also said to have inculcated abstinence from animal food; a feeling so naturally connected with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, that we may well believe him to have entertained it, as Empedokles also did after him. It is certain that there were peculiar observances, and probably a certain measure of self-denial, embodied in the Pythagorean life. Yet, on the other hand, it seems

equally certain that the members of the order cannot have been all subjected to the same diet, or training, or studies; for Milo the Krotoniate was among them, the strongest man and the unparalleled wrestler of his age—who cannot possibly have dispensed with animal food and ample diet (even setting aside the tales about his voracious appetite), and is not likely to have bent his attention on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not enforce the same bodily or mental discipline on all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it first stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no communion with wrestlers, and comprised only ascetic, studious men, generally recluse, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The succession of these Pythagoreans, never very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out; being superseded by other schemes of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokrates. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterward, the orientalizing tendency—then beginning to spread over the Grecian and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative fanaticism—Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And thus, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all peculiarity of sect, and passed into the general studious world—the original vein of mystic and ascetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up **anew** into the pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrines of **Plato**. Neo-Pythagorism, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, outlasted the other more positive and masculine systems of pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras came from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of memorials from illustrating, with ample latitude of fancy, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Grecian philosophical inquirers within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one attested it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind

impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic habits and religion, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and, above all, endued with those talents for religious and personal ascendancy over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polykrates, which rendered it an unsuitable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuals. Unable to attract hearers, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 535-530 B.C.) the recent subjugation of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Miletus and Knidus on the one side, and Sybaris and Tarentum on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated seemingly about the same time—from Kolophon to Tanke, Katana, and Elea.

Kroton and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic name. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the heirs and representatives of the principal proprietors at its first foundation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what manner the executive offices were filled, we have no information. Besides a great extent of power, and a numerous population, the large mass of whom had no share in the political franchise, Kroton stood at this time distinguished for two things—the general excellence of the bodily habit of the citizens, attested in part by the number of conquerors furnished to the Olympic games—and the superiority of its physicians or surgeons. These two points were in fact greatly connected with each other; for the therapeutics of the day consisted not so much of active remedies as of careful diet and regimen; while the trainer, who dictated the life of an athlete during his long and fatiguing preparation for an Olympic contest—and the professional superintendent of the youths who frequented the public gymnasia—followed out the same general views and acted upon the same basis of knowledge as the physician who prescribed for a state of positive bad health. Of medical education properly so called, especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physician acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances: and this same knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best men in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the

former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Demokedes (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Milo), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia maintained themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asklepiads at Kos and Knidus, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct, produced an effect almost electric upon the minds of the people, with an extensive reform public as well as private. Political discontent was repressed, incontinence disappeared, luxury became discredited, and the women hastened to exchange their golden ornaments for the simplest attire. No less than 2,000 persons were converted at his first preaching. So effective were his discourses to the youth, that the Supreme Council of One Thousand invited him into their assembly, solicited his advice, and even offered to constitute him their Prytanis or president, while his wife and daughter were placed at the head of the religious processions of females. His influence was not confined to Kroton. Other towns in Italy and Sicily—Sybaris, Metapontum, Rhegium, Katana, Himera, etc., all felt the benefit of his exhortations, which extricated some of them even from slavery. Such are the tales of which the biographers of Pythagoras are full: and we see that even the disciples of Aristotle, about the year 300 B.C.—Aristoxenus, Dikæarchus, Herakleides of Pontus, etc.—are hardly less charged with them than the Neo-Pythagoreans of three or four centuries later. They doubtless heard these tales from their contemporary Pythagoreans, the last members of a declining sect, among whom the attributes of the primitive founder passed for godlike, but who had no memorials, no historical judgment, and no means of forming a true conception of Kroton as it stood in 530 B.C. To trace these tales to a true foundation is impossible. But we may reasonably believe that the success of Pythagoras, as a person favored by the gods and patentee of divine secrets, was very great—that he procured to himself both the reverence of the multitude, and the peculiar attachment and obedience of many devoted adherents, chiefly belonging to the wealthy and powerful classes—that a select body of these adherents, 300 in number, bound themselves by a sort of vow both to Pythagoras and to each other, adopting a peculiar diet, ritual, and observances, as a token of union—though without anything like community of property, which some have ascribed to them. Such a band of men, standing high in the city for wealth and station, and bound together by this intimate tie, came by almost unconscious tendency to mingle political ambition with religious and scientific pursuits. Political clubs with sworn

members, under one form or another, were a constant phenomenon in the Grecian cities. Now the Pythagorean order at its first formation was the most efficient of all clubs; since it presented an intimacy of attachment among its members, as well as a feeling of haughty exclusiveness against the public without, such as no other fraternity could parallel. The devoted attachment of Pythagoreans toward each other is not less emphatically set forth than their contempt for every one else: in fact these two attributes of the order seem the best ascertained as well as the most permanent of all. Moreover, we may be sure that the peculiar observances of the order passed for exemplary virtues in the eyes of its members, and exalted ambition into a duty, by making them sincerely believe that they were the only persons fit to govern. It is no matter of surprise, then, to learn that the Pythagoreans gradually drew to themselves great ascendancy in the government of Kroton. And as similar clubs, not less influential, were formed at Metapontum and other places, so the Pythagorean order spread its net and dictated the course of affairs over a large portion of Magna Græcia. Such ascendancy of the Pythagoreans must have procured for the master himself some real, and still more supposed, influence over the march of government at Kroton and elsewhere, of a nature not then possessed by any of his contemporaries throughout Greece. Yet his influence was probably exercised in the background, through the medium of the brotherhood who revered him: for it is hardly conformable to Greek manners that a stranger of his character should guide personally and avowedly the political affairs of any Grecian city.

Nor are we to believe that Pythagoras came originally to Kroton with the express design of creating for himself an ascendent political position—still less that he came for the purpose of realizing a great preconceived political idea, and transforming Kroton into a model city of pure Dorism, as has been supposed by some eminent modern authors. Such schemes might indeed be ascribed to him by Pythagoreans of the Platonic age, when large ideas of political amelioration were rife in the minds of speculative men—by men disposed to forego the authorship of their own opinions, and preferring to accredit them as traditions handed down from a founder who had left no memorials. But it requires better evidence than theirs to make us believe that any real Greek born in 580 B.C. actually conceived such plans. We cannot construe the scheme of Pythagoras as going farther than the formation of a private, select, order of brethren, embracing his religious fancies, ethical tone, and germs of scientific idea—and manifesting adhesion by those observances which Herodotus and Plato call the Pythagorean orgies and mode of life. And his private order became politically powerful, because he was skillful or fortunate enough to enlist a sufficient number of wealthy Krotoniates, possessing individual influence which they strengthened immensely by thus regimenting themselves in intimate union. The

Pythagorean orgies or religious ceremonies were not inconsistent with public activity, bodily as well as mental. Probably the rich men of the order may have been rendered even more active, by being fortified against the temptations of a life of indulgence. The character of the order as it first stood, different from that to which it was afterward reduced, was indeed religious and exclusive, but also active and domineering; not despising any of those bodily accomplishments which increased the efficiency of the Grecian citizen, and which so particularly harmonized with the pre-existing tendencies of Kroton. Niebuhr and O. Müller have even supposed that the select Three Hundred Pythagoreans constituted a sort of smaller senate at that city—an hypothesis no way probable; we may rather conceive them as a powerful private club, exercising ascendancy in the interior of the senate, and governing through the medium of the constituted authorities. Nor can we receive without great allowance the assertion of Varro, who, assimilating Pythagoras to Plato, tells us that he confined his instructions on matters of government to chosen disciples, who had gone through a complete training, and had reached the perfection of wisdom and virtue. It seems more probable that the political Pythagoreans were those who were most qualified for action, and least for speculation; and that the general of the order possessed that skill in turning to account the aptitudes of individuals, which two centuries ago was so conspicuous in the Jesuits; to whom, in various ways, the Pythagoreans bear considerable resemblance. All that we can be said to know about their political principles is, that they were exclusive and aristocratical, adverse to the control and interference of the people; a circumstance no way disadvantageous to them, since they coincided in this respect with the existing government of the city—had not their own conduct brought additional odium on the old aristocracy, and raised up an aggravated democratical opposition carried to the most deplorable lengths of violence.

All the information which we possess, apocryphal as it is, respecting this memorable club is derived from its warm admirers. Yet even their statements are enough to explain how it came to provoke deadly and extensive enmity. A stranger coming to teach new religious dogmas and observances, with a tincture of science and some new ethical ideas and phrases, though he would obtain some zealous votaries, would also bring upon himself a certain measure of antipathy. Extreme strictness of observances, combined with the art of touching skillfully the springs of religious terror in others, would indeed do much both to fortify and to exalt him. But when it was discovered that science, philosophy, and even the mystic revelations of religion, whatever they were, remained confined to the private talk and practice of the disciples, and were thus thrown into the background, while all that was seen and felt without was the political predominance of an ambitious fraternity—we need not wonder that Pythagorism in all its parts became odious to a large portion of the

community. Moreover we find the order represented not merely as constituting a devoted and exclusive political party, but also as manifesting an ostentatious self-conceit throughout their personal demeanor—refusing the hand of fellowship to all except the brethren, and disgusting especially their own familiar friends and kinsmen. So far as we know Grecian philosophy, this is the only instance in which it was distinctly abused for political and party objects. The early days of the Pythagorean order stand distinguished for such perversion, which fortunately for the progress of philosophy, never presented itself afterward in Greece. Even at Athens, however, we shall hereafter see that Sokrates, though standing really aloof from all party intrigue, incurred much of his unpopularity from supposed political conjunction with Kritias and Alkibiades, to which indeed the orator Æschines distinctly ascribes his condemnation, speaking about sixty years after the event. Had Sokrates been known as the founder of a band holding together intimately for ambitious purposes, the result would have been eminently pernicious to philosophy, and probably much sooner pernicious to himself.

It was this cause which brought about the complete and violent destruction of the Pythagorean order. Their ascendancy had provoked such widespread discontent, that their enemies became emboldened to employ extreme force against them. Kylon and Ninon—the former of whom is said to have sought admittance into the order, but to have been rejected on account of his bad character—took the lead in pronounced opposition to the Pythagoreans; whose unpopularity extended itself farther to the Senate of One Thousand, through the medium of which their ascendancy had been exercised. Propositions were made for rendering the government more democratic, and for constituting a new senate, taken by lot from all the people, before which the magistrates should go through their trial of accountability after office: an opportunity being chosen in which the Senate of One Thousand had given signal offense by refusing to divide among the people the recently conquered territory of Sybaris. In spite of the opposition of the Pythagoreans, this change of government was carried through. Ninon and Kylon, their principal enemies, made use of it to exasperate the people still farther against the order, until they provoked actual popular violence against it. The Pythagoreans were attacked when assembled in their meeting-house near the temple of Apollo, or, as some said, in the house of Milo. The building was set on fire, and many of the members perished; none but the younger and more vigorous escaping. Similar disturbances, and the like violent suppression of the order, with destruction of several among the leading citizens, are said to have taken place in other cities of Magna Græcia—Tarentum, Metapontum, Kaulonia. And we are told that these cities remained for some time in a state of great disquietude and commotion, from which they were only rescued by the friendly mediation of the Peloponnesian Achæ-

ans, the original founders of Sybaris and Kroton—assisted indeed by mediators from other parts of Greece. The cities were at length pacified, and induced to adopt an amicable congress, with common religious festivals, at a temple founded expressly for the purpose and dedicated to Zeus Homarius. Thus perished the original Pythagorean order. Respecting Pythagoras himself, there were conflicting accounts; some representing that he was burnt in the temple with his disciples; others, that he had died a short time previously; others again affirmed, that he was alive at the time, but absent, and that he died not long afterward in exile, after forty days of voluntary abstinence from food. His tomb was still shown at Metapontum in the days of Cicero. As an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observances and common pursuit of science. They were readmitted, after some interval, into the cities of Magna Græcia, from which they had been originally expelled, but to which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging—though individual members of it are found besides at Thebes and in other cities of Greece. Indeed, some of these later Pythagoreans sometimes even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between B. C. 540–530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotoniates. They had recently been defeated by the united Lokrians and Rhegians, vastly inferior to themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which humiliation is said to have rendered them docile to the training of the Samian missionary. As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotoniates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Traeis or Trionto, about twenty years afterward.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the period of 510 B. C., Sybaris seems to have been decidedly the greatest. Of its dominion as well as of its much denounced luxury I have spoken in a former chapter. It was at that time that the war broke out between them, which ended in the destruction of Sybaris. It is certain that the Sybaritans were aggressors in the war; but by what causes it had been preceded in their own town, or what provocation they had received, we make out very indistinctly. There had been a political revolution at Sybaris (we are told) not long before, in which a popular leader Telys had headed a rising against the oligarchical government, and induced the people to banish 500 of the leading rich men, as well as to confiscate their properties. He had acquired the sovereignty and become despot of Sybaris. It appears too that he, or his rule at Sybaris, was much abhorred at Kroton; since the Krotoniate Philip-

pus, a man of splendid muscular form and an Olympic victor, was exiled for having engaged himself to marry the daughter of Telys. According to the narrative given by the later Pythagoreans, those exiles, whom Telys had driven from Sybaris, took refuge at Kroton, casting themselves as suppliants on the altars for protection; it may well be, indeed, that they were in part Pythagoreans of Sybaris. A body of powerful exiles, harbored in a town so close at hand, inspired alarm, and Telys demanded that they should be delivered up, threatening war in case of refusal. This demand excited consternation at Kroton, since the military strength of Sybaris was decidedly superior. The surrender of the exiles was much debated, and almost decreed, by the Krotoniates, until at length the persuasion of Pythagoras himself is said to have determined them to risk any hazard sooner than incur the dishonor of betraying suppliants.

On the demand of the Sybarites being refused, Telys marched against Kroton at the head of a force which is reckoned at 300,000 men. He marched, too, in defiance of the strongest religious warnings against the enterprise; for the sacrifices, offered on his behalf by the Iamid prophet Kallias of Elis, were so decisively unfavorable, that the prophet himself fled in terror to Kroton. Near the river Traeis or Trionto, Telys was met by the forces of Kroton, consisting (we are informed) of 100,000 men, and commanded by the great athlete and Pythagorean Milo; who was clothed (we are told) in the costume and armed with the club of Herakles. They were farther reinforced by a valuable ally, the Spartan Dorieus (younger brother of king Kleomenes), then coasting along the Gulf of Tarentum with a body of colonists, intending to found a settlement in Sicily. A bloody battle was fought, in which the Sybarites were totally worsted, with prodigious slaughter; while the victors, fiercely provoked and giving no quarter, followed up the pursuit so warmly that they took the city, dispersed its inhabitants, and crushed its whole power in the short space of seventy days. The Sybarites fled in great part to Laos and Skidros, their settlements planted on the Mediterranean coast, across the Calabrian peninsula. So eager were the Krotoniates to render the site of Sybaris untenable, that they turned the course of the river Krathis so as to overwhelm and destroy it: the dry bed in which the river had originally flowed was still visible in the time of Herodotus, who was among the settlers in the town of Thurii afterward founded nearly adjoining. It appears, however, that the Krotoniates for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens; from which circumstances (as has been before noticed) the commotion against the Pythagorean order is said to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thurii was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterward. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish; they maintained

themselves at Loas, Skidros, and elsewhere—and afterward formed the privileged old-citizens among the colonists of Thurii; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory; Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Theokritus.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 510 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Miletus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shaved their heads in token of mourning. The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotoniates might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed to its wide dominion over dependent territory: and the extinction of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Oscan movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece by Xerxes thirty years after this conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens send to ask for aid both from Sicily and Korkyra, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greco-Italian cities. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thurii and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written memorials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both meager and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotoniates, who alleged that they had accomplished the conquest by themselves and with their own unaided forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel out of which the Krathis had been turned, and in honor of the Krathian Athene. This of itself forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertion of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express mandate and encourage-

ment of the oracle. After tarrying awhile at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the south-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Egestæans—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighboring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites deduced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favorable promise of the oracle beforehand, a confident proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued), without turning aside for any other object, the prophecy on which his hopes were founded would have been unquestionably realized, and he would have succeeded. But the ruinous disappointment which actually overtook him was at once explained, and the truth of prophecy vindicated, when it was recollected that he had turned aside to help the Krotoniates against Sybaris, and thus set at nought the conditions prescribed to him. Upon this argument (Herodotus tells us) the Sybarites of his day especially insisted. And while we note their pious and literal faith in the communications of an inspired prophet, we must at the same time observe how perfectly that faith supplied the place of historical premises—how scanty their stock was of such legitimate evidence—and how little they had yet learnt to appreciate its value.

It is to be remarked that Herodotus, in his brief mention of the fatal war between Sybaris and Kroton, does not make the least allusion to Pythagoras or his brotherhood. The least which we can infer from such silence is, that the part which they played in reference to the war, and their general ascendancy in Magna Græcia, was in reality less conspicuous and overruling than the Pythagorean historians set forth. Even making such allowance, however, the absence of all allusion in Herodotus, to the commotions which accompanied the subversion of the Pythagoreans, is a circumstance not easily explicable. Nor can I pass over a perplexing statement in Polybius, which seems to show that he too must have conceived the history of Sybaris in a way different from that in which it is commonly represented. He tells us, that after much suffering in Magna Græcia from the troubles which followed the expulsion of the Pythagoreans, the cities were induced by Achæan mediation to come to an accommodation and even to establish something like a permanent league with a common temple and sacrifices. Now the three cities which he specifies as having been the first to do this, are, Kroton, Sybaris, and Kaulonia. But according to the sequence of events and the fatal war (just described) between Kroton and Sybaris, the latter city must have been at that time in ruins; little, if at all, inhabited. I cannot but infer from this statement of Polybius, that he followed different authorities respecting the early history of Magna Græcia in the beginning of the fifth century B.C.

Indeed the early history of these cities gives us little more than a few isolated facts and names. With regard to their legislators, Zaleukus and Charondas, nothing is made out except their existence—and even that fact some ancient critics contested. Of Zaleukus, whom chronologists place in 664 B.C., I have already spoken; the date of Charondas cannot be assigned, but we may perhaps presume that it was at some time between 600–500 B.C. He was a citizen of middling station, born in the Chalkidic colony of Katana in Sicily, and he framed laws not only for his own city, but for the other Chalkidic cities in Sicily and Italy—Leontini, Naxos, Zankle, and Rhegium. The laws and the solemn preamble ascribed to him by Diodorus and Stobæus, belong to a later day, and we are obliged to content ourselves with collecting the brief hints of Aristotle, who tells us that the laws of Charondas descended to great minuteness of distinction and specification, especially in graduating the fine for offenses according to the property of the guilty person fined—but that there was nothing in his laws strictly original and peculiar, except that he was the first to introduce the solemn indictment against perjured witnesses before justice. The perjured witness, in Grecian ideas, was looked upon as having committed a crime half religious, half civil. The indictment raised against him, known by a peculiar name, partook of both characters, approaching in some respects to the procedure against a murderer. Such distinct form of indictment against perjured testimony—with its appropriate name, which we shall find maintained at Athens throughout the best-known days of Attic law—was first enacted by Charondas.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXES AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both Eretria and Athens; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the string of Eretrian prisoners brought to Susa attested—but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Darius. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his

empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burden. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece. Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxes, his son by Atossa; for the ascendancy of that queen insured to Xerxes the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxes succeeded without opposition. It deserves to be remarked, that though we shall meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxes, personally the handsomest and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with all the Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxes found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus; who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for him-

self. There were not wanting Grecian counselors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the color of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Susa a new instrument, the holy mystic Onomakritus—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peisistratids, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and consulted by him as the expositor of these venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Lasus of Hermione, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peisistratids however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgave this offense, and carried Onomakritus with his prophecies to Susa, announcing him as a person of oracular authority, to assist in working on the mind of Xerxes. To this purpose his interpolations, or his omissions, were now directed. When introduced to the Persian monarch, he recited emphatically various encouraging predictions, wherein the bridging of the Hellespont, and the triumphant march of a barbaric host into Greece, appeared as predestined; while he carefully kept back all those of a contrary tenor, which portended calamity and disgrace. So at least Herodotus, strenuous in upholding the credit of Bakis, Musæus, and other Grecian prophets whose verses were in circulation, expressly assures us. The religious encouragements of Onomakritus, and the political co-operation proffered by the Aleuadæ, enabled Mardonius effectually to overcome the reluctance of his master. Indeed, it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honor obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire. The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged; and in addition to this double stimulus to action, Mardonius drew a captivating picture of Europe as an acquisition—"it was the finest land in the world, produced every variety of fruit-bearing trees, and was too good a possession for any mortal man except the Persian kings." Fifteen years before, the Milesian Aristagoras, when entreating the Spartans to assist the Ionic revolt, had exaggerated the wealth and productiveness of Asia in contrast with the poverty of Greece—a contrast less widely removed from the truth, at that time, than the picture presented by Mardonius.

Having thus been persuaded to alter his original views, Xerxes convoked a meeting of the principal Persian counsellors, and announced

to them his resolution to invade Greece; setting forth the mingled motives of revenge and aggrandizement which impelled him, and representing the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become coextensive with the ether of Zeus and the limits of the sun's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, toward which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amid those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Croesus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, "*Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello,*" in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*: probably too, if the lost Grecian epics had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the imagination of the historian has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the *Atræidæ* against Troy. He enters into the internal feeling of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overruling, than it appears in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: though the Godhead in Herodotus, compared with Homer, tends to become neuter instead of masculine or feminine, and retains only the jealous instincts of a ruler, apart from the appetites, lusts, and caprices of a man: acting, moreover, chiefly as a centralized, or at least as a homogeneous, force, in place of the discordant severalty of agents conspicuous in the Homeric theology. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man—is worked into his history of Xerxes as the ever-

present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination. For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honorable frankness which Plutarch calls his "malignity," neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valor, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open.

I have already mentioned that Xerxes is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counselor. As soon as Xerxes, yielding to persuasion, has announced, to the Persian chief men whom he had convoked, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Mardonius is represented as expressing his warm concurrence in the project, extolling the immense force of Persia, and depreciating the Ionians in Europe (so he denominated them) as so poor and disunited that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxes—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor embolden him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxes, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Grecian conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—reproves Mardonius for falsely depreciating the Greeks and seducing his master into personal danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont—reminds the latter of the imminent hazard which Darius and his army had undergone in Scythia, from the destruction (averted only by Histæus and his influence) of the bridge over the Danube: such prudential suggestions being further strengthened by adverting to the jealous aversion of the Godhead toward overgrown human power.

The impatient monarch silences his uncle in a tone of insult and menace: nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissuasions work upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme. In this latter disposition he falls asleep, when a dream appears: a tall stately man stands over him, denounces his change of opinion, and peremptorily commands him to persist in the enterprise as announced. In spite of this dream, Xerxes still adheres to his altered purpose, assembles his council the next morning, and after apologizing for his angry language toward Artabanus, acquaints them to their great joy that he

adopts the recommendations of the latter, and abandons his project against Greece. But in the following night, no sooner has Xerxes fallen asleep, than the same dream and the same figure again appear to him, repeating the previous command in language of terrific menace. The monarch, in a state of great alarm, springs from his bed and sends for Artabanus, whom he informs of the twice-repeated vision and divine mandate interdicting his change of resolution. "If (says he) it be the absolute will of God that this expedition against Greece should be executed, the same vision will appear to thee also, provided thou puttest on my attire, sittest in my throne, and sleepest in my bed." Not without reluctance, Artabanus obeys this order (for it was high treason in any Persian to sit upon the regal throne), but he at length complies, expecting to be able to prove to Xerxes that the dream deserved no attention. "Many dreams (he says) are not of divine origin, nor anything better than mere wandering objects such as we have been thinking upon during the day: this dream, of whatever nature it may be, will not be foolish enough to mistake me for the king, even if I be in the royal attire and bed; but if it shall still continue to appear to thee, I shall myself confess it to be divine." Accordingly Artabanus is placed in the regal throne and bed, and as soon as he falls asleep, the very same figure shows itself to him also, saying, "Art thou he who dissuadest Xerxes, on the plea of solicitude for his safety, from marching against Greece? Xerxes has already been forewarned of that which he will suffer if he disobeys, and thou, too, shalt not escape either now or in future, for seeking to avert that which must and shall be." With these words the vision assumes a threatening attitude, as though preparing to burn out the eyes of Artabanus with hot irons, when the sleeper awakens in terror, and runs to communicate with Xerxes. "I have hitherto, O king, recommended to thee to rest contented with that vast actual empire on account of which all mankind think thee happy; but since the divine impulsions is now apparent, and since destruction from on high is prepared for the Greeks, I too alter my opinion, and advise thee to command the Persians as God directs; so that nothing may be found wanting on thy part for that which God puts into thy hands."

It is thus that Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxes to have originated; partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Plataea—but still more in the influence of "mischievous Oneiros," who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the Iliad) to put a cheat upon Xerxes, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyages, Polykrates, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus,

but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. Modified more or less in each individual narrator, it is made to supply connecting links as well as initiating causes for the great events of history. As a cause for this expedition, incomparably the greatest fact and the most fertile in consequences, throughout the political career both of Greeks and Persians, nothing less than a special interposition of the gods would have satisfied the feelings either of one nation or the other. The story of the dream has its rise (as Herodotus tells us) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and colored by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxes after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact, that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the *Persæ* of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods toward vast power and overweening aspirations in man; though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxes by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxes began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and as we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius, though not brought to any ultimate result, we cannot doubt that the maximum of force, which the empire could possibly be made to furnish, was now brought to execute the schemes of Xerxes.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands of the Ægean north of Krete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdera with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa. It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire, at the time when Xerxes mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medising* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B. C., the vast army thus raised by Xerxes arrived from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis: a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa. From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kelænæ, Anaua, and Kolossæ, and the Lydian town of Kallatebus, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak farther presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burden, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed, been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be

thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxes was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other,—which Xerxes caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighborhood of Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first intrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fiber of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxes as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off, but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment. Moreover, Herodotus had heard, but does not believe, that he even sent irons for the purpose of branding it. “Thou bitter water (exclaimed the scourgers while inflicting this punishment), this is the penalty which our master inflicts upon thee, because thou hast wronged him though he hath never wronged thee. King Xerxes *will* cross thee, whether thou wilt or not; but thou deservest not sacrifice from any man, because thou art a treacherous river of (useless) salt water.”

Such were the insulting terms heaped by order of Xerxes on the rebellious Hellespont. Herodotus calls them “non-Hellenic and blasphemous terms,” which, together with their brevity, leads us to believe that he gives them as he heard them, and that they are not of his own invention, like so many other speeches in his work, where he dramatizes, as it were, a given position. It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont, as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy’s calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings, is among the early and widespread

instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion. And although the enlargement of reason and experience gradually displaces this elementary fetichism, banishing it from the regions of reality into those of conventional fiction—yet the force of momentary passion will often suffice to supersede the acquired habit: and even an intelligent man may be impelled in a moment of agonizing pain to kick or beat the lifeless object from which he has suffered. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting, scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath. The vengeance exercised by Cyrus on the river Gyndes (which he caused to be divided into 360 streamlets, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it), affords a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxes took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterward enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified. The decapitation of the unfortunate engineers was an act fearfully impressive, and even the scourging of the Hellespont, while essentially public, appears to Herodotus (as well as to Arrian afterward), not childish, but impious. The more attentively we balance, in the case before us, the positive testimony against the intrinsic negative probabilities, the more shall we be disposed to admit without diffidence the statement of our original historian.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work, which Herodotus now describes in detail, and which was executed with increased care and solidity. To form the two bridges, two lines of ships—triremes and pentekonters blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their sterns toward the Euxine and their heads toward the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former toward the latter. They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was 360; the number in the other, 314. Over each of the two lines

of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridgeway to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore: in three different places along the line, a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Out of the six cables assigned to each bridge, two were of flax and four of papyrus, combined for the sake of increased strength; for it seems that in the bridges first made, which proved too weak to resist the winds, the Phenicians had employed cables of flax for one bridge, the Egyptians those of papyrus for the other. Over these again were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was, the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland. That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighboring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire, were brought together to assist. The headquarters of the fleet were first at Kyme and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and Mount Athos. The canal-cutting at the latter was placed under the general directions of two noble Persians—Bubares and Artachæus, and distributed under their measurement as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighboring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phenicians, who, within sight of that lofty island of Thasos which had been occupied three centuries before by their free ancestors, were now laboring as instruments to the ambition of a foreign conqueror. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down,

so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation; “for it would have cost no trouble at all” (he observes) to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus; a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them; such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. Thirdly, it is to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halikarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians—even to drive the troops of their subject contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way toward freemen, and especially toward freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterward subjects, of Athens; and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxes excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxes as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481–480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch dispatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare “dinner” for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of

several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Xerxes was blind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its signification—while another was misinterpreted into a favorable omen by the compliant answer of the Magian priests.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all came the baggage, carried by beasts of burden, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1,000 Persian cavalry with 1,000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downward as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pomegranate at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred horses, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Nisæan plains in Media; next, the sacred chariot of Zeus, drawn by eight white horses—wherein no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Nisæan horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Patiramphes, being seated in it by the side of the monarch—who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persian infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 9,000 carried spears with pomegranates of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 1000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pomegranates of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops; after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the remaining host followed pell-mell. Respecting its numbers and constituent portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great review at Doriskus.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythius, a Phrygian old man resident at Kelænæ, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So abundant was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess

(replied Pythius), besides lands and slaves, 2,000 talents of silver and 3,993,000 of golden darics, wanting only 7,000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality; at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythius out of his own treasure the sum of 7,000 darics, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favor, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five sons were all about to serve in the invading army against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was, that the eldest of them might be left behind, as a stay to his own declining years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered as sufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he asked. "Wretch! (replied Xerxes) dost thou dare to talk to me about *thy* son, when I am myself on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? thou who art my slave, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. As, when thou didst good deeds and madest good offers to me, thou canst not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—so now, when thou hast turned round and become impudent, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I received from thee shall serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythius should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they were themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offense not to be pardoned. In this as in the other acts of Oriental kings, whether grateful, munificent, or ferocious, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating itself into act without any thought of consequences, and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown toward his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaikus—then through Aterneus, Karine, and the plain of Thebe. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder. From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilium,—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 oxen to the patron goddess Athene,—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honor of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details, abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his innumerable host. Another day's march between Rhöeteium, Ophryneium, and Dardanus on the left hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis—and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading number, the unmeasured hopes succeeded by no less unmeasured calamity—it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxes on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxes. He farther quotes certain supposed exclamations of the Abydenes at the sight of his superhuman power. “Why (said one of these terror-stricken spectators), why dost thou, oh Zeus, under the shape of a Persian man and the name of Xerxes, thus bring together the whole human race for the ruin of Greece? It would have been easy for thee to accomplish *that* without so much ado.” Such emphatic ejaculations exhibit the strong feeling which Herodotus or his informants throw into the scene, though we cannot venture to apply to them the scrutiny of historical criticism.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals, the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxes himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar—"I do not exactly know (adds the historian) whether he threw them in as a gift to Helios, or as a mark of repentance and atonement to the Hellespont for the stripes which he had inflicted upon it." Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burden. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him "under the lash." But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over—a fact to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals computed by Herodotus.

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxes directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Helle on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea—crossing the river from which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus and the harbor called Stentoris, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius. The spacious plain called by this same name reached far along the shore to Cape Serreium, and comprised in it the towns of Sale and Zone, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Kikones on the main-land. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the

numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt. "What Asiatic nation was there (asks Herodotus, whose conceptions of this expedition seem to outstrip his powers of language) that Xerxes did not bring against Greece?" Nor was it Asiatic nations alone, comprised within the Oxus, the Indus, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Levant, the Ægean, and the Euxine: we must add to these also the Egyptians, the Ethiopians on the Nile south of Egypt, and the Libyans from the desert near Kyrene. Not all the expeditions, fabulous or historical, of which Herodotus had ever heard, appeared to him comparable to this of Xerxes, even for total number; much more in respect of variety of component elements. Forty-six different nations, each with its distinct national costume, mode of arming, and local leaders, formed the vast land-force. Eight other nations furnished the fleet, on board of which Persians, Medes, and Sakæ served as armed soldiers or marines. The real leaders, both of the entire army and of all its various divisions, were native Persians of noble blood, who distributed the various native contingents into companies of thousands, hundreds, and tens. The forty-six nations composing the land-force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Kissians, Hyrkansians, Assyrians, Baktrians, Sakæ, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadikæ, Kaspians, Sarangæ, Paktyes, Uti, Myki, Parikani, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyes, Matieni, Maryandyni, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kabelians, Mares, Kolchians, Alarodians, Saspeires, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phœnicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots, and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i.e., arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge,—for hand combat in line as well as for defense of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight): The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only staves with the end hardened in the fire. A nomadic tribe of

Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 8,000 horsemen, came armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Æthiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of sharp stone.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted, and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of inclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men. Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1207 triremes or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3,000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers, and thirty fighting men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burden, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus, who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of "camp-followers" as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men. We are to reckon, besides, the eunuchs, concubines, and female cooks, at whose number Herodotus does not pretend to guess;

together with cattle, beasts of burden, and Indian dogs, in indefinite multitude, increasing the consumption of the regular army.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible; yet the disparaging remarks which it has drawn down upon Herodotus are noway merited. He takes pains to distinguish that which informants told him, from that which he merely guessed. His description of the review at Doriskus is so detailed, that he had evidently conversed with persons who were present at it, and had learnt the separate totals promulgated by the enumerators—infantry, cavalry, and ships of war great and small. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the "Persæ" gives the exact number of 1207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis; but between Doriskus and Salamis, Herodotus has himself enumerated 647 ships as lost or destroyed, and only 120 as added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 276,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or omission in the narrative which we cannot clear up. But the aggregate of 3,000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ship's crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few grandees and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European. And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much previous pains been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march; in addition to which, the cities in Thrace were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have

been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to admit his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that prayers for exemption were regarded by the Great King as a capital offense—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea, we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterward in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterward increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host disorderly, heterogeneous, without any interest in the enterprise; and wherein the numbers of each separate contingent were unknown.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1000 triremes, independent of the war chariots; if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men; Diodorus appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enable us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him. He is in some sort an original witness, having evidently conversed with persons actually present at the muster of Doriskus, giving us their belief as to the numbers, together with the computation, true or false, circulated among them by authority. Moreover, the contemporary Æschylus, while agreeing with him exactly as to the number of triremes, gives no specific figure as to the land-force, but conveys to us in his "Persæ" a general sentiment of vast number, which may seem in keeping with the largest statement of Herodotus: the Persian empire is drained of men—the women of Susa are left without husbands or brothers—the Baktrian territory has not been allowed to retain even its old men. The terror-striking effect of this crowd was probably quite as great as if its numbers had really corresponded to the ideas of Herodotus.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes passed in his chariot by each of the several contingents, observed their equipment, and put questions to which the royal scribes noted down the answers. He then embarked on board a Sidonian trireme (which had been already fitted up with a gilt tent), and sailed along the prows of his

immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment in the Greek language. Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may. Xerxes receives the statement with derision, but exhibits no feeling of displeasure: an honorable contrast to the treatment of Charidemus a century and a half afterward, by the last monarch of Persia.

After the completion of the review, Xerxes with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies. All was still within his own empire, and he took reinforcements from each as he passed. the Thracian Satræ were preserved from this levy by their unassailable seats amidst the woods and snows of Rhodope. The islands of Samothrace and Thasus, with their subject towns on the mainland—and the Grecian colonies Dikæa, Maroneia, and Abdera—were successively laid under contribution for contingents of ships or men. What was still more ruinous—they were constrained to provide a day's meal for the immense host as it passed: on the day of his passage the Great King was their guest. Orders had been transmitted for this purpose long beforehand, and for many months the citizens had been assiduously employed in collecting food for the army, as well as delicacies for the monarch—in grinding flour of wheat and barley, fattening cattle, keeping up birds and fowls; together with a decent display of gold and silver plate for the regal dinner. A superb tent was erected for Xerxes and his immediate companions, while the army received their rations in the open region around. on commencing the march next morning, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing restored to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge, of each one among the cities, so that the cost brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to abandon house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the main-land, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents (£92,800) while at Abdera, the witty Megakreon recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required

breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destitution. A stream called Lissus, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Pistyrus.

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterward memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honors by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried alive nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot: he also left, under the care of the Pæonians of Siris, the sacred chariot of Zeus, which had been brought from the seat of empire, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus, hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bisaltæ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodope for safety, and forbade his six sons to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by, obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. But the inhabitants of Akanthus had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal and had probably made considerable profits during the operation: Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the tie of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents; though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallene, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krusis or Krossæa, on the continental side of the isthmus of Pallene. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance. Near Therma (Salonichi) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland, through

Pæonia and Krestonia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmon.

Xerxes had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of an army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hope of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus. The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadæ—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him shall be related in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLCE.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Kleomenes and Leotychides, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleid king Demaratus; and Kleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His maneuver being betrayed shortly afterward, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the

misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess. But the Athenians and Argeians were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own—the former believed that the gods had thus punished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognized the avenging hand of the hero Argus, whose grove Kleomenes had burnt, along with so many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pronouncing between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Kleomenes was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognized on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenes had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to sparta.

The death of Kleomenes, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenes, and Leotychides had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychides was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenes in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece, yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychides was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasides, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychides should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit. They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychides having been obliged to retire without success, the

Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theors or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina, beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxes.

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished (as he thought unjustly), he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the seashore, less protected though more convenient. But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, 700 in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone among these prisoners burst his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Demeter Thesmophorus, and was fortunate enough to seize the handle of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His pursuers did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then executed him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the 700 prisoners does not seem to have drawn down upon the Æginetan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the violation of sanctuary, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Demeter never forgave. More than fifty years afterward, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Æginetans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety, which half a century of continued expiatory sacrifice had not been sufficient to wipe out.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy sail they defeated the

Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenes, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the pentathlon named Eurybates, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Eurybates, confiding in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Sophanes of Dekeleia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him. At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part; the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency toward maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristides and Themistokles became the chief men at Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions insured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival, Themistokles, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing that even Aristides himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum." Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political

rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a voté of ostracism, and Aristeides was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistokles. On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeides would probably be found opposed to it: but it was more over a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeides seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence. The land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks; the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers: though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete, than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistokles, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistokles displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeides, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbor—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistokles knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon; against which the best defense would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistokles, who now prevailed upon his

countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia. Not only were 200 new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistokles was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbor for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalerum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports, admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus—that the Æginetan “war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power.” The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was in truth the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession toward Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B. C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B. C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of Sunium, amid a district of low hills which extended across much of the space between the eastern sea at Thorikus, and the western at Anap^hlystus. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratic constitution of Kleisthenes. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Peisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Kleisthenes first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common center at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was

the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistokles made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachmas to each man. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistokles availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy. One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; inasmuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labor bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition. The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance. Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief; so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds dispatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the

different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defense. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Poloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyraeans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose—the defense of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas alike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising* (i.e., embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defense and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens. In this work of reconcil-

ing feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistokles took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of Tegea in Arcadia. The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Kretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to dispatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous—Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and, indeed, something more than human. Of course, such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonike, when she at once exclaimed—“Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten; fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.”

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: “O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here, until death.” Upon which the priestess replied—“Athene with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot

propitiate Olympian Zeus. But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible: and the envoys wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall?" Some supposed that the acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever. The last lines of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistokles, the great-originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties destined to perish there were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen, therefore, to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board. Great, indeed, were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded, by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real savior of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence. Not only did the Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed, as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised. To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance—prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive—furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment—sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into

united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Platæans fifty-three years afterward) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honors of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset; preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta.

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxes. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection to themselves and of vengeance against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenes. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards. It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was, that they did not choose to join any Pan-hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason was, that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in

their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed, *medising*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Krete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle; the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretense of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence. Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies.

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defense of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.

The endeavors of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other re-enforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B. C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ: while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus, intimating the necessity of guarding

the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defense, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistokles, were dispatched by the sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiotis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly. Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempe, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempe formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host. But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempe begins to narrow. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempe, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempe, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position. He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter. On the present occasion the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempe, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempe, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.

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This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defense, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before. When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Lokrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiotid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plataæ. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Alcudæ, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempe and arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defense was yet thoroughly organized; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.

CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment; to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity. Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defense, next to that of Tempe—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians,

Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Phthiotid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempe; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knemis and Cape Kenæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiotis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Histiaea. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to co-operate with the land force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia, becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defense; but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Othrys to the north, and Mount Ceta to the south—near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiotis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Ceta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Ceta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ. On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of the little streams called the Phœnix and the Asopus, was placed the town of Anthela, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Demeter, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthela, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Ceta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow

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entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpeni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which procured for the place the appellation of Chytri or the Pans: but the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud, and deposited its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs here, as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Herakles, whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding region—Mount Ceta, Trachis, Cape Kenæum, the Lichades islands, the river Dyras. Some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and adorned by the genius of Sophokles, in his drama of the Trachinian Maidens.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit: while at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Ceta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Ceta, only through the straight gate; save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the path by the Phokians was now half ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-establishing it, determined to wait in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempe—the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpeni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempe, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these

positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion: the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiades, apparently about the latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenes, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenes, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places. Along with them were 200 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Philus, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiades. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medised*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defense of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men, chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed, the Theban people and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious: while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medise*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes, and influential in guiding his movements. The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. "The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preced-

ing the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover, there was no cause for fear, since the invader was, after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition." Such arguments prove but too evidently the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind. Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states. Even at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake, the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes, when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to the complete and splendid fulfillment of their religious festival obligations—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order that the Theoric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in the Athenians to make this sacrifice—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates, remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath. The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas, with his detachment, would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force. They engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asopus and the hill called Anopea, then crossing the crest of Ceta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of

Alpeni. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Amphissa—was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who, in former days, had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it. But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defense, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempe; and so insufficient did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defense at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phokians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements. So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium, on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiades. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plataea, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Trœzenian, 2 from Styris in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes; together with 9 pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistokles was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing. Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian, were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to

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Athens, leaving the vessels to the enemy: the other two ships were overtaken and captured afloat—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites, Pythes, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a presaging omen in the approaching contest: perhaps (observes the historian) his name may have contributed to determine his fate. The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmex, between Skiathos and the main-land, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by fire signals from Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out ships, inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy was at hand. They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the narrowest and most defensible passage, leaving scouts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the panic of their troops, similar to that which King Leonidas, more powerful than Eurybiades and Themistokles, had found means to arrest at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defense, by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host, land force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend with. Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by announcing that divine succor was at hand. On entreating advice from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen, in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for his help in need. Never was help

more effective, or more opportune, than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at Delphi.

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as preferable to the defile of Tempe. Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake. His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiotis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days: the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that the river Onochonus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa Phthiotis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up, according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family. He respected and protected these sacred places: an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Miletus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling. Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance, now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guard-ships) that the channel between Skia-thos and the main-land was safe, the Persian admiral Magabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna, his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sepias Akte. The first line of ships were moored to the land, but

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the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defense, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers. Though the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sepias Akte—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day: thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious cutting through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory; the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land-army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen ships of that fleet having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Sandokes, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kyme—Aridolis, despot of

Alabanda in Karia—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the Isthmus of Corinth, after having been questioned respecting the enemy; the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself on board.

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm; but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleid leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn; and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoiter them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any attention among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defense, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and puzzled. It happened, too, that at the moment when this horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advance guard, outside of the wall; some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes—Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days; on the fifth he became wroth at the impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Cresus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable.

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The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus that the Lokrians, when they first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes, together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempe. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet meanwhile would be arrived at Alphetæ after the dangers of the storm. We may thus venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon, manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks, and practiced fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even the Immortals, or 10,000 choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "Thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army."

At the end of two days' fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defense not less triumphant than courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtes revealed to Xerxes the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was

the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Persians he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians honored as a patriot. There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnes with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asopus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Cætæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of daybreak the noise of his army trampling through the wood aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnes in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnes, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday. But before he had yet completed his descent the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kymæan named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended. There was, however, ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the

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circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself, forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy: moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The 300 Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension. The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who, however, refused to obey it and staid, though he sent away his only son. None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general, Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat to them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders; while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having staid along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans. All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavored to

save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present, they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtes, Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnes might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive, but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnes, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades—300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Amid such equal heroism, it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished: nevertheless Herodotus mentions the Spartan Dienekes, Alpheus, and Maron—and the Thespian Dithyrambus—as standing pre-eminent. The reply ascribed to the first became renowned. "The Persian host (he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the sun." "So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them in the shade." Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterward, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta. One alone among them—Aristodemus—returned home, having taken

no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus, another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and both were lying at Alpeni suffering from a severe complaint in the eyes. Eurytus, apprised that the fatal hour of the detachment was come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired his attendant Helot to lead him to his place, in the ranks; where he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived. Aristodemus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade: overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens. He was denounced as “the coward Aristodemus;” no one would speak or communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire. After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honor at the battle of Plataea, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amid the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylae against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiades was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author, who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiades, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylae. Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. “Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions

have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?" "O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8,000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythera, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defense against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes the brother of Xerxes interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action; not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who (he affirmed) like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all good fortune above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and co-operating mass.

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiades to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their

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envoy Pelagon to Themistokles with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defense of the island. Themistokles employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiades, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of three talents.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistokles doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defense, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistokles, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him, perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral. It was finally determined therefore to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles (says Herodotus) they would have packed up and removed long before; for a text of Bakis gave them express warning: but having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape. Accordingly they detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this

squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the maneuver was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skione. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm, and the dispatch of the intercepting squadron.

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships; and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistokles, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ. Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and maneuvered their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained. Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both, it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshaled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front, at all points of the circumference. In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be waiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who, however, rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on the shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on

the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sepias Akte, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove toward their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who re-enforced them the next day, of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it. The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders—and Themistokles, as it seems among them—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece: though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistokles to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks

were thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abronychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistokles, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighboring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistokles hoped by this stratagem, perhaps, to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side; or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency. With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaæ to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaæ and the neighboring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1,000 whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4,000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover the bodies of the slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few. According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4,000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defense of the pass seems to have been about 7,000: but the

epigram composed shortly afterward and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4,000 warriors "from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies." Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4,000 warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders." On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor of Leonidas: decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one odè, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs."

CHAPTER XLI.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken. Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss

sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Plataea, now joined him. Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns, as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians on the other hand abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium, were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sepias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him; a reproach true, almost to the letter. It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day. As a defense to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position; they considered it as their last chance, abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes, while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ; no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the sepa-

rate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant dissatisfaction as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defense of their own isthmus and their own separate existence. The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen, there to await such re-enforcements as could be got together. But the Athenians entreated Eurybiades to halt at Salamis so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiades was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him ; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.

Meanwhile Themistokles and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalerum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinions, and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Oropus, within the narrow space of less than six days ; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where, indeed, he might have arrived even sooner. The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles ; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind of reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens) —but in part also to Ægina : there were, however, many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistokles impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls ; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the Acropolis were for awhile deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athene Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was

placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched; the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the Acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city. Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding, moreover in their own interpretation of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the Acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades. When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterward, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens, lost their energy; arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended. Themistokles proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under the sentence of temporary banishment; moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristides, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiades, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the Acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended—thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback. It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet; yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the Senate of Areiopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others, and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustable resources of Themistokles, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statute of

Athene was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying away, available to the public service. By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners. Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partly disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force greater than at Artemisium. Of these no less than 200 were Athenians; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermoine, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, dispatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games. The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (358 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lade, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterward at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalerum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service; that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Traitant-

tæchmes son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—"Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honor!" Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favorable terms. Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phokis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them. The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus, among the towns of the inflexible Phokians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest; all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataæ; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Cræsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to

take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Akeratus, the religious superior; but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, was seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schiste up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athene Pronæa,—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athene. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and Autonus whose sacred precincts were close adjoining; and Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athene the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians. Thus did the god repeat these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which remained inviolate until 130 years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacriligious hands of the Phokian Philomelus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender. The Athenian acropolis—a craggy rock rising abruptly about 150 feet with a flat summit of about 1000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side; moreover in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus: from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to

the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time, the great king seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade ; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified : moreover the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison ; who deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temple pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames. The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled : Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately dispatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus. On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps, obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive tree near the chapel of Erichtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athene, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long : at least the piety of restored Athens afterward believed this encouraging portent, as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plan. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries ; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so : but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. Yet whatever may have been received in

after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalerum, re-enforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sepias Akte; an estimate certainly not admissible.

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the King of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return to the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote, and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterward. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to

attack the next day, and for the land force to move forward toward Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalerum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis; among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiades convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape. In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defense of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one

body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermione, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiades to keep them together. Hence the order of quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defense: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also lead by their own separate safety to cling to the defense of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistokles, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistokles returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron—he found an Athenian friend named Mnesiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnesiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistokles. On learning what had been resolved, Mnesiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for. He vehemently urged Themistokles again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote in favor of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistokles had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiades, asked permission to speak to him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiades alone, Themistokles was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiades had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistokles addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corin-

thian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying—"Themistokles, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."

Eurybiades then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistokles began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defense of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded,—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistokles, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiades had no right to count the vote of Themistokles until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistokles, who reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiades, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin. For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiades had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistokles. But this last downright menace clinched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without

the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling. The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistokles, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messenger from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross-wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defense,—even if worsted at sea,—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defense of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiades: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked. Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians were equally urgent in favor of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistokles that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiades; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defense, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he dispatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals, Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek who understood Persian and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistokles, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail

themselves of it without delay, first to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.

Such was the important communication dispatched by Themistokles across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistokles lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days, as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its headquarters were in the bay of Phalerum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalerum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos in Attica. During the night, a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner. These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbor, the next morning.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistokles had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote, until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible. Such prolongation was nowise difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side, and

that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiades himself was favorable to the view of Themistokles. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. The ostracized Aristeides arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence—a revocation proposed by Themistokles himself—he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistokles to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs; and after a generous exordium wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered farther debate useless. Themistokles expressed his joy at the intelligence; communicating his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own consent. He, moreover, desired Aristeides to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistokles, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate, indeed, was their incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeides: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.

Having caused his land force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians—approaching from the side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on

ship-board all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position; while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistokles and the other leaders. Just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the trireme which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æakus with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed, the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—"Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?" The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle. The brave Athenian captains Ameinias and Lykomedes (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardor; though, according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid heroes, which first set this honorable example. The Naxian Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candor, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse—the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they

had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance: the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalerum: Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great; the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vexation (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent his feelings.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the

trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit—for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city. But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him: "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied: "My men have become women; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships; among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristides carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement. But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well-suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service

except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects. He fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube. Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward. Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalerum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board. They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes dispatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch: it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to reassure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person. His confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had

every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of farther service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously) by all means let him have the troops; should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen by intrusting to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalerum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistokles and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistokles readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistokles) had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridge—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat. Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistokles fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingencies.

Such crafty maneuvers, and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistokles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfillment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistokles knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover, a clever man tainted with such constant guilt might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city and blest with excellent gods: but that *they* were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—Poverty and Helplessness. In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistokles sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals, but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.

The intimation sent by Themistokles perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents; making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated—inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal, delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow; magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the super-human pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed—an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food.

Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried ; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him. But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdera still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader ! who re-entered Sardis with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost : she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed. At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot ; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athene at Sunium and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans ; from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians ; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians, Eumenes and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants. Respecting the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a

battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus son of Adeimantus was among the most efficient enemies of the former.

Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistokles had a large majority of votes for the second. The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistokles was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly after to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid before nor afterward to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurýblades as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistokles as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippias, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the frontiers of Tegea. Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartan, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistokles should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated. Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in regular course of the Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistokles.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after

having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kyne and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomestor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomestor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection. Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phenicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychides, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, dispatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychides to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Herakles: not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterward, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ, and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius; nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallene, as well as the neighboring towns in the long tongue of Pallene, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Critobulus of Torone. It was in this manner that Glynthus, afterward a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defense of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallene. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skionæan auxiliaries

in the town, became accidentally disclosed : a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallænæan peninsula to the mainland : and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophonius at Labedeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptoon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect toward the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priests of the Ptoian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself. It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus. The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon ; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance. The Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable : especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defense as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.

This offer, dispatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if dispatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas : and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens her-

self protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game : while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character ; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn. The prudential view of the case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned in Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said : " Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours : we too know *that*, as well as thou : but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes : we will encounter him in our own defense, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings : thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor ; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations : but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defense of Attica. The Spartan envoys, promising fulfillment of this request, and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators. But among

the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous neglect. The same feeling of indifference toward all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired : but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defense was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defense and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Cleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died. Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavorable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third : they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian) to fulfill “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakipthia prevail over the necessities of defense, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity toward an exposed ally and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his proposals had received in Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian headquarters in Athens (May or June—479 B. C.).

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfillment of the Spartan promise that a Pelo-

ponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier ; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis. The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and dispatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage as an additional temptation. Murychides, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian Senate at Salamis ; but he experienced a refusal not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lydikas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychides. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death ; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor ; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings. Murychides, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica ; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the meantime they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defense of Peloponnesus, if the

Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they dispatched forth within the night 5,000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification, the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory. Considering that this step was an expiation imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian History, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5,000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all; 5,000 Lacedæmonian Pericæki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also dispatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late, yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders. If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it; and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia—a country in every way more favorable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or around Athens, hoping that the Athenians

might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara, he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea, through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phyle, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asopus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asopus; along which river he next day marched westward to Skolus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Plataea. He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asopus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his center over against Hysiaë, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing a fortified camp of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible—the fortified city of Thebes in his rear—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success: even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attaginus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterward recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbor, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian, continued thus: "Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few surviving." Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—"Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:" but the Persian rejoined—"My friend, man cannot avert that which

God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result.”—“This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him even before the battle of Platæa.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior. Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydes, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the PHEME, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down. The general Harmokydes, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their

courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain—difficult as the supposition is to entertain—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tega, 1500; from Corinth, 5,000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæ; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3,000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Trœzen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykenæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermione, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from Pale in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3,000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8,000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Plataean, under Aristeides, who passed over from Salamis. The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armor—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5,000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterward. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then

advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupy the line of the Asopus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, dispatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain. So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in his side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defenses of his helmet and breastplate, however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a while to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand,

overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platean territory along the Asopus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia, and their left wing near the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platean hero Androkrate. In this position they were marshaled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens. In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratic forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little further to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the center; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000: nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas. All received large pay,

and the prophet of Pausanias had, indeed, been honored with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favorable for resistance if attacked—unfavorable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataea had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed by Aristides, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position, near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks. Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this maneuver; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith. In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian

army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned; so as to allow time of distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent; some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said: "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterward all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it; on that ground, therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone, that it had no reference to the Persians; it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermodon and Asopus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out; it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon, who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aris-

teides and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit; he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved."

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeides to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his maneuver had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their personal bravery. Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style, casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by

the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asopus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroe; both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asopus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asopus. It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering; insomuch that the center of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour

arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Here, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i.e., between the course of Aso-pus and that of the Oeroe), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side. Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the center had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana, obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner." Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behavior of the Spartans toward Athens, is visible in this proceeding; yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been

severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—"This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Demeter. The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march toward the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians, on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuada—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asopus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush

forward: but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appeared to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighborhood of the Demetrium or temple of Eleusinian Demeter, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him. Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows: their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavorable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks, among them the brave Kallikrates, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Here to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favorable: but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armor, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks. They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger. Mardonius, himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Acimnestus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn

out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asopus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp. With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marched his division and led them out toward the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to insure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned

that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honor, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians, and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asopodorus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men. But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of the defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterward exhibited in their temple of Athene Alea—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar, were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3,000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports without any pretense of computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any

active part in the battle. Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery, while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. The general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterward Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast. It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians, and the Phliasiens each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikrates—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighborhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honor, with the connivance and aid of the Plataeans. The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas. On the morrow the body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntes, the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included. By order of the

general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers. The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetorides of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandates; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father. Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterward discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece. It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timegenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus,

who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous, that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timegenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation. It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterward, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money. In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timegenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognized untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valor at the battle of Plataea may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristides appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Plataeans, to which proposition both Aristides and Pausanias acceded. But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all—Aristodemus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valor and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honors as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any

previous taint such as to render life a burden to them. Subsequent valor might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honored citizens.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plateæans received by general vote the prize of valor, it is certain that they were largely honored and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and center of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plateæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied. The Plateæans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honorable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athene—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honors every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece. In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Plateæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Plateæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover, the town of Plateæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristides, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it

might reassemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykale had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable; nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterward organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeides and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defense which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage of this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeides, from taking effect.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea the naval armaments under Leotychides and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykale on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychides that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomestor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychides was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus," i. e., army-leader. "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychides, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favorable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deiphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.

When they reached the Heraeum near Kalami in Samos, and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the

neighboring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykale near Miletus. Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranes—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defense of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykale. On reaching that point they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychides was to copy the previous maneuver of Themistokles, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops and marshaled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation and suspecting, either from his maneuver, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykale—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the month Boedromion (about September), 479 B.C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platæa in Bœotia had

been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phenomenon or message flew into the camp. While a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus, and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykale were alive to tell their own story. He, moreover, mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there was a chapel of the Eleusinian Demeter close to the field of battle at Mykale, as well as at Plataea. Diodorus and other later writers, who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataea, employed their gerrha, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defense from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardor of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpracticed in line and drill, and acting only in small knots, with disadvantages of armor such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack that the defense was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians, who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykale, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pur-

suers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranes and Mardontes, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntes and Ithamithres, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus. The honors of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykale, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntes, whom Masistes, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistes, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras, who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistes. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amestris. But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomestor were expelled from Chios and Samos. But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the medising Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing

the metropolitan dignity of Athens. The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November, 480 B.C.). Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychides and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiades down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiades to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493–480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykale were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiades, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiades had in after days, with private forts of his own. To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina. Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the co-operation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the center in which all the neighboring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Œobazus and Artayktes.

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defense. But of

all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore, was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighboring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktes, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—“Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land”—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktes, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, plowed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines. Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to re-enforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well-nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktes and Œobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Œobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Abyssinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistorus: Artayktes fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous

resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktes, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed. There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, toward the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this history, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæonids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretense to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself

of the opportunity of a festival of Demeter to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighborhood: but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims inclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life. Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterward, we shall find his descendant Thero established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the southeast of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory. With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenes.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Killyrii, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labor and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were amply materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The

general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves, is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Toward or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythes at Zankle, Terillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini. It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and found a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya, now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia—a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighboring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes, did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokrates to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidemus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Telos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphemus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Telines, had first raised the family to distinction

by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighboring town of Maktorium. Telines was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Demeter and Persephone: "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phye-Athene in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Telines was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses—a function certainly honorable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokrates, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini, and Zankle were successively reduced to dependence.

The fate of Zankle—seemingly held by its despot Skythes in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokrates, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Miletus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the-Ionic Greeks in Sicily toward the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklæans especially invited them to form a new pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kale Akte, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Miletus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zankle; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that

when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythes, the despot of Zankle, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kale Akte. His enemy, the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zankle. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythes farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokrates. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythes, whom he considered as the cause of it, at Inykus, in the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokrates should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, the not the least valuable part consisted in the person of those Zanklæans whom Hippokrates had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting, however, from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterward disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were, however, spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokrates, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythes found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow-Greeks. The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messene—a name which it ever afterward bore; and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above mentioned, Hippokrates of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helorus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having re-peopled this territory, which became thus annexed

to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokrates, and seized the scepter himself.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterward (B.C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helorus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the *Kyllyrii*, and the smaller freemen called the *Demos*; they were forced to retire to *Kasmenæ*, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow. But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of *Ortygia*, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent main-land (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of *Achradina*. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in *Kamarina*, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighboring towns of *Megara* and *Eubœa*.

Both these towns, *Megara* and *Eubœa*, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a *Demos* or body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the *Demos*, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the *Demos* as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily.

“His conduct (says Herodotus) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with.” It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others; but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as “troublesome yoke-fellows”—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighborhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zankle or Messene, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messene was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thero, son of Ænesidemus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possession, had its own government, free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage. A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokrates, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agesias, the Iamid prophet from Stymphalus—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population were poor, brave, and ready

for mercenary soldiership; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes. Moreover during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, toward the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers, 2,000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last. If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo: and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to co-operate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone. We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathokles. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognized by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to intreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognized as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy; and Gelo then

so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know that, even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshaling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—*we* will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thero; while Rhegium and Mes-

zene under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seems to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thero, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage. It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thero, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage: backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian Suffet or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favorably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3,000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms. These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans. This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language, in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himerians, re-enforced by Thero, and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defense, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were dispatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5,000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this re-enforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the

Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines — partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings. Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies: on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years afterward, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3,000 Grecian prisoners.

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation. Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damarete wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2,000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded. If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship. But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage. Indeed, we may considerably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm: and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder. Splendid offerings

of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonides, composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending re-enforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse. When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians toward Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperiled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work, and were either employed on public undertakings for defense, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thero governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera.

In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thero. His conduct, both at Syracuse and toward the cities dependent upon him was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterward died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterward by the despot of Agathokles. And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse that Gelo was thus solemnly worshiped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided, new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzelus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonides, Bacchylides, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel and rapacious in his gov-

ernment—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzelus, who was very popular in the city, he dispatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzelus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thero; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonides the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thero, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thero against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokrates, cousins of Thero, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thero. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thero both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokrates collected some forces to resist Thero, but were defeated by him at the river Himera: his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thero invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thero and with his brother Polyzelus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies: he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighboring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messene, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbors the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist. Those heroic honors, which in Greece belonged to the CEkist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of ~~Ætna~~

on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna; 5,000 of them from Syracuse and Gela—with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighboring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenes, and his friend and confidant Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model. Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar, that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offense. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messene were preserved for his children, yet minors. But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thero, which took place seemingly about 472 B. C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in

his own territory, perhaps he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbor Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2,000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4,000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries. But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished. The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratic government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela, nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the scepter. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves intreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterward, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself. This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among

the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbor. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its latter name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thero to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to re-enforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested. The expelled Thrasybulus afterward lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus (son of Thero) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years. Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratic were established everywhere. The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messene, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire, and began their era of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thero, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less consider-

able. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7,000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honor. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favored partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position. But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city toward the Great Harbor, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honor, and a reward of one mina per head.

The meager annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighborhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna, with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to readmit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messene. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina, which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokrates, despot of Gela, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela. For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with

Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrollments of citizens took place without any rightful claim, probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yokefellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger numbers than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrollments of Kleisthenes at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbors the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, dispatched 3,000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, inasmuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge. Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical.

In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes. Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defense under Darius Codomannus labors under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Plataea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenes and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agesilaus—Iphikrates—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander: for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and maneuvering in Greece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon—ability in command, with vigor in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Plataea had indeed been adjudged to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and

feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. Even on land at Plataea, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykale, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistokles; next, Aristides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistokles and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataea, found a desolate home to harbor them. Their country was laid waste—their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters—and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Troezen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction. But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged

her to arrest the work. In the front of these complainants probably stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenseless like Sparta itself. But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of refortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistokles was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistokles himself was presently dispatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristeides and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeides and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens labored unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses nor sacred edifices were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardor in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defense. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistokles, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained toward him was at

that time so great, that his assurance obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistokles urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristides and Abironichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistokles at once threw off the mask. He avowed the statagem practiced—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to insure the safety and free-will of its inhabitants—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now passed, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of this self-judgment, resolved on fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means of defense: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistokles, whom they never afterward forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offense, nor had they indeed put forward any pretense which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction—yet not without murmurs on the part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterward for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-

defense which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded. Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalizing. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defense of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organization—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the center: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoe. In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistokles, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influ-

ence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands. It was the great engine of defense, of offense, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it. Themistokles, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbor-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office two or three years before, made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalerum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbor of Peiræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done toward the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistokles now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit, was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison. We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated. In respect to thickness however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up, “not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal.” The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the

people to this fatiguing and costly work, he labored to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world. We may even suspect that if Themistokles could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus; the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterward consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterward, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Perikles, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistokles, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistokles it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistokles proposed to exempt them from the *metoikion* or non-freeman's annual tax: but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading-pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but

especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistokles prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistokles thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta, intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbor for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid toward the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (b. c. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristides and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured, seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but toward which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades, I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in

Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses, camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod. Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he intrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect: "Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia), to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans,

and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption, his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterward, could not tolerate even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct toward the free women of Byzantium. Kleonike, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her. Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behavior, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan, found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised, whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeides and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming

a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behavior of the latter was not only oppressive toward themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race; entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristides not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiralship in the harbor of Byzantium. The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously; but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydides. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristides. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece (considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and

strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetœmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile to excite their alarm. Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterward, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land. Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command. and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

The example of their king Leotychides, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychides was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterward in exile at Tegea. Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favor of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point toward which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and important pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence on the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such

presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling toward Sparta. The necessities of common defense against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defense, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mykale—when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near—her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-hellenic union, but even all tendencies toward it, from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, toward one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, toward Athens—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Plataea, toward Sparta. Along with this national schism, and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states. But the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of the internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies at this time were not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no

farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristides as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious co-operation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient center for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body.

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistokles on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity. It was no less her good fortune now—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities—*not* to have Themistokles; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristides. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristides was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favor at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.

Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents (=about £106,000, sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydides in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of

the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the Hellenotamiæ, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*; a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterward usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterward became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavoring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed, which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection against arrogance, could have had no power of constraining parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and ranking among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance; and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public import of the name Hellenotamiæ, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a center—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island or sea-port which might refrain from contributing was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an

equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenseless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a center, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, etc.—which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeides, were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organized and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed, even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium

to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of medism (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not re-appointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermione, under pretense of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognized heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force. And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolonæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy: until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes, the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers. Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side

of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege; with a view, first to destroy the board of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterward, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus, intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were intrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favorite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the

Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service, with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Athene Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story—not recognized by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the ravine or hollow called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals; probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterward, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinterment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athene, enjoining that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athene, or Hikesius, the tutelary god of suppliants,

was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not however without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Plataea, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistokles.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistokles, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date) to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistokles, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistokles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeides is commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistokles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard, is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We

ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation or Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was further greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. "The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis," and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognized political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than "a maritime multitude," among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenes. At the time when that constitution was first established, it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, includ-

ing the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristides, a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work, after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine (as has been stated in my preceding volume) that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time afterward. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle; after a certain length of experience it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have before remarked) to all offices at Athens—never for example to the Strategi or Generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the Strategi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten Strategi: we know him afterward only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Strategi perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Prætor was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distri-

bution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistokles to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbor. Such boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the Metronomi, who watched over weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city. We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterward (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis was the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Strategi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the Strategi, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates, administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristides appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistokles, though so often exalted by his unrivaled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathizing with Aristides and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristides himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiades) and Alkmæon: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistokles immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in

Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him. He is said to have given offense by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honor of Artemis Aristobule, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristides had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.

But the main cause of his discredit was the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistokles, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy, is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistokles—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of medism. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistokles, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristides as in his censure of Themistokles, whom he denounces as “a lying and unjust traitor.”

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistokles to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations toward the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations toward their cause; and if Themistokles had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not

proved against him at Sparta until long afterward—which first seems to have raised the presumption of medism against Themistokles also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also that Themistokles had given some color to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistokles since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of medism to be preferred against him at Athens, by secret instigations and, as it is said, by bribes to his political opponents. But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistokles himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristеides, his defense was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favor. His splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents—Aristеides, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; and we can hardly wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly; and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including of course a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings—especially when one of those parties was Themistokles, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristеides: and lastly the friends of Themistokles himself, elated with his acquittal and his seeming augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favor, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistokles.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried

a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistokles. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to co-operate in them. Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.

Whether this latter request would have been granted or whether Themistokles would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been dispatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favorably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighboring continent. Here however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admetus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admetus was not at home; and Themistokles, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themistokles revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger—entreatng protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenseless, for offense given under such very different circumstances; and for an offense, too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admetus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to

land there, he would of course have been recognized and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistokles: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.

Thus did Themistokles, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents. The poverty of Aristides at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistokles, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favorite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterward. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydides. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretense that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandane, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandane: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable

duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several other uncertified details, which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. Indeed Ephorus, Deino, Kleitarchus, and Herakleides, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistokles had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him; whereas Thucydides and Charon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is *nearly* contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker:—“I, Themistokles, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defense to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to thee, but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views.”

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer—and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, “I have got Themistokles the Athenian”—as some of Plutarch’s authors informed him. In the course of the year granted, Themistokles had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence. No Greek (says Thucydides) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents

yearly, were assigned to him for bread; those of the neighboring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine. Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistokles received altogether; but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia, he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step toward the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydides; who at the same time notices a rumor partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistokles himself that the promises made could never be performed—a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness toward his memory; since his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there. These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If, however, we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydides, that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honor of Themistokles in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really inclosed within it.

Aristeides died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistokles; but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeides as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on

the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honorable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulcher was provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Nearly a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just Aristeides, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance. On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeides with Themistokles. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choragic victory at Athens, with little scruples as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonorable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistokles attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD.— FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, toward something like one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as

president—from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into co-operation either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of *Ægos-potami*) as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony.

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins; but it had been consummated before the thirty years’ truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphemus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistokles or Aristeides fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the *Ægean* sea was an Athenian lake—was of course the period of her greatest splendor and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the *Ægean*, as

the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479–450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thucydides, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the time immediately succeeding. Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydides) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results, which perhaps Themistokles may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristides and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydides introduces as “the digression from this narrative,” he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C.—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-

stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or *kleruchs*. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskames governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress."

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defense sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Boges governor of Eion. Boges, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames. His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thucydides; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydides, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskames maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykale, drove the Persians out of Greece and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the *Ægean* and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments; an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighborhood, and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy; while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy that the Athenians first established that constant, systematic, and

laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontent among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B. C.

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydides about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydides, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristides on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea, never again to be seen. As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honorable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employ-

ing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her in strictness of dealing toward those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burden.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties, that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labor and privation, it was a welcome relief: while to the Athenians, full of ardor, and patient of labor as well as discipline for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens. But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens were less and less paralyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede: but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years

—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practiced by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed, and qualified, to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable causes: voluntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending toward separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance. But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling toward Athens was

rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred toward her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, the latter were "ready enough with their bodies," but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions. The contempt felt by these Dorian landmen for the military inefficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labor, as that which broke up the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amid such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristides and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date

of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinope and Ægina, subsequently added.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C. was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon, where the Persian governor Boges, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C. that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had pre-

vented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C., and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city. On the spot was built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage. Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and 8,000 hoplites—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject; its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was dispatched to attack the Persians on the southwestern and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia; among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon

in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustes and Pharendates, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther re-enforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the re-enforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription of the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils. The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phaselis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighboring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring

grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skapte Hyle, as well as from others in the neighborhood. The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasiæns of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon. Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiaëus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, 10,000 in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabekus, convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the 10,000 colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed hereafter.

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two

years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away; its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home. Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event. It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Perikles and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to

obligations on both sides of the *Ægean sea*, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtes, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Ceta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medising* Greeks should be expelled from the synod—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistokles successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repeopled, under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of “ancient Bœotian right and usage.” The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves; while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate; whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendancy was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Medieval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of

Athens, except by organizing the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendancy—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when recovered, against the dangerous neighborhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics toward Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious; but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis: and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time. Such aggregation of towns out of the pre-existing separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favorable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotychides—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighborhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment: not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity toward their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Pericæi. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind

of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Aeimnestus (the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa), was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklerus, overpowered by superior numbers. When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithome, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defense, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia. Defense indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans. The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4,000 men, under the command of Kimon; Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithome. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Kimon their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they introduced into the interior of Laconia. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians—they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretense of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Perikles and Ephialtes, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly

discouraged it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Lacænan Kritias afterward characterized as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon—employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all further democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta; and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. “Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;”—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chion poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly. The dispatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Perikles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens received again into her public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithome.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about

thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenes. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighborhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Platea, which their powerful neighbor had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterward, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment. Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighboring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleonæ—on the other side upon Megara: on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connection, and obtained permission to enroll herself as an ally of Athens. This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pegæ was situated—and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offense to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and

energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighborhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Perikles was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus: but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigor: and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succor from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterward copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermione), were defeated on land by the

Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterward in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat—neither of them apparently very decisive—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterward at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithome, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission. The Corinthians and Epidaurians however, while they carried to Ægina a re-enforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myronides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the

refuse of the Athenian military force, that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground inclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myronides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the inclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Perikles, which were now becoming ascendent in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa; for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (=about $4\frac{1}{2}$ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (=nearly 4 Eng. miles) to join it with Phalerum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistokles himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while, Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride, at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized; and the democratical movement pressed by Perikles and Ephialtes (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Perikles, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistokles when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for

contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians; to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possession: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalerum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athene. When to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.


Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithome were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomedes. The ostensible motive, or the pretense, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandizement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia in their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Plataea: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbor at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it

was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterward, in organizing Arcadia and Messene against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics, and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbors, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchic opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Perikles, and to the Democratic movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a re-enforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myronides at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road or march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbor of Pegæ, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement. But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favor the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the *Æneis*. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Perikles on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the *Akamantis*, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration toward the ostracized leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Perikles himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return. We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistokles had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeides from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis; and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterward, and on which Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myronides into Bœotia: the extreme pre-



CENTER GROUP ENLARGED.
THE GABLE-GROUP OF THE TEMPLE OF MINERVA AT AEGINA.

cision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thucydides is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Cēnophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Cēnophyta was the last—Myronides was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns: reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratic governments—and forcing the aristocratic leaders, favorable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pegæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægian. Her admiral Tolmides displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methone and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus, belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town, and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallenia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterward find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began. During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon with a force of 1000 hoplites under Perikles himself, sailing from the Megarian harbor of Pegæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmides—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterward made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Cēniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year

against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460-455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inaros; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabyzus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopitis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrene: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inaros himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was further aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmides, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithome, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmides at Naupaktus

(recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians), where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no further expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly in the continuance of the siege of Ithome, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithome, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer. This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon, who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Perikles, that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service, so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he dispatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxikrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.

From this time forward no further operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phaselis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos,

then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility, this convention did little more than recognize the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydides, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details, and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King, that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydides? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thucydides and his contemporaries, living in the actual fullness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show even from him—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased after the last mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydides in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war; and that no further aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean, nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound from the silence of Thucydides to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realized. But when

we reflect, further, that Herodotus certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.

We may, therefore, believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Perikles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death insured more complete ascendancy to Perikles, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite: while even Thucydides, son of Milesias, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Perikleian party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Perikles was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens further aggressions against Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Perikles, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state. Nor

are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the free-will of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defense. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers and enfeeble the authority of the Delian synod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favor any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is further said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristides characterized it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his life-time. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to insure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy, and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Cœnophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into

a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbor of Pegæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus: but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 488 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens, a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenseless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognized head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon

Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognized as legitimate — threatened nevertheless still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451–446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies. The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favor of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Eubœa was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favorable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies. After the victory of Œnophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate

body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy established at Thebes after the battle of Œnophyta was ill-conducted and disorderly: which circumstance laid open Bœotia still farther to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general Tolmides marched to expel them, with 1000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmides, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Perikles, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution. Fatally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Tolmides was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Koroneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmides himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy. Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians, and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armor on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmides had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Perikles himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still

more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighborhood of Eleusias and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandrides, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counselor. Perikles (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandrides never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athene at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Perikles returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmides, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histiaea at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens.

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Koroneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pegæ, yet her communication with the latter harbor was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of

acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Perikles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterward, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defense of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Perikles would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether, and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterward, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important inter-

nal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of Kleisthenes, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataea, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life); though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliaea, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings, and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenes. The Strategi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority disobedient parties: the imperium of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments: though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenian constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behavior, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office—and to the farther animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative assembly) meet-

ing periodically during the course of that year; in some of which assemblies, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before his year was expired. Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristides had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristides to that of Perikles: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataea, this new fervor of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Perikles and Ephialtes, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Perikles who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates.¹ But the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Perikles and Ephialtes that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the

citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; 6,000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused, with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidency of an archon. It is to be remarked that the system of reference to arbitration, for private causes, was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterward carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Perikles and Ephialtes. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called Heliaa, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states (in somewhat exaggerated language) that “nearly one-third of the citizens sat as judges every day,” cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Perikles, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of such causes

had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered. The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.

In reference to the senate of Areopagus, also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source. Especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenian constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendancy. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides: and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenes, Æchines, or Deinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokrates, in his discourse usually called Areopagiticus, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while

its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetoric is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the color of past realities—is sufficiently obvious. But it enables us to presume generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When we learn that the Spartan senate was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokrates affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: while the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following. But that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time. Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duty of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480–460 B. C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the time when prudence would have counseled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so; which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of the new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a center of action to the oligarchical or conservative party; that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered—with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this

sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistrates were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve; and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendancy was in progress.

The political opposition between Perikles and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus the father of the former had been the accuser of Miltiades, the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Perikles, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Perikles must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterward of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libelers (about 467–428 B. C.). His public life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracized, and when Aristides was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both, a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleides—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance (like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens

had greatly changed since the days of Themistokles and Aristides. For the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Perikles devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive; yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans. Moreover he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchic Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanor of his rival Perikles. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But the property of Perikles was administered with a strict though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market. It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Perikles: a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits—but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendancy of Perikles was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though no way deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all

rash or distant enterprises. His private habits were sober and reclusive; his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talkative energy, spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valor of the conquerors of Marathon. Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Perikles, and no way inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man. As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Perikles, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtes advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers, Ephialtes and Perikles were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithome, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtes. But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for

proposing soon afterward a vote of ostracism—a challenge, indeed, which may perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtes or Perikles. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendant. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Perikles and Ephialtes carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate *Heliæa*. Ephialtes first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighborhood of the market-place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularized.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is that Perikles was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Perikles did was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments, and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organized: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Perikles really effected was to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority: while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power sprung up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of thei-

previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining which was still left both to individual magistrates and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them—for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtes as impious and guilty innovations. How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtes caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra named Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterward until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtes produced an effect unfavorable in every way to the party who procured it. The popular party in their resentment must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Perikles, the superior leader left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes—already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchic party, which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtes, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. Kimon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Perikles henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise, whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct

of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Perikles—and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Koroneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Perikles, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called *Nomophylakes*, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These *Nomophylakes* sat alongside of the *Proedri* or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws. They were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law. We do not know whether they possessed the presidency of a *dikastery*—that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency—or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates, however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtes to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the *Areopagus* without introducing any substitute. The *Nomophylakes* were honored with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed (like the *Archons*) to enter the senate of *Areopagus* after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction and increasing application of the *Graphe Paranomon*, presently to be explained. They are not even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals, after the battle of *Arginusæ*, to be tried by a novel process which violated legal form not less than substantial justice. After the expulsion of the *Thirty*, the senate of *Areopagus* was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendancy.

Another important change, which we may with probability refer to Perikles, is the institution of the *Nomothetæ*. These men were in point of fact *dikasts*, members of the 6,000 citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the *dikasts* for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and

acting together throughout the entire year: they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasions and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a *psephism*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The Thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws seriatim, and submit them for approval or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of Nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the Nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defense of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defense, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the 6,000 sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as 1000—and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly. And there can be no doubt that the Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have

the same interest with the whole—not permanent but delegated for the occasion—assembled under a solemn sanction—and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephism, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery or the Nomothetæ—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the Nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Perikles at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated Nomothetæ. This was the *Graphe Paranomon*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphe Paranomon*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the *Thesmothetæ*.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the *Graphe Paranomon* at the time of Demosthenes. The mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself—the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against

himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the sum of 1000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the Nomothetæ, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the Nomothetæ. In the former case the indictment staid its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the Nomothetæ, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to intrust the defense of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such pre-existing law—was in no way unreasonable. It imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfill. It served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception, and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. It was a security to the dikasts, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assem-

blies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. He had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the *Graphe Paranomon* as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterward in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus Æschines indicts Ktesiphon under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to Demosthenes. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on further to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Demosthenes was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) Ktesiphon had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favor of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *Graphe Paranomon*: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpracticed citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon, toward the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphe Paranomon* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore

out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenes against Leptines. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage—if he carried the law for repeal before the *Nomothetæ*.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Perikles varied in number of members: we never hear of less than 200 members—most generally of 500—and sometimes also of 1000, 1500, 2,000 members, on important trials. Each man received pay from the treasurers called *Kolakretæ*, after his day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachma: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Perikles was one obolus, afterward tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly. Now one obolus seems to have proved afterward an inadequate temptation even to the *ekklesiasts* (or citizens who attended the public assembly), who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings than the dikasts: much less therefore would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli: the rather, as these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confederate treasure from Delos to Athens—so that the Exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend. But it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A—when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers—from those who belonged to division B or Δ , besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Perikles and Ephialtes—changes full of practical results—the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Kleisthenes had begun and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the

popular *dikasteries* and the *Nomothetæ* are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Perikles. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the *Areopagus* of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and salaried *dikasts* to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterward made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Perikles made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous *dikasteries* at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first—That personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta,—next, That in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them. We know also from the same unsuspected source, that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on ship-board were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanor of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiades, and Meidias, even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness, even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the *dikasteries* established by Perikles were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that, the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect—it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on

the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanes and Xenophon give us plainly to understand. If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavor—every censure or sneer or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been overstated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same—recourse to a certain number of private citizens taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupillage, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even to the terrible punishment of attain. And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken

the place of the old attaint—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens—sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit (always excepting political trials), of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. Moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendancy, of a professional judge—obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognizing no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practiced in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive. Partly for this reason, partly for others not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English administration of justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box—comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in insuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally—might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Perikles about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that

he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighborhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails,—there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognizes to have been gross injustice. A jury who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offense before the dikastery at Athens,—having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defense, of summoning witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century. Juries bring the common feeling as well as the common reason of the public—or often, indeed, only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases. They are a protection against anything worse—especially against such corruption or servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons—but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now, the dikast-trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingre

dients of error and misdecision as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose, without the counteracting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less: not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual—but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part. The dikast, therefore, heard little of the naked facts, the appropriate subjects for his reason—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner skillfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and coloring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror. We see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries. Of course, such artifices were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the hearers. Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that, in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief. They insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great. Their extreme publicity—as well as their simple and oral procedure, divest-

ed of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome even at its outset—was no small benefit. And as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgment common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos. The susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions—and that genuine taste for sitting in judgment and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanes may caricature and deride it, was alike honorable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from *Æschylus* to *Sophokles*. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse, in which also some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated; not always happily, for several of the early rhetors adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterward liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periklean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view; either as professing to improve the moral character—or as communicating power and facility of expression—or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience,

dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, etc. Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkedon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodikus of Keos, Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery and preserved down to the later critics. These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, which Herodotus applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain—they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public. For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists. Moreover Sokrates—himself a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a *Sophist*—but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers—Sokrates—or rather, Plato speaking through the person of Sokrates—carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokrates himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, or from those unfavorable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the *Apologies* of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the Ekklesia, but still more from the

contentions before the dikastery—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Perikles opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away. And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanes derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanes selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Perikles has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to insure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6,000 Heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Perikles and Ephialtes, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its further development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn. The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and sea port towns; the reverses immediately preceding the Thirty years' truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian

violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member. It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterward.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconceived plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members; nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defense to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish, so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every

Grecian community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit. Even Perikles, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Perikles had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Perikles formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters. This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly managed by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training. And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the Thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Aristophanes which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydides at about 600 talents. Of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information. It was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamiæ; originally officers of the confederacy but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated by Xenophon at 1000 talents. Customs, harbor and market dues, receipt from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, etc., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents: which sum added to the 600 talents from tribute would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanes during the

ninth year of the Peloponnesian war (B. C. 422) gives the general total of that time as "nearly 2,000 talents;" this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiades, which Thucydides nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1200 talents. Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Perikles, the revenue including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the Acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war—which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of 9,700 talents (=£2,230,000), and was still at 6,000 talents after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began. This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year, in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever, goes far of itself to vindicate Perikles from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Kimon, no further expeditions were undertaken against the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The tribute-money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it. And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity in Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Perikles and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Perikles. While discouraging all distant and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many *kleruchies*, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of

the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he further repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labor of carrying a wall of defense across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon, had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiades about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Perikles even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinope, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinopians. We may presume that on this occasion, Sinope became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyora and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinope further eastward, which the 10,000 Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterward, existed in the time of Perikles or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Perikles produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast, contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion—others poor, and hiring themselves out as laborers. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maxi-

num during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon and as a convenient center for the ship timber and gold and silver mines of the neighboring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed—first that of Histæus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497–496 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 465 B.C. under Leagrus and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000. So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families and became in this manner actively engaged in mining—to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself, seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around. This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agnon, dispatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbors who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from

Argilus, a Grecian city colonized from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to Amphipolis, and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laus and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Perikles with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolizing for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies, the Sybarites, were masters of the city, and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was,

we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Arkas, Achais, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Eubois, Nesiotis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honoring an Athenian Ækist, or indeed any Ækist except Apollo. The Spartan general Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia half-way between the two—in the fertile territory called Siritis.

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies. From the circumstance that so small a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Perikles was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom emigration was desirable, should rather become kleruchs in some of the islands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Perikles had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told far more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmides into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Perikles had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydides, son of Melesias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Perikles; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Perikles assumed a constant char-

acter and organization, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the “honorable and respectable” citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens. Thucydides himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Perikles—perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Perikles or he were the better wrestler, Thucydides replied—“Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who actually saw him fall.”

Such an opposition, made to Perikles in all the full license which a democratic constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratic chiefs, which Thucydides son of Milesias introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratic majority round Perikles, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict. As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Perikles toward the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydides contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretense of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians, but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Perikles replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honorable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Perikles in defense of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Perikles

continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defense. What Thucydides and his partisans appear to have urged, was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life. But Perikles was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed apocryphal) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The *allies*, indeed, might have had some ground of complaint against Perikles, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydides and his party; nor was it calculated to find favor either with aristocrats or democrats in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Perikles—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies; we shall find that the schemes of Perikles were nevertheless eminently pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the center of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratic patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbors, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur, which made her appear even much stronger than she really was—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full license of criticism—of elegant pursuits economically followed—and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Perikles in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated

Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition forever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to this projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Perikles, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Perikles and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism. And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Perikles.

The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place about two years after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (443-442 B. C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Periklean works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbor was the proposition of Perikles, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalerum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Perikles now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance (seemingly near one furlong) from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokrates to have cost 1000 talents, were constructed; while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets. Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, per-

manently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora. At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Perikleian age. A new theater, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athene, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs: lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began. Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athene Polias, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Demeter at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athene at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athene, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athene—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athene Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not of course to Perikles that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution, and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his predecessors. He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Perikles imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—

Iktinus, Kallikrates, Korœbus, Mnesikles, and others—worked under his instructions: and he had besides a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labors was confided. With all the great contributions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenians and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkile. Plutarch observes that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta. The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3,000 talents in the aggregate (about £690,000). The expenditure of so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athene, and ivory employed

In its place. Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents. A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious toward the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Perikles knew well that the visible splendor of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Perikles, apparently not long after the commencement of the thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfillment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a pan-Hellenic congress for pan-Hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme. It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name—a comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realized under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Perikles. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens. It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the

same footing as these two: that is, paying no tribute-money—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchic government, its fortifications, and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Miletus lay the small town of Priene, one of the twelve original members contributing to the pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priene, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the thirty years' truce (B.C. 440–439). Whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply: whereupon an armament of forty ships was dispatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratic government; leaving in it a garrison and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchic families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchic party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Miletus, whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was dispatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Perikles himself and the poet Sophokles, both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Strategi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophokles went in person; partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Perikles had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate

to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Miletus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently he was re-enforced by forty ships from Athens and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force and blocked up the harbor with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Perikles felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunus and Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet never came in sight, though Diodorus affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnes certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it. Yet I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Perikles, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbor in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus—surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land. For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper. It was not until the return of Perikles that they were again blockaded. Re-enforcements, however, were now multiplied to the investing squadron—from Athens, forty ships under Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormion, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Antikles, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raze their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated installments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached 1000 talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same time.

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium, or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favorable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there

was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realized his promise of bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom at a special meeting the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens—many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know—but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognized the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterward took credit, in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors. Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterward, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Geomori or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year. As Samos remained during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens—and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran toward oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Perikles was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war, and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Perikles. He

was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens; once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us, but the second has been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by Thucydides, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony—doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings. They were then placed in coffins of cypress and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted on an elevated stage and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Perikles after the Samian expedition, that when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands like a victorious athlete. Only Elpinike, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phœnicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Perikles—to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities. But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honor of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favorable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril, but rendered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterward, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them toward Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy; which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by

Athens—and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydides go so far as to disdain all pretense of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force. As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Perikles nor Kleon, indeed, lays stress on the attachment of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodotus in the discussion respecting Mitylene after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylene, in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favor of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the

allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence but against the inclination of their own people. In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mende, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas—we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanor, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem. But neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been omitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls. These particular examples warrant us in affirming that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy, and felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety. But their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change—partly from the coercive hand of Athens—partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them—and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as Kleruchs (out-settlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was 600 talents yearly. It appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in

every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. Afterward, probably, it became more burdensome, though when, or in what degree, we do not know: but the alleged duplication of it (as I have already remarked) is both uncertified and improbable. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments or powerful citizens. Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia. Of course many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and sea-ports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal, to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both toward the confederacy collectively and toward other allies with their individual citizens separately, as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy also claimed and exercised. Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire, the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenseless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens (taking

this numerical statement of Aristophanes not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that *all* the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens; yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn, between matters carried up thither, and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens: so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfillment of public duty, etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterward adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a Dekarchy (or oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of com-

plaint, constantly open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydides. The chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes—but they looked up to the “Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbor of refuge to themselves.” If the popular dikasteries at Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject ally, was ensured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta. For though oligarchical leaders in these allied cities might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and Dekarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course, therefore, disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydides, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace,—he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost and a partisan oligarchy. And we read anec-

dotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasus (of Leuktra in Bœotia) had been first violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus in Eubœa had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodemus: in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished. We shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Paches at Mitylene, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts. Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favor or lenient dealing. But this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. "If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise." For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by

nothing better than a love of litigation." "Our allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations. They suffered worse hardship under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours."

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens. And an Athenian citizen indeed might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogize the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the *Ægean*. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation" (if, indeed, we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining), much less in those petty collateral interests indicated by Xenophon, such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties toward the whole—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself. It may be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies—and in so far the latter had good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberate or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable

from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest. There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same unrelenting rigor as we shall find hereafter manifested toward Mitylene, Skione, and Melos. The policy of Perikles, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylene at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing to say except that they were defenseless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylene, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity. But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylene might be strong enough to protect itself and its

own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek) was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years insured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by a majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war. The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing. She had, indeed, once possessed the largest navy in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or, if she had, her comparative naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallene in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them averse to collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies toward war on behalf of Samos. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong, arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance—prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed toward peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth toward peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amid the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy. What extent of real power and interference

this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amid such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus (known afterward in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium, hard by the modern Durazzo)—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the *Ækist* (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city—a citizen of Herakleid descent named Phalius—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognized grand-daughter (if the expression may be allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honor of the *Ækist*.

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the seacoast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighboring Illyrians, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Here, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy, and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found: while the Demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed con-

dition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its Ækists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defense—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiotic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollonia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.

The arrival of such a re-enforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans; who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for succor and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterward strengthened by a farther re-enforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know; but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and 3,000 hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Pales in the island of Kephallania, five by Epidaurus, two by Træzen, one by Hermione, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any



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one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to insure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition such as was customary among Grecian states—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred toward Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently dispatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged—and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in the *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, dispatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes under Aristeus, Kallikrates, and Timanor, with 2,000 hoplites under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Am-

brakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service: the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighboring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimme, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllene the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled toward the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defense of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimme, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together: and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when re-enforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail; twenty-seven tiremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elias, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleides and four others were commanders-in-chief.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies

which that city could command, and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure. While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties. The Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be intrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the Strategi or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens (Athe-

nian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay: moreover they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important re-enforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force. The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of

war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending re-enforcements to the Peloponnesians.

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former time—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly toward Corinth her mother city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognized, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed. Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony. The Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact, in such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the Thirty years' truce, but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies, especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval co-operation of Korkyra would compensate.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous

debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow; so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily Thucydides does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Perikles, who determined the ultimate result.

Epidamnus with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others). The generating causes of war are at work—and it will infallibly come whatever you may determine respecting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly; but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformably to the steady conviction of Perikles. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra or some Korkyræan possession with a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra. They there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Æpirotic tribes in the neighborhood. The Korkyræan fleet of 110 sail, under Meikiades and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took

station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybotha, while the land force and 1000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimme. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing toward them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and maneuvering were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations. Lacedæmonius with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable, orders could neither be heard nor obeyed, and the individual valor of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships

of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and water-logged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks or keeping above water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbor, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defense. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epirotic coast. The Korkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokides; which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimme, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies. At first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The re-enforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defense—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians

had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyræan. And when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies." It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realized: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sybota on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans, planting in it a re-enforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismissed, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over,

so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Relieved now from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretense to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallene (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalkidike, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic Gulfs), was situated the Derian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance toward the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of *Epidemiurgi*. On various points of the neighboring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighboring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidike, was held by the Macedonian king *Perdikkas*, son of that Alexander who had taken part fifty years before in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers *Axius* and *Strymon*. Now *Perdikkas* had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother *Philip*, and *Derdas*, holding independent principalities in the upper country (apparently on the higher course of the *Axius* near the *Pæonian* tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, *Perdikkas* from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the sea-ports on the mainland than over the islands. For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land neighbor, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assidu-

ously the favor of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the sea-ports. Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens; and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens. And he further prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas further assigned some territory near Lake Bolbe to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Korkyræan sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallene, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea side, and fortified only toward the mainland—requiring them further both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1000 hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, dispatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighboring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty years' truce still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about Midsummer 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance. Archestratus, with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pyna. But it would probably have been wiser had he

turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a re-enforcement of 1600 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion, under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defense shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth—40 triremes and 2,000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias, son of Kalliades, with four other commanders—who, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the sea-port called Gignonus, near which they encamped.

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent 200 horse to join them under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side toward Olynthus—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the

Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.

The victory was however quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side toward Pallene: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1600 fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallene, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallene, so that the town was now completely inclosed and the harbor watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favorable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbor, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians, and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favorable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence, and general slowness in resolving, might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians, but also the Lesbians had endeavored to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed, had given them no encouragement.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Perikles, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact that the Megarians had harbored runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis, partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent inclosure. In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterward was imputed to the Megarians. We may reasonably suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before—which caused to Athens an irreparable

mischief—the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge. Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce, and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Perikles compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians toward Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety further to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavoring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader, and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong toward Peloponnesus.

Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Ephor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favorably prepared for them—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise, to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves, on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in the case of Potidæa and that of Korkyra was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be

bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their speech at Sparta they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth—we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa. But at any rate the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians either of outrage toward Corinth, or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech is to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure—of Athens: as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height: especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterward to build the long walls from the city to the sea. The Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow. In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behind-hand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs—which,

however, as the Spartans were now well-disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. “You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires. *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is that your performance comes short of your power—you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back—you are habitual laggards: *they* love foreign service—you cannot stir from home: for *they* are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while *you* fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated they fall back the least. Moreover they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her services. When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.

“Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians—yet ye still hang back from action. . . . Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbors like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours.”

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica—they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognize Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy toward which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honorably earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without imperiling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy. He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from the Spartans and other Greeks—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistokles, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save

her empire from reproach; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia. By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise:—no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city: and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city (though doubtless the account of a partisan) is in substance correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion; the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks

at the question with a view to the interests and honor of Sparta only—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valor and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders, his contemporaries, around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation. He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down? Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could, indeed, invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation. Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly cultivated soil of Attica was held over them in *terrorem* without being actually consummated—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined; admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valor. “We Spartans owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valor is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent,

because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them. And thus, not being otherwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of neighboring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed, there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us for our parts not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa and of the other grievances alleged by our allies—and that, too, the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies."

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man—the temper of the assembly—and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

"I don't understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good. But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings. Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses—but *we*

have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can with honor deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong: it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly—which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the *Ay* or *No* of the English House of Commons—the presiding Ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger. Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He, therefore, directed a division—like the Speaker of the English House of Commons when his decision in favor of *Ay* or *No* is questioned by any member—"Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to insure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having,

now been carried, they had to enforce, upon the allies, generally, the dishonor as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot-city. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honorable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members. The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen—so that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would excite revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed. Nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his co-operation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. “Be ye persuaded then (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, had her means of attack prepared against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest. Let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery.”

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately: and the majority decided for war. This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January, 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November, 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Thucydides, recognizing these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies. That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce,—and moreover that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant. It was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos; peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—fomented by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was, in point of fact, the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to insure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendancy and unshaken resolution of Perikles induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defense, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favor of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Perikles, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute. But Perikles was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else, by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They dispatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel. Meanwhile the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political maneuver aimed at Perikles, their chief opponent in that city. His mother Agariste belonged to the great family of the Alkmæonids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megakles nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.

Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political maneuver. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenes, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenes (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenes to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras the rival of Kleisthenes, had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Perikles (the grand-nephew of Kleisthenes), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies. Religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out." If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Perikles with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Perikles with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it. Not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias.

We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of Miletus, beautiful, well-educated, and aspiring. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed (though upon very doubtful evidence) to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtezans. Whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Perikles, it is certain that so remarkable were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism—that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokrates among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single. Everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of a class of women called *Hetærae* or Courtezans, literally Female Companions, who lived a free life,

managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character. The most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodote, appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendancy.

Perikles had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage having never been comfortable, was afterward dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted. Perikles concurred with his wife's male relations (who formed her legal guardians) in giving her away to another husband. He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterward on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Perikles his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may reasonably believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Perikles, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus—disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment—reported abroad with exaggerated calumnies, and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Perikles, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the pretended revelations, which served them as matter for scandalous libel on the privacy of this distinguished man.

While the comic writers attacked Perikles himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphale, the Deianeira, or the Here, to this great Herakles or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Perikles, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydides son of Melesias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instance of Diopetithes. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterward fatally in the case of Sokrates, and imbittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas—that Perikles did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banish-

ment was passed against him in his absence. But Perikles himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery. In fact, the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Pheidias) was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Perikles. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears. The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons. In Perikles, however, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled; for constant self-mastery was one of the most prominent features in his character. And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticises the speech of Perikles as if it were simply the composition of Thucydides, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.

It appears also, as far as we can judge amid very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athene, took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Perikles. A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to insure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Perikles dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Perikles in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Perikles, in order that the sus-

pitions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontides proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Perikles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1500 in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.

If Perikles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honorably acquitted: for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed, another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Perikles, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war;" and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially, that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on. We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Perikles were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydides that the war depended upon far deeper causes—that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it—that it was not Perikles, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amid these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Perikles was hard-pressed by the accusations of political enemies—perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection. And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Perikles and his family might be banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war:—to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honor even by the greatest Athenian families. On this occasion, however, the maneuver did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæonids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans, too, had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus,

in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death—and the sanctuary of Athene Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege—was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Perikles. Probably the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem: very different from the effect of the same maneuver when practiced before by Kleomenes against Kleisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterward arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Perikleian leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But, on the other hand, the party opposed to Perikles would have a much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and his advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigences of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: “The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous.” Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favor of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amid the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant that they even

now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if they were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Perikles for refusing to concede such a trifle. Against this opinion Perikles entered his protest, in a harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians—though I know that men are in one mood, when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another, when actually in the contest—their judgments then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavorable; or else not take credit for wisdom in the event of success. For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences; and each to retain what we possess—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it when tendered. They choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now, let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war. Let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality.”

Perikles then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means. In a border-war or a single land-battle,

they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi. For besides that the mariners of the dependant islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterward—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land-battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.

“Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator). Reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them. Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy. But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present, let us dismiss these envoys with the answer:—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbors, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (xenelasy or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we had them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more

cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honor greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors.”

These animating encouragements of Perikles carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand. With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground skillfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Perikles. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydides bears out the judgment of Perikles on this important point, so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens (as the Spartans themselves afterward came to feel), but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica; it was not Athens, but her enemies, who after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war. The case made out by Perikles, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydides. And though it is perfectly true that the ambition of Athens had been

great, and the increase of her power marvelous, during the thirty five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the Thirty years' truce; it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Perikles had not been one of foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment toward other Grecian powers. Even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce; while the circumstances, out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy, the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse; though individuals who passed the borders did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbor.

The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithæron; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (from which it was separated by the river Asopus) on the other: the distance between Platæa and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though

Bœotian by descent, the Platæans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance (as well as qualified communion of civil rights) with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes for a period of now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long proscription the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Plataea. An oligarchical faction of wealthy Platæans espoused their cause with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town—of destroying its leaders, their political rivals—and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleides, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes. To both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval before watches had been placed and the precautions of a state of war commenced. They resolved to surprise the town of Plataea in the night, during a period of religious festival, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard. Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C., a body of rather more than 300 Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Plataea during the first sleep of the citizens. Naukleides and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Plataea by break of day in order to support them.

Naukleides and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents, the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or dispatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent. Believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large re-enforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence. They wished, moreover, rather to soften and justify than to aggravate the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite by public proclamation all Platæans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race and to the Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But finding out soon, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with, they speedily took courage and

determined to attack them; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways, and forming barricades with wagons across such of these ways as were suitable.

A little before daybreak, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages. Having been out all night under a heavy rain, they were inclosed in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in tracking out even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Plateæans two or three times. The attack was repeated with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Plateæan citizen who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others escaped through an unguarded gate by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance to escape, and the Plateæans at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.

Had the re-enforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asopus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Plateæa, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Plateæan territory (no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls) in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the

town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures.

Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement. But the Plataeans gave a different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath—and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydides records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Plataeans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Plataeans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their movable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were 180 in number.

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Plataea to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Perikles doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact; for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans afterward, when fortune was in their favor, chose to designate it as such. But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be, to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Plataeans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth; so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Koroneia, and by that of Sparta (hereafter

to be recounted) after the taking of Sphakteria. The Plataeans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Perikles would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Plataea, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Plataea and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds. The incident at Plataea, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up. And the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment. A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Plataea tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Perikles, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent around to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free. The latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians. To the island of Kephallenia, the Athenians sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterward. With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town

with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternizing with their fellow-tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly, the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral Phormio commenced.

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera. Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Perikles could make a report to his countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service; 1200 horsemen and horse-bowmen; 1600 bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than 29,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 13,000 in number; while the remaining 16,000, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalerum—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 6,000 talents, or about £1,400,000, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 9,700 talents, or about £2,230,000, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to 6,000. Moreover the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Perikles spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the sub-

ject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about £138,000; besides all other items, making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about £230,000.

To this formidable catalogue of means for war, were to be added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Perikles to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts, and he could guarantee success as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise while their force was required by the necessities of war near home. But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover the best which Perikles could promise was a successful resistance—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had never been got together—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus (except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellene joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians, and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellene, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phokians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities however supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war—the devastation

of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march—gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset—a common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, with favorable sympathies throughout Greece—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war. And the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process. Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Perikles.

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of 500 triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbors. Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phœnician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise of Plataea. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry, were not constrained to send two thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition

of some length. On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. “We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight, even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated.”

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melesippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Perikles, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melesippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melesippus exclaimed, with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—“This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks.”

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of CEnoe, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica toward Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of CEnoe, which had been put into so good a state of defense, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skillful, had been tried in vain—and after a delay of several days before the place—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before CEnoe—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more

likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Perikles at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and movable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory—or carried across to one of the neighboring islands. It would indeed make a favorable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate maneuver of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Perikles, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæonid race. But though this declaration from Perikles would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, yet the lesson which he had to inculcate—not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them—to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success—were recommendations which probably no one but Perikles could have hoped to enforce. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens. It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labor, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Perikles against his will to make proposi-

tions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions to be made; though, as this calculation was not realized, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis forty-nine years before—entire families with all their movable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands. Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city—always excepting the acropolis and the Eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants. But even the ground called *the Pelasgikon* immediately under the acropolis, which by an ancient and ominous tradition was interdicted to human abode was made use of under the present necessity. Many too placed their families in the towers and recesses of the city walls, or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honorable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas the march of Archidamus might perhaps now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party opposed to Pericles, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before (Enoe without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Plataea. His army was of irresistible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch, or of 100,000 according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder—even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also. But since Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement toward peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory

that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right hand until he came to Kropeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and north-westerly from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighborhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than 3,000 hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighboring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanes, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable. It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme—which could not have contained less than 12,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost in inflaming this temper and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.

Though his calculation was not realized, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Perikles, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Pleistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ, within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye, except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed

of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together, angrily debating the critical question of the moment, while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Perikles was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering. He was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general. The rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten. This burst of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous political enemies of Perikles, and particularly by Kleon, now rising into importance as an opposition speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment or the firmness of Perikles. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens. It appears that he as general, or rather the Board of the Generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the Ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting, and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Perikles should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honorable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact that his refusal to call the Ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Perikles, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Perikles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the

compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry, their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder. At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica. Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction toward the demes between Mount Brilessus and Mount Parnes, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the north-western road near Oropus, which brought them into Bœotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens—the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes. It would seem that they quitted Attica toward the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, under Karkinus, Proteas, and Sokrates, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methone (Modon), on the south-western peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory. The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas, the son of Tellis—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterward—who happened to be on guard at a neighboring post, thrown himself into it with 100 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honors bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighborhood and 300 chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harborless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbor of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they

handed over to the inhabitants of the neighboring Akarnanian town of Palærus—as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallenia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion—with its four distinct towns or districts, Pales, Kranii, Same, and Prone. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens toward the close of September—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alope were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa. It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy, and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on ship-board and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two—and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Toward the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Perikles, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were 10,000 citizen hoplites, (independent of 3,000

others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and 3,000 metic hoplites—besides a large number of light troops. Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian Ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the Strategi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office, that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighboring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable. Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, five centuries afterward, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavorable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defense, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity. It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigor, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the forbidden change,

appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of the democratical government. But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done. But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Perikles, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which

Perikles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this 1000 talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be forever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterward adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade—and of the neighboring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkes king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of Abdera, who engaged to render him and his son Sadokus allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Sitalkes that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the re-conquest of her revolted towns: the honor of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus. Nymphodorus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Thesma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover the town of Astakus in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Akarnania

and upon the island of Kephallenia. In the latter they were entrapped into an ambuscade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.

It was toward the close of autumn also that Perikles, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos. But that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and senator; probably heard by Thucydides himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Perikles, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.

The eleven chapters of Thucydides which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind misled by a bad or unattainable model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Perikles—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly not composed for actual delivery. And it deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenes, and even Lysias, the honorable distinction which Thucydides claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech Perikles distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues. He thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence—than when it is translated into the words of a

speaker, who may easily offend either by incompetency or by apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its business-like, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it—Perikles proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.

“ We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbors—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends toward the Many and not toward the Few. As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while in regard to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man's chance of advancement is determined not by party favor but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department. Neither poverty, nor obscure station, keep him back, if he really has the means of benefiting the city. Moreover our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other's diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbor for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks, which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no xenelasy to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to maneuvers and quackery than to our own native

bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy—partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

“Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law—we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

“In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated: we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasoning about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

“In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece; while viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality:

and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior. Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

“Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her.”

Perikles pursues, at considerable additional length, the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no further addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians—is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Perikles, as well as in others afterward—“Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honorable sense of shame in their actions”—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the

public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those “black looks” which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Perikles deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta:—it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present, I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Perikles as negating the supposition, that exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty was universal among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a comparison with the extreme narrowness and rigor of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed in Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbors or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokrates, and it far-

ther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of "democratical license." The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Perikles depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical, or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the tolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits—is an ideal, which, if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Perikles contrasts with the xenelasy or jealous expulsion practiced at Sparta—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite, to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet no way abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgment, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own

private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Perikles and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenes seventy years afterward. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, adverted to with pride by Perikles, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterward reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigor, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all—but no way surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Perikles delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Perikles never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripides had designated it in his tragedy "Medea," represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus. A picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city. Such calamities might indeed be foreseen; but there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then impending, could not be foreseen—the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colors and tone of

cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Perikles, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper: a contrast, to which Thucydides was doubtless not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

AT the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus. In spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made toward the fulfillment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was no way advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Perikles and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.

In regard to this second invasion, Perikles recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enor-

mously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; while the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favorable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of salubrity—and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.

Of this plague—or (more properly) eruptive typhoid fever, distinct from, yet analogous to, the small-pox—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydides, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. “In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate in addition such other matters as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur.” To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thucydides mentions in his preface, as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have

reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics, and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorizing from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time. But his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary Hippokrates, and the other Asklepiads of Kos.

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydides the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished after deplorable agonies on the seventh or on the ninth day. Others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhœa afterward: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognized their friends. No treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault. While trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing. The charms and incantations, to which the unhappy patient resorted, were not likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the Gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the *Iliad* as author of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked—and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally; while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth—"The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it." Under the distress which suggested, and was

reciprocally aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician, could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservatives. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, “like sheep,” from such contact, that at length no man would those expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers. The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they decined themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read, in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention—that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst—that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect were burnt or buried without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also; or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and

then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amid such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations, in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval, short and sweet, before their doom was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honor or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydides, who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of 1200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 300 died of the epidemic; besides 4,400 hoplites out of the roll formally kept, and a number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation. No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favor, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands. The Lacedæmonian army

was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Perikles equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4,000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus. 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transport, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Re-enforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making an unavailing attempt upon the city. Next they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermione; and lastly attacked and captured Prasîæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practiced; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4,000 hoplites under Agnon, no less than 1050 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left as before to the slow course of blockade.

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Perikles found his countrymen almost distracted with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory (except the Marathonian Tetrapolis and Dekeleia—districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy) during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death, sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree. They vented their feelings against Perikles as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf

ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Perikles, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively manifested.

In his capacity of Strategus or General, Perikles convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydides; but that of Perikles himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an impregnable mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen, while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness. and he now addressed them not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment toward him—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). “Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged—but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet

inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression—that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea—one-half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering: and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honor and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honor is sustained: moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them: still less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honor for the future. Send no further embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress.”

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce—together with the age and character of Perikles—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when in the Pnyx and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly, indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly,

the assembly resolved that no further propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigor.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Perikles, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors. The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. The event, however, disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favor, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Perikles as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.

But that life, long, honorable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Perikles was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country in the midst of private suffering, he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amid this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favorite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiades and some other friends, of the restored con-

fidence of the people toward him, and of his re-election to the office of Strategus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps, indeed, the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law—in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed toward him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Perikles singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Perikles, one branch of the great Alkmæonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure toward the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Perikles to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.

It was thus that Perikles was reinstated in his post of Strategus as well as in his ascendancy over the public counsels—seemingly about August or September—430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever, which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Perikles replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking—“What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune—and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed

—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine.”

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other: Telekleides, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanes, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Herakles and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher, who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy—“his majestic intelligence”—in language not less decisive than Thucydides. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amid the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Perikles toward opponents was always mild and liberal. The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him, contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon—though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydides will at once recognize in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favor.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. “He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch’s words) and shaped his administration for their immediate favor, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession,

thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill.”

Now, the charge here made against Perikles, and supported by allegations in themselves honorable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydides in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Perikles with his successors in the express circumstance that *they* did so, while *he* did not. The language of the contemporary historian well deserves to be cited—“Perikles, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favor, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favor of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition,” etc.

It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydides contradicts, in an unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Perikles of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his political career. Perikles began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well founded, inasmuch as the power of

opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydides exclusively to the later life of Perikles, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Perikles. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Perikles and his political ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the Ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the Diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theater), taking it as it then stood, etc.—did not appear to Thucydides mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Perikles.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Perikles was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterward belonged to him (Ephialtes in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Perikles, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination)—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Perikles was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Perikles on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is eminently favorable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Perikles (which Thucydides, since he produces it at length, probably consid-

ered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman), we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Perikles, of Athens “as the schoolmistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce not less than of public citizenship and soldiership—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Perikles, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Perikles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city, yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defense, or public safety, or military honor. It cannot be shown of Perikles that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable to the transitory and showy—assured present possessions to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmides at Koroneia in Bœotia would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Perikles is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character. He found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgment, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Perikles found it and as he left it, is unquestionably the pacific and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical re-

search, and recreative variety. To which if we add great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil—extension of Athenian trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Phormio)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Perikles, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Perikles in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh, that Perikles sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh therefore depends upon the question, how far Perikles contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydides, we shall see that, in the judgment of that historian, not only Perikles did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. Moreover we shall see, that the calculations on which Perikles grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were (in the opinion of the historian) perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Perikles during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation" (to use the words of Thucydides) dictated chiefly by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war. If in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidæ, and the resolutions of the Congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta—we must recollect that these were demands essentially insincere, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without insuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydides, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors in speaking of Perikles are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Perikles did not bring on, and could not have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he steered his course in refer-

ence to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These proprietors might, indeed, be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Perikles seriously to amend; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds. We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included; but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, no way surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they as well as Athens and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knemus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island; and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, toward the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilocheian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Ambrakia; which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phormio and restored to the Amphilocheians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against

Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavored to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire. This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus (now inhabited by the Messenians) as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbor of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured. Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians—even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians—were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity. But to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns; so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence.

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phælis and Phenicia to Athens; to protect which the Athenians dispatched in the course of the autumn a squadron of six triremes under Melesander. He was farther directed to insure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Aneristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accom-

panied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they traveled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont. Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkes, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa. On being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way toward Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniades, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkes, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly, the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine to such a degree, that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon, son of Euripides, and his two colleagues, admitted them to favorable terms of capitulation—allowing the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighborhood. These terms were singularly favorable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 2,000 talents; since the assailing force had never been lower than 3,000 hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmas per diem. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves—and Athenian vengeance

probably gratified by putting the warriors to death. A body of 1000 colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thebans on Platæa. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace (contrary to the advice of Perikles) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there—but still more, by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Platæa.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory than the Platæan heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: “Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Platæa. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias, son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius in the market-place of Platæa; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Platæans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valor and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platæan territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed.”

Whereunto Archidamus replied—“Ye speak fairly, men of

Platæa, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied.”

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned: that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Platæans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place, we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harbored at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—“Well then, hand over your city and houses to us, Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received—in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants.”

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Platæa bearing the following answer—“Men of Platæa, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance.”

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should

require it, their union with Athens. It was, indeed, impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Plataea counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Plataeans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere reluctance, attested in the following invocation emphatically pronounced:

“Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Plataean territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not until these Plataeans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks to fight in: nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—may those who are aiming to inflict penalty righteously, obtain their object.”

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavored to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate, so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Plataean people, but only to the Plataean territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing antipathy of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise; for the conquest of Plataea was of no avail toward the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a resolute garrison of 400 native citizens, with eighty Athenians. There was no one else in

the town, except 110 female slaves for cooking. The fruit trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to inclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labor at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose; and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound; sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighboring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the wood-work against fire-carrying arrows. And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound; which then fell in at the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen its earthy foundation; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defense were used. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine,

and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft: so that at the proper moment when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak. However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly built crescent wall—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favorable. There was, indeed, a further story of an opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydides does not seem to credit. In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Plataea, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox. Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were, moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside toward Plataea, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataea, the Athenians on their side dispatched a force of 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripides (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the deserted site of Potidæa. Moreover, the general had acquired some knowl-

edge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottæian town of Spartolus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligences within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spartolus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still further strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonor to Athens.

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Ambrakiots, exasperated by their repulse from the Amphiloichian Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defense: so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus (Zante), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force

of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbors and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knemus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with 1000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio, but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintanes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Parauæi, from the banks of the river Aous, under their king Orædus, together with 1000 Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however arrived too late to be of any use. This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knemus, finding the land-force united and ready near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knemus and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the center—the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knemus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions,

indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the lookout; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained further pursuit—the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knemus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were pre-eminently skillful. Knemus did not choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to co-operate with Knemus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store vessels, it departed from the harbor of Corinth and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, and with little attention to the choice of skillful rowers.

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the

Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority, but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success. Accordingly the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian Gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the north-west in order to cross over toward the Ætolian coast in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus; and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by the incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the Gulf, where it was near the strait and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them. And if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea. But he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in midchannel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning. On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward—like the spokes of a wheel. The circle was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practice the maneuver of the diekplus, and the interior space was sufficient not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, which were kept as a reserve to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after day-break by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailers, and his own ship leading; all being

strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this maneuver, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favorable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or become entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men on board were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbors on each side with poles—not without loud clamor and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustes animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskillful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost command over their vessels. The critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dyme, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who, with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes, carried away almost the entire crews, and sailed off with them to Molykreium or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captured triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllene, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterward joined by Knemus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details—the repulse of Knemus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of co-operation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them

is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, no way inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians under Peter the Great learnt the art of war from the Swedes under Charles XII.—while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse, and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard indeed of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant; so that they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knemus at Kylene, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonor. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokrates, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. By this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus, a harbor of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet.

Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting re-enforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him. Yet they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favor to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfill it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away. This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much

the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Perikles, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterward. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen, was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy—seventy-seven triremes with a large force on land to back them: the latter no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium as it was called—the northern headland, opposite to the other headland also called Rhium, on the coast of Achaia. The line between these two capes, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian maneuvering; while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill. If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of maneuvering introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it. To him every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his re-enforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance prevailing among their seamen—many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat—that Knemus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favorable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honor, the laggards would assuredly be punished: a topic

rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous commands of Sparta. To such reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle—useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side toward Naupaktus. Knemus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defense of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian maneuvering would be unavailing. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast toward the northern coast of the Inner Gulf. The right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokrates, was in the van, according to its natural position, and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall, was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land toward Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and toward the same point—the Athenian close along shore—the Peloponnesian somewhat farther off. The latter had now got Phormio into the position

which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side toward Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by, before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Athenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and center were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbor of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defense near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant-vessel at the entrance of the harbor of Naupaktus. The Athenian captain in his flight observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid maneuver. He pulled swiftly round the trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her, amidships, with an impact so violent as to disable her an once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timokrates, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbor. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes

in the harbor were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy, whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under weigh, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on the right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and center, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Panormus. Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited—and further so much in fear of the expected re-enforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf to Corinth; all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Presently the re-enforcement arrived, after that untoward detention which had well nigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while a chief named Kynes, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelous; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But as the great spread of the waters of the Achelous rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens

toward the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knemus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbor. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man carrying his seat-cloth, and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side and thus prevented from slipping.

There lay forty triremes in Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen, immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. Yet such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbor of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war. Forty years afterward, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias.

As, during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians—so during the autumn the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from

the powerful barbaric prince before mentioned, Sitalkes king of the Odrysian Thracians.

Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Teres, father of Sitalkes, had made use of this power to subdue and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdera or the mouth of the Nestus in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkes himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and the Strymon. Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes (under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. Even Grecian cities, not in Thrace, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes. The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium, in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and north-east of Rhodope. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithes had married the daughter of the Odrysian Teres, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgment of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydides considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed, and temporary, but

such as they never reached either before or afterward. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkes had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodorus, a Greek of Abdera; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens. He had further been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians—his ancient kinsmen, according to the myth of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas king of Macedonia had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkes and Nymphodorus in procuring for Perdikkas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikkas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axios, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkes. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Sitalkes, nevertheless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to cooperate. In treating with Sitalkes, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes, and the Athenians were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

But the forces of Sitalkes, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion between Hæmus, Rhodope, and the two seas: the Getæ between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians (their neighbors on the other side of the river) with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion. Lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodope, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to 150,000 men—one-third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodope. The whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him

Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkine, which divided the Pæonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he reached the Pæonian town or district called Doberus; it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Doberus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axios, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia which lies along the higher Axios, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip. The presence in his army of Amyntas, son of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortynia, Atalante, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomene was taken by storm, and Europus in vain attacked. From hence he passed still further southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas, ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axios even to the neighborhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus, and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Further south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axios and the head of the Strymonic Gulf—Mygdonia, Krestonia, and Anthemus—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta or small shield—but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to dispatch any force of their own to the spot. Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the co-operating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkes soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonike in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia, during eight of

which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantes, Droi, and Dersæi) in the plains on the north-east of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangærus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkes should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them. On the other side, the Thessalians, Magnes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion further south, began to organize means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated when Sitalkes, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkes.

APPENDIX.

Thucyd. ii. 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐξ τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλομένοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἔω ἐπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξίμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῶ κέρα ἡγουμένοι, ὡσπερ καὶ ὠρμον· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῶ ἑκοσι νῆες ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαψύλοιεν πλεόντα τὸν ἐπίπλου σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν.

The above passage forms the main authority for my description (given above) of the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet, previous to the second battle against Phormio. The annexed plan will enable my reasoning to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν? Does it mean the land of the Peloponnesians, south of the Gulf—or the land of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous editions, I adduced several examples of the use of the pronoun ἑαυτοῦ, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of criticism, my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now reprint the illustrative passages. As to the facts, however, my conviction remains unchanged. The land here designated by Thucydides must be "the land of the Athenians north of the Strait:" it cannot be "the land of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait." The pronoun ἑαυτῶν must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into αὐτῶν, as Mr. Bloomfield proposes, or ἐκείνων.

The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν is here equivalent to παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold thoroughly approving the description of Mitford, who states that the Peloponnesian fleet were "moving eastward along the Achaic coast," says: "The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρὰ. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion toward a place and neighborhood to it: express-

ing that the Peloponnesians sailed toward their own land (i.e., toward Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellene, to which place the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close upon their own land, in the sense of ἐπι with a dative case."

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon ἐπι τὴν γῆν is one which cannot be admitted without examples to justify it. No two propositions can be more distinct than the two, πλείν ἐπι τὴν γῆν—and πλείν παρά τὴν γῆν? The Peloponnesian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moored close upon its own land—at the headland Rhium near Panormus where its land-force stood (Thucyd. ii. 86). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Peloponnesian coast, or along the Peloponnesian coast: and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the words πλείν ἐπι τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

To obviate this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of ἐπι, Dr. Arnold changes that of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν; which words, according to him, denote, not the Peloponnesian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Phormio, but Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellene; to which places (he says) the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a sense altogether unnatural. Corinth and Sicyon are so far off that any allusion to them here is most improbable. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Strait. The *own land* of the Peloponnesians was that southern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land-force was encamped: it is distinguished from the *enemies' land*, on the opposite side of the Strait. If Thucydides had wished to intimate that the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in the direction of Corinth and Sicyon, he would hardly have used such words as ἐπλεον ἐπι τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

Professor Dunbar (in an article among the Critical Remarks annexed to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon) has contested my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says: "The Peloponnesian fleet must have proceeded along their own coast—ἐπι τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἄσω ἐπι τοῦ κόλπου. In this passage we find ἐπι with two cases: the first with the accusative, the other with the genitive. The first appears to me to indicate the locality to which they were sailing: and that evidently was the headland on the Achæan coast, nearly opposite Naupactus."

The headland, to which Mr. Dunbar alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked Drepanum. It is sufficiently near not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of Corinth and Sicyon. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in Thucydides. On Mr. Dunbar's interpretation, the Peloponnesians must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now if Thucydides had meant to affirm this, he surely would not have used such words as ἐπλεον ἐπι τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as in c. 86 παρέπλευσεν ἐπι τὸ Ῥίον)—or of he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded along their own coast," he would have said παρά instead of ἐπι.

Thus far I have been discussing simply the verbal interpretation of ἐπι τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, for the purpose of showing that though these words be admitted to mean the land of the Peloponnesians—still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly improbable, and even to identify ἐπι with παρά. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the Peloponnesian fleet *must have been* toward the Athenian coast and toward Naupactus. Therefore, since ἑαυτῶν cannot have that meaning, ἑαυτῶν must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the Peloponnesians in effecting the movement was to make Phormio believe that they were going to attack Naupactus; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if Phormio did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for maneuvering. This was what the Peloponnesians not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now I ask how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of Peloponnesus from the headland of Rhium to the headland of Drepanum—which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce Phormio to think that the Peloponnesians were going to attack Naupaktus, or throw him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at Drepanum, they would hardly be nearer to Naupaktus than they were at Rhium: they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us, however, suppose that their movement toward Drepanum did really induce Phormio to come into the Gulf for the protection of Naupaktus. If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from Drepanum toward Naupaktus, they would expose themselves to be attacked by Phormio midway in the open sea; the very contingency which he desired, and which they were maneuvering to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thucydides, that the actual attack of the Peloponnesians upon Phormio, in which they cut off nine out of his twenty ships, took place on the *northern coast of the Gulf*, at some spot between the headland Antirrhium and Naupaktus; somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the Messenian soldiers (who had come out from Naupaktus to assist Phormio, and who waded into the water to save the captured ships) would of itself place this beyond a doubt—if indeed any doubt could arise. It is farther certain that when the Peloponnesian fleet wheeled from column into line to attack Phormio, they were so near to this northern land that Phormio was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore: only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now I ask how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Peloponnesian fleet, on quitting their moorings at Rhium, coasted along their own land toward Drepanum? If they did so, how did they afterward get across the Gulf to the place where the battle was fought? Every yard that they moved in the direction of Drepanum only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterward. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from Rhium along their own coast in the direction of Drepanum would have been absurd. Supposing, however, that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction across the Gulf. But of this second movement, Thucydides says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Peloponnesians is contained in this phrase—*ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἕσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῶ κέρα ἡγουμένω, ὡσπερ καὶ ὄρμου.* If these words really designate a movement along the southern coast, we must assume, first, that the historian has left unnoticed the second movement across the Gulf, which, nevertheless, must have followed—next, that the Peloponnesians made a first move for no purpose except to increase the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering therefore the facts of the case, the localities and the purpose of the Peloponnesians, all of which are here clear—I contend that *ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἕσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου* must denote a movement of the Peloponnesian fleet toward the land of the Athenians, or the northern shore of the Gulf; and that as *ἑαυτῶν* will not bear that sense, it must be altered to *αὐτῶν* or *ἐκείνων*.

It remains to explain *ἕσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου*, which bear a very distinct and important meaning. The land of the Athenians, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antirrhium with both the lines of coast which there terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting inside toward the Corinthian Gulf*—the other, *fronting outside toward the Gulf of Patras*. The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now when Thucydides says that the Peloponnesians sailed "*upon the land of the Athenians inward fronting the Gulf*," these last words are essential to make us understand toward which of the two Athenian lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail toward that outer side of the headland where Phormio was moored, but toward the inner side of it, on the line which conducted to Naupaktus.

CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B. C. 429-428). It is no wonder that under the pressure of such a calamity their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere. The Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted. To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mitylene and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos—Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylene. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans built new ships—put their walls in an improved state of defense—carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbor and render it capable of being closed with a chain—dispatched emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine—and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and, above all, dispensed with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand,—still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of *proxeni* (or *consuls*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens—especially by a Mitylenæan named Doxander, incensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of marriage with two orphan heiresses. Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighborly jealousy toward Mitylene; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the intrigues between Mitylene and the Spartans, and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.

This news seems to have become certain about February or March 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Perikles—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylene paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that in case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not, we do not know. It would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos or of any other ally of Athens—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals under like complaints from Mitylene. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful that the Athenians, fearful of coping with it in their actual state of depression, were loath to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleippides, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylene. It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival

of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighborhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleippides was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war and raze their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylene. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, and getting aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, he reached Mitylene with a favorable wind on the third day from Athens: so that when Kleippides arrived shortly afterward, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbor to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty: upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleippides, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens—protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleippides was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was not sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained moored off the harbor at the north of Mitylene until the envoys (among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylene who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion) should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleippides, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid. And on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermaondas (who had been dispatched to Mitylene earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleippides), a second trireme was sent along with them, carrying additional envoys to reiterate the solicitation. These arrivals and dispatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral; chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel or euripus, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island—like Syracuse and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbors, one north, the other south of the town: Kleippides was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, re-enforce-

ments reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna: so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did with an unfavorable reply, war was resumed with increased vigor. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle; yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavorable to the stability of the Athenian empire. But when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. The Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal, in obedience to the summons of Athens for re-enforcements. Kleïppides soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbors at once. But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within. But this expectation was not realized, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterward attacked Antissa, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition, the island continued, until (somewhere about the month of August B. C. 428) the Athenians sent Paches to take the command, with a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylene was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present—and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.

Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced, as it was, by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves—and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her—we should have

expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded, though perilous effort, on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which the speech is apologetic and embarrassed. The speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens toward the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with marked honor; and that too, throughout a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes toward them, than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors. According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon the necessity of acquiring security for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans (he contends) could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level—the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendancy. It had hitherto suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions as a proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have joined forces in reducing them. But this policy was now no longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own safety to seize the earliest opportunity for emancipating themselves in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety, but a farther impulse of Pan-hellenic patriotism; a desire to take rank among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries, of Athens, in her usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states. The Mitylenæans had however been compelled to revolt with preparations only half completed, and had therefore a double clam upon the succor of Sparta—the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And Spartan aid—if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land—could not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by pestilence as well as by the cost of three years' war, and occupying her whole maritime force either in the siege of Mitylene or round Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to the

sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.

In following the speech of the orator, we see the plain confession that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the conduct of Athens toward themselves. She had respected alike their dignity, their public force, and their private security. This important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt; next, the barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression.

The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognized this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite true (as Perikles urged at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected (or only partially connected) with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up; at the same time that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendancy much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try to overcome—these political difficulties; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylene—in so far as they represented a genuine feeling and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here pres-

ent, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged that had Athens felt any dispositions toward such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the Fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They there began to prepare carriages or trucks, for dragging across the Isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbor of Lechæum into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest; while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mitylene. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict this by a great and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics, and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, i. e., the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the Isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time thirty other Athenian triremes, dispatched some time previously to Akarnania under Asopius, son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia for the same purpose. This news reached the Lacedæmonians at the Isthmus, while the other great Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes. Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes under Alkidas to the relief of Mitylene itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.

Meanwhile Asopius with his thirty triremes had arrived in Akar-

ania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phormio should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was his name and character among them. Asopius, however, accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the Akarnanians a fruitless march against Cœniadæ. Ultimately he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukas.

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the 250 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war. But the assertion that Athens was impoverished in finances was not so destitute of foundation: for the whole treasure in the acropolis, 6,000 talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of 1000 talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigences of defensive resistance. This is not surprising when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant. There were during the whole time of the blockade 3,000 hoplites engaged there,—and for a considerable portion of the time, 4,600; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly, the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of 200 talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylene: and they at the same time dispatched Lysikles (with four colleagues) in command of twelve triremes to collect money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular tribute paid by the subject allies, or whether they were allowed to visit these latter, we do not know. In the present case, Lysikles landed at Myus, near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighborhood, and slain with a considerable number of his men.

While the Athenians thus held Mitylene under siege, their faithful friends the Platæans had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length provisions began to fail, and the general Eupompidæ, backed by the prophet Thæænetus (these prophets were often

among the bravest soldiers in the army), persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one-half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about 212 in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them!

It has been already stated that the circumvallation of Platæa was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day; but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, leaving the intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that the plan of escape was founded. The Platæans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows. The right foot was naked, but the left foot shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground. Taking care to sally out with the wind in their faces and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. The ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Ammeas son of Koræbus, followed by eleven others armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others armed with spears followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. Many of the Platæans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamor was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall,

yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found, a perplexity further increased by the Plataeans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amid such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes. But here, again, the Plataeans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.

Meanwhile the escaping Plataeans, masters of the two adjoining towers—on the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders—prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch. Every man, immediately after crossing, stood ready on the outer bank with bow and javelin to repel assailants and maintain safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty—the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was found embarrassing—so full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not, however, until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers—who were yet descending and scrambling through—that the Peloponnesian reserve of 300 were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unshielded right side being turned toward the ditch, the Plataeans, already across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins—in which the torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in check until the rearmost Plataeans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road toward Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalæ to Athens. After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes (leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkates on their right hand), the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward toward Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon found themselves in safety

among the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point, from whence they passed into the glad harbor and refuge of Athens.

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and honorable traditions of Plataea. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall, telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at day-break, the Plataeans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the answer made to this request, that they learnt the actual truth. The description of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design, and is the more interesting inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men who best deserved it.

Meanwhile Paches and the Athenians kept Mitylene closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation, when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading wall (about February, 427 B.C.). He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement: we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenæans awaited with impatience the arrival of Alkidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But no news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.

The tidings which at length arrived proved very unsatisfactory.

Salæthus and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of

blockade. For this purpose he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people or commons, who had hitherto been without them having at best nothing more than bows or javelins.

But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and (to repeat what has been remarked in the early portion of this volume) we find that even among the subject-allies (to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylene), the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positive reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given was found wanting. The Mitylenæan Demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armor, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practiced by an oligarchy, but which assuredly the Athenian Demos would have been too well informed to entertain—that their governors were starving them and had concealed stores of provision for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all; threatening unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Paches that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylene; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Paches engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold in slavery. Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Paches, so great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection.

But being induced by his assurances to quit their sanctuary, they were placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from Athens.

Having thus secured possession of Mitylene, Paches sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylene even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of conscious weakness and timidity (especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year) as that which beset land-troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed. Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who had established themselves at Anæa on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens—nevertheless, instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews, until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarns and Mykonos, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylene by night in its existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kyme, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnes of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mitylene, Alkidas believed himself interdicted from any other project. He determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Paches and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton accordingly he started on

his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an incumbrance to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnesus near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them—a barbarous proceeding which excited lively indignation among the neighboring Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens except by constraint, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece—and that if he persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them Chians, and then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea toward Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbor of Kyllene in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian admiral who dared to enter that *Mare clausum* which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens. But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkidas might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Paches from Erythræ and from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called *Paralus* and *Salaminia* (the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations) had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Paches, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylene, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far as the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alkidas had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbor—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade, besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Brasidas.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylene Paches was induced to

stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was at some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.

About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap Pissuthnes), had placed him in possession of the town; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnes. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbor to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Paches to reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias, the Arcadian captain, to come forth to a parley, under the promise that if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace him "safe and sound" in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley than Paches, causing him to be detained under guard but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it—"safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed—and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on literal performance and real violation of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behavior of the Paches at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens we do not know: yet we remark, not without surprise, that Thucydides recounts it plainly and calmly, without a single word of comment.

Notium was now separated from Kolophon and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent *Ekists* and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon. Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship and recognized collective personality on the new-born town of Notium; without which neither its theory or solemn deputation would have been admitted to

offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Paches returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylene and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenæans who had been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Plataea in case his life was spared. What to do with Mitylene and its inhabitants was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thucydides first takes notice of Kleon, who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Perikles. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up; men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege—since through the reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property—the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Knights. New men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code. Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life—he found himself farther borne up by the family connec-

tions, associations, and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly, contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station obtained no favorable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him halfway; nor did he possess established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendancy, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance—by acquaintance with business—by powers of striking speech—and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians and organized party-clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising into importance.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Perikles, they appear to have risen in greater or less numbers. But the personal ascendancy of that great man—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born—though the aristocratical party properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians—Eukrates, the rope-seller—Kleon, the leather-seller—Lysikles, the sheep-seller—Hyberbolus, the lamp-maker; the two first, of whom must, however, have been already well known as speakers in the Ekklesia even during the lifetime of Perikles. Among them all, the most distinguished was Kleon, son of Kleænetus.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Perikles, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydides in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation. Aristophanes, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts

Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover as venal in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—persecuting merit as well as rank—and courting the favor of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history), we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Without this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them. It is probable enough that they had it to a displeasing excess—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in A'kibiades would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimen to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Æschines, seventy years afterward; each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Perikles were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed by Kleon, employed first against Perikles, would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens. But among the numerous enemies of Perikles, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous support at first, which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know. At the time when the question of Mitylene came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendancy which Thucydides describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people." The fact of Kleon's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hos-

tile to him—Thucydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theater and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting—and the Athenian people taken individually—were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgment: Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos sitting at home. The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Perikles exercised influence over both one and the other, but Kleon swayed considerably the former, without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylene and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylene presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be. Indeed we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honorably treated by her, with special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot. But there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more. The revolters had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire. The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war, in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about 6,000 persons—and to sell as slaves all the women and children. The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith dispatched to Mitylene, enjoining Paches to put it in execution.

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war (apart from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the

maxim without the smallest abatement toward the Plataean prisoners in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people—so long as they remained in assembly, under that absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude—and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case,—What had Mitylene deserved?—thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war (they would conceive) would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it—a sensible change, and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterward unexecuted—that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere *passing* of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterward realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks), became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree. Even the captain and seamen to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylene; and the minority generally of the previous assembly—soon discerned, and did their best to foster, this repentance; which became during the course of the same evening so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the Strategi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.

Though Thucydides has given us only a short summary without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus—the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the

signal defeat of Kleon, whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here.

That orator coming forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding; also upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth, either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public "wise beyond what was written," who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches. He restated the heinous and unprovoked wrong committed by the Mitylenæans—and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum of punishment which "justice" enjoined. He called for "justice" against them, nothing less, but nothing more; warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them—or by unseasonable moderation toward those who would neither feel nor requite it—or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the strong political interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed on the day preceding.

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the license and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment: that he could therefore pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism—while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of maneuver, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions, both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of

coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favor of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favor of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some 6,000 persons, would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation. He further discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature—and rests his opposition altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

He begins by vindicating the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion. He enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents; and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success: but it might perhaps drive them, if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand, it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterward upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect, even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal—views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century. And he further supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken no part in it, but as soon as they obtained possession of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies: but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscrim-

inately were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Paches had sent to Athens as chiefs of the revolt should be put upon their trial separately, but that the remaining population should be spared.

This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals however might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the preceding discussion, without success. But Diodotus knew that the reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction toward pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, would work in favor of his arguments, though he might disclaim all intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both for and against, the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.

The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylene. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. The oar was never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylene—the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment, of barley-meal steeped in wine and oil, swallowed on their seats. Luckily there was no unfavorable wind to retard them: but the object would have been defeated if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their rigorous mandate as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reprieve in time. And after all, it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Paches, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale destruction: so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterward incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skione, and elsewhere. Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon

would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Paches had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterward adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate, after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-*repentance*: yet the men so slain were rather more than 1000 in number.

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mitylene, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they further established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3,000 lots, of which 300 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian *kleruchs*, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian *kleruch* an annual rent of two *minæ* (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that 2,700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos—as *kleruchs*: that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the *kleruchic* allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylene; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.

To the misfortunes of Mitylene belongs, as a suitable appendix, the fate of Paches, the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has been recently recounted. It appears that, having contracted a passion for two beautiful free women at Mitylene, *Hellanis* and *Lamaxis*, he slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly they may have had private friends at Athens, which must, of course, have been the case with many Mitylenæan families. At all events they repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and brought their complaint against Paches before the Athenian *dikastery*, in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew himself with his sword in open court.

The surrender of *Platæa* to the Lacedæmonians took place not

long after that of Mitylene to the Athenians—somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still their whole stock had now come to be exhausted, so that the remaining defenders were enfeebled, and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenseless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by force, but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterward found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favor. Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation “that the wrong-doers should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly.” To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days’ interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgment upon their fate—one Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal family.

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Platæa, by their side—the prisoners taken, 200 Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the judges—“Have you, during the present war, rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians, or to their allies?” The Platæans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. It admitted but of one answer—but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans, their request was granted. Astymachus and Lakon (the latter, proxenus of Sparta at Platæa) were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydides has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere

mockery of trial and judgment to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians. They adverted to the first alliance of Plataea with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Plataean patriotism toward Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban treason—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias, and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Plataea, in the midst of the truce. They did not omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta—the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithome. This speech is as touching as any which we find in Thucydides; the skill of it consisting in the frequency with which the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed transitions, to these same topics. And such was the impression which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of proceeding—the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence destined to follow upon answer given—had been settled beforehand between them and the Lacedæmonians.

The Theban speakers contended that the Plataeans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too—and that the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and canceled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterward for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Plataea, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town, who were anxious only to bring back Plataea from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home—and that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defense. They then reproached the Plataeans, in their turn, with that breach of faith whereby, ultimately, the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force—they at the same time charged the Plataeans with permanent treason

against the Bœotian customs and brotherhood. All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance at the time of the battle of Koroneia, and having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter, and, as yet, unsatisfied hatred against Plataea, proved effectual: or, rather, it was superfluous—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the proposition, twice made by Archidamus to the Plataeans, inviting them to remain neutral, and even offering to guarantee their neutrality—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him, upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege—the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from a obligation to respect the sanctity of the place; looking upon the inhabitants as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability, and sealed their own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydides. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Plataeans before them, and repeated to every one of them, individually, the same question which had before been put. Each of them, as he successively replied in the negative, was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Plataea were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Plataean exiles, together with some Megarian exiles—but after a few months, recalled this step, and blotted out Plataea, as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. Having pulled down all the private buildings, they employed the materials to build a vast barrack all round the Heræum, or temple of Here, 200 feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly as an abode for the tenant-farmers, or graziers who were to occupy the land. A new temple, of 100 feet in length, was also built in honor of Here, and ornamented with couches prepared from the brass and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Plataeans. The Plataean territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

Such was the melancholy fate of Plataea, after sustaining a blockade of about two years. Its identity and local traditions were extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honor of the deceased victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended—which the Plataean speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated, and which, perhaps, the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances, except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have

been rigorous in the extreme. And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case, and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretense for considering Plataea as a revolted town, whereas Mitylene was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover, Sparta promised trial and justice to the Plataeans on their surrender: Paches promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little city—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harbored at Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so checkered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbors. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salæthus by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigor admitted and tolerated, though not always practiced on both sides—toward prisoners of war.


We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylene and Plataea. We next pass to the west of Greece—the island of Korkyra—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

It has been already mentioned that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 250 Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth, and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylene and Plataea were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylene would be relieved, but the neighboring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly, the Korkyræan prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of 800 talents, for which those Korkyræan citizens who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible. The proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless participant in the entire design.

But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so

long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these maneuvers; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defense originally stipulated; but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. Since that event, however, the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had become practically more intimate, and the Korkyræan fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus. Accordingly, the resolution now adopted abandoned the present to go back to the past—and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practicing to bring Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was acquitted of the charge. He then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege—of having violated the sanctity of the sacred grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, to be cut in it. This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, under a penalty of a stater or four drachmas for every stake so cut. But it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies politically better organized than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, yet habitually violated, sometimes even by everyone, but still oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid to prosecute. Moreover, in this case, no individual was injured by the act, so that any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the odium of an informer—which probably Peithias might not have chosen to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydides implies that the fact was not denied: nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence of being allowed



INTERIOR OF THE TEMPLE OF JUPITER AT OLYMPIA.
(RECONSTRUCTION).

to pay the fine by installments. But Peithias, then a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its course. It was, moreover, understood that he was about to avail himself of his character of senator—and of his increased favor, probably arising from the recent judicial acquittal—to propose in the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed; together with a new resolution, to recognize only the same friends and the same enemies as Athens.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals. Some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbor, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality both toward Athens and toward the Peloponnesians—permitting no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms. At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such coloring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island. With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes under Eurymedon was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra—for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllene after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra having little faith in the chances of this mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to insure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme—which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news

that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear—they organized their force, and attacked the people and the democratic authorities. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper part of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to Hyllaic harbor—one of the two harbors which the town possessed; while the other harbor and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthier Korkyræans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries around the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward, while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Re-enforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the housetops. Toward the afternoon the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighboring arsenal. The oligarchy had no other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to the merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town: indeed had the wind been favorable, the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still further strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus, and 500 Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. These men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes

instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it; and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under such impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them, and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyræan Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Here; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heræum; where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them for four days.

At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkididas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland—fifty-three triremes in number, since the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been re-enforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion—himself worth more than the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkididas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise. Despising the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Naupaktus, the Spartans were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before re-enforcements should arrive from Athens; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkididas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion at Korkyra was unspeakable. The Demos and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders—the oligarchical party, though defeated was still present, forming a considerable minority—and the town was half-burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith—while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth

from the harbor in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron, but the Korkyræans instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves: even those who actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority; the more so as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy—the *Salaminia* and the *Paralus*. He took care to avoid entangling himself with the center of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar maneuver in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships toward the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave the most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbor; while such was the superior maneuvering of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.

It was the expectation in Korkyra that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbor. We may easily believe (what report afterward stated) that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. The Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried to come

to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defense. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews.

But the slackness of Alkidás proved their best defense. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimne: after ravaging the neighboring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire-signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with, or be descried by, the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidás made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.

That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this checkered narrative—the Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks—including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering.

As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan leaders brought into the town the 500 Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned—and held ready in the harbor facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian fleet, but now no longer needed—were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbor. Even while they were thus sailing round, some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were slain. But when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbor, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by putting to death those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews. Then came the fate of those suppliants, about 400 in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were still under sanctuary, in the sacred precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to

quit sanctuary and stand their trial. Fifty of them accepted the proposition, were put on their trial—all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground; who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and in one way or another the entire band thus perished. It was probably a consolation to them to believe that this desecration of the precinct would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight to the mainland; while those who did not or could not flee were slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds even on the altar itself—others shared the same fate after having been dragged away from it by violence. In one case a party of murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysus, refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and left them to starve, as the Lacedæmonians had done on a former occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, that in one case a father slew his own son. It was not merely the oligarchical party who thus suffered: the flood-gates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal as well as moral restraints continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose; yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see further reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character. Had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery; unfortunately, Thucydides tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, in which doubtless the newly emancipated slaves were not the most backward—and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thucydides disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylene became more or less completely masters of the

Peræa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force; but their request found no favor, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istone, not far from the city. Having burnt their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, they maintained themselves for near two years by a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island. This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istone, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Such a drama could not be acted in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydides has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical. The Korkyræan sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such a union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydides of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher. He has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies far distant both in time and place (especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799) than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian æra. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candor in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means—the loss of respect for legal authority as well as of confidence

in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendancy of party-ties—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered signification of all the common words importing blame or approbation—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalizing for the time the better and the worse cause, by taking hold of democracy on one side, and aristocracy on the other, as mere pretenses to sanctify personal triumph—all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, “so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now,” to use the language of Thucydides himself. He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have further so recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added to his list of horrors mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging to any one of them. I do not believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes which worked upon this unfortunate island became disseminated and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities, yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the

minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius—"deteriorem fore, quisquis vicisset"—of two bad men all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy, of the island—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves, and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist; in the use of this same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive. Instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments—fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance—obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat, successively brought by Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse men mingled with liberated slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defense, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defense successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means—an aggression, too, the more gratuitous, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives were restored from Corinth, there was no pretense for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and tranquillity, since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort. They plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behavior whereby it was earned.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion

to recount two political movements in Athens similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote—of having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen in his character of *Dikast* or *Ekklesiast*, the conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honorably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of “the best men, the honorable and good, the elegant, the superior,” etc., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history. Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honorable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an unmeasured self-importance—and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite—peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were no way superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealths. Indeed many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat

for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle—we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR.

ABOUT the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias the Athenian general conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minoa, which lay at the mouth of the harbor of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa and formed the entrance of the harbor, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minoa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the mainland by a lagoon bridged over with a causway. Minoa, thus becoming thoroughly insulated, was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbor, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.

Though Nikias, son of Nickeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Strategus along with Perikles, this is the first occasion on which Thucydides introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the Strategi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family, he ranked among the first class of Athenians; in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides son of Melesias and Theramenes, above all other names in Athenian history—seemingly even above Perikles.

Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Theramenes. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucy-

dides (son of Melesias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendancy that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Silician expedition and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenes among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred. But Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

Nikias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but hitherto found competent as a general under ordinary circumstances: assiduous, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of Strategus or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Perikles, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Perikleian view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Perikles was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, but at the same time refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes—his value

as a permanent counselor was steadily recognized, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Perikles, he was perfect in the use of minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practice. While Perikles attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem, in the eyes of the public, either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Perikles was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets—whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his temperament and as a guide to his intelligence under difficulties. One of them was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between one prophet and another, just as the government of Louis XIV. and other Catholic princes has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men, each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot were performed with such splendor, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honor of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover, the remarkable caution and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offense or making personal enemies. While his demeanor toward the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility. But most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, profited greatly by reputation thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this, too, he stood distinguished from Perikles. He was a careful and diligent money-getter; a speculator in the silver-mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves, whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each. The super-

intending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value. Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripides owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias.

The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty. But such unambitious reluctance, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves—and, on the whole, the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers, who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites, who despised Kleon—and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor—respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid choragies, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit—who, moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very serious or difficult enterprise; but what he had done had been accomplished successfully; so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a prudent commander. He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians at Athens; probably by his own choice, and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias—after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age—was in opposition to Kleon; the last half, in opposition to Alkibiades. To employ terms which are not suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising, and always likely to exercise, official functions—Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that accompaniment which they are understood to carry in English political life—a standing

parliamentary majority in favor of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position—who served in the posts of Strategus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote—were obliged against their will to execute.

In attaining such offices they were assisted by the political clubs, or established *conspiracies* (to translate the original literally) among the leading Athenians to stand by each other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under judicial trial. These clubs, or *Hetaeries*, must have played an important part in the practical working of Athenian politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly oligarchical in disposition—while equality, or something near to it, in rank and position, must have been essential to the social harmony of the members. In some towns, it appears that such political associations existed under the form of *gymnasia* for the mutual exercise of the members, or of *syssitia* for joint banquets. At Athens they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with each other; since the antipathies among different oligarchical men were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them at the time of the Four Hundred, arising only out of common desire to put down the democracy, lasted but a little while. But the designation of persons to serve in the capacity of Strategus and other principal offices greatly depended upon them—as well as the facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which every man was liable after his year of office. Nikias, and men generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs and lending help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, gave orders as to specific acts, and saw to the execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail possessed by the *Strategi* must have been very great, and essential to the safety of the state.

While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition. We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgment of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of *Sphakteria*. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theater of action was the senate, the public assembly, the *dikasteries*; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Perikles—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly

inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy. His powers of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life.

To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader. The points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes, however, without doubt, of considerable moment—but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year (the fifth of the war—B. C. 427) that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favorable to these distant undertakings. I reserve, however, the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterward became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately, and bring them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach the date of that important event.

During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalante and Peparethus: the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships at Atalante were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one effect favorable to Athens. They deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis, king of Sparta, had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavorable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.

These earthquakes, however, were not considered sufficient to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast north-west of the strait of Thermopylæ was occu-

ped by the three subdivisions of the Malians—Paralii, Hieres, and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Ceta on its north side—as well as the Dorians (the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally) who joined the same mountain range on the south—were both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætoliæ, on the high lands between them. At first the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens. But not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was wood in the neighboring regions for ship-building, so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighboring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Pericæki, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan Cékists—Leon, Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter (we are to presume, though Thucydides does not say so) the same admiral who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was further made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 10,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia; not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Maliac Gulf, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port with dock and accommodation for shipping was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Cékists were harsh and unskillful in their management; while the Thessalians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Cêtæan assailants were also active enemies; so that Herakleia, thus pressed

from without and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence. We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong philo-Laconian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offense to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor's field; and the former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses—a deed of blood which deeply dishonored her annals. On this occasion, Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Oropus, on the north-east frontier of Attica bordering on Bœotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Bœotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias re-assembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything further.

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenes and Prokles, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Cœniadæ—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthus—they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenes to undertake this

measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighboring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations, more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians—rude, brave, active, predatory, and unrivaled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Ceta to the eastern bank of the Achelous. The scheme suggested by the Messenians was that Demosthenes should attack the great central Ætolian tribes—the Apodoti, Ophioneis, and Eurytanes:—if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian Gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens—the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force, Demosthenes contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian Gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting—until he arrived at Kitynium in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phokians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favorable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phokis the scheme was to invade from the northward the continuous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens; which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general who could have executed this comprehensive scheme would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenes had been ill-informed both as to the invincible barbarians and the pathless country comprehended under the name of Ætolia. Some of the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even ate their meat raw; while the country has even down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenes accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust. He then sailed with his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Eneon in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the Corinthian Gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus—where his army was disembarked, together with 300 epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes—including on this occasion, what was not

commonly the case on shipboard, some of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Œneon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning, under the guidance of the Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Krokyleium, on the third Teichium—all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and await the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenes was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægitiium, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

Here, however, was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægitiium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the distant tribes Bomies and Kallies, who bordered on the Maliac Gulf. The invasion of Demosthenes had become known beforehand to the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their own tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid. However, they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory without foreign aid. Demosthenes found himself assailed in his position at Ægitiium, on all sides at once by these active highlanders armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighboring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge them—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenes for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay. But the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain; the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, Chromon the Messenian, the only man who knew the country and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them and in every successive onset thinned and distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenes was completely broken and compelled to take flight; without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious, from continual mountain,

rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the Ætolians. The fugitives were at length reassembled at Ceneon near the sea, with the loss of Perikles, the colleague of Demosthenes in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll. The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenes remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure; and that the expedition against Ætolia, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favor of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys, who had been dispatched to Sparta and Corinth, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus. About the month of September, a body of 3,000 Peloponnesian hoplites, including 500 from the newly founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township and in the immediate neighborhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbors on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phokian antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover, they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Eurylochus received from these various townships re-enforcements for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kytinium in Doris: and he was thus enabled to march through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance; except from Ceneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians. Their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighborhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenes, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition.

Apprised of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defense of Naupaktus. For a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas—but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of 1000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenes threw himself into Naupaktus, and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward to the neighboring territories of Ætolia—Kalydon, Pleuron, and Proschium, near the Achelous and the borders of Akarnania.

The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighborhood, prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well as Akarnania; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian Gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves, with 3,000 Ambrakiot hoplites, invaded the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ, immediately bordering on the Ambrakian Gulf, about three miles from Argos itself; a hill employed in former days by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Krenæ in the Amphilochian territory, to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenes at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Aristoteles and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenes to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him, arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Leukas—for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace at Ætolia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus now worked fortunately for them as well as for him. It secured to them a commander whom all of them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous petty townships—it procured for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenes, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian Gulf with the twenty triremes, conducting 200 Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. Finding the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphilochian Argos, he was named general, nominally along

with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 3,000 Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprised that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelous, marched westward of Stratus, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, under cover of the darkness, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Krenæ, so as to join in safety the 3,000 Ambrakiots at Olpæ, to their great joy. They had feared that the enemy at Argos and Krenæ would have arrested his passage; and believing their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large re-enforcements for themselves and their own protection.

Demosthenes, thus finding a united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, conducted his troops from Argos and Krenæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither liked to be the first to pass; so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavorable sacrifices (which may indeed have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive practical genius of Thucydides merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favorable for ambuscade, Demosthenes hid in a bushy dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians with the Amphilocheian akontists, or darters, occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own toward the left center. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus, with his superior numbers, was proceeding to surround Demosthenes, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who

made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenes, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the center, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenes over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order. The loss in the army of Demosthenes was about 300; that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem, indeed, that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot re-enforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenes and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenes (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops—that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus—but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenes to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation. Yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended faithlessness of democracy. But as it was the act of a

Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a further manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation toward extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case, indeed, heightened by the fact, that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and fellow-soldiers who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretense of collecting wood and vegetables. On getting to a little distance, they quickened their pace and made off—much to the dismay of the Ambrakiots, who ran after them trying to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. It was not without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued without any reserve, and 200 of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agræans. To distinguish Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was however no easy task. Much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large re-enforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought; but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenes, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians, who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomene, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenes, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomene; the other, under Demosthenes himself, went directly through the pass leading from Idomene to Olpæ. After marching all night they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak—Demosthenes himself with his

Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete. The Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle—hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenes had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighboring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country. It was the country of the Amphiloichians—subjects of Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots became entangled in ravines—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphiloichians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphiloichians—barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling—and seeing no other possibility of escaping them, swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Ambrakia.

The complete victory of Idomene, admirably prepared by Demosthenes, was achieved with scarce any loss. The Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy and despoiling the enemy's dead, prepared to carry off the arms thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow, however, before this was done, they were visited by a herald, coming from those Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory after the battle of Olpæ and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomene—just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomene, supposed that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomene lay piled up in the camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomene. “About two hundred,” the herald replied. “Yet these arms here show, not that number, but more than a thousand men.”—“Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us.”—“Nay—but they are—if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomene.”—“We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat.”—“O, then—ye have to learn, that

we were engaged yesterday with these others, who were on their march as re-enforcement from the city of Ambrakia.”

The unfortunate herald now learnt for the first time that the large re-enforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies—which appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Thucydides considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learnt the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed—a scruple which we his readers have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenes was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once. Had they consented, Thucydides tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow. But they refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing (according to the historian) that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbors to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative we need not doubt. but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief reason; for had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian co-operation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenes, and had quarreled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Leukas—and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenes had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, 300 panoplies were first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenes: the remainder were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve personally appropriated to Demosthenes enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general. For the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favor—an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were, not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be 1800, and the total of Ambrakiot slain whose arms became public property would be 5,400. To which must be added some Ambrakiots killed in their flight from

Idomene by the Amphilochians, in dells, ravines, and by-places: probably those Amphilochians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, the total number of Ambrakiots slain in both battles and both pursuits, would be about 6,000; a number suitable to the grave expressions of Thucydides, as well as to his statements, that the first detachment which marched to Olpæ was 3,000 strong—and that the message sent home invoked as re-enforcement the total force of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterward to send by land a detachment of 300 hoplites for its defense.

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians (who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the territory of Salynthius and the Agræi) on the other—insuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter. With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected: the Akarnanians and Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for 100 years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate alliance—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens. It was stipulated that the Akarnanians should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots against Athens, nor the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.

To Demosthenes personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian Gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the Ætolian expedition, and to re-establish himself in the favor of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during the course of the winter, with his reserved present of 300 panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenes were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Thucydides mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this

period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighboring island of Rheneia: and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover, the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times. They appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias were strikingly displayed at Delos.

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

THE invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes: though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istone, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyræans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there. Sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed. But during the course of this voyage an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war—illustrating forcibly the observations of Perikles and Archidæ-

mus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.

So high did Demosthenes stand in the favor of his countrymen after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian Gulf, that they granted him permission at his own request to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots—the more so from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus on the southwestern shore.

That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakteria; though in vague language the whole neighboring district seems also to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenes requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterward and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defense both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted, and full of wood: which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three-quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances; one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenes, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast—the other at the southern end about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demosthenes proposed to plant his little fort—the ground being itself eminently favorable; with a spring of fresh water in the center of the promontory.

But Eurymedon and Sophokles decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra. They might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before, from the delay of the re-enforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the

coast of Krete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbor which Demosthenes had fixed upon—the only harbor anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders chimerical. There were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus (they said), if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them. They remained unmoved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenes presumed upon the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs or inferior officers—and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority: but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance. Nor can we be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the great real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land-force. It happened however that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar. Accordingly, they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their bended backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardor of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenes was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The crews of the five ships (two of which, however, were sent away to warn Eurymedon afterward) would amount to about 1000 men in all. But there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, from which Demosthenes obtained a re-enforcement of forty Messenian hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about 200 hoplites, besides the half-armed seamen.

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken

to march to the spot; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression however was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions (the corn not being yet ripe), and from an unusually cold spring: accordingly, Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus of Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighboring Periœki. For the more distant Periœki, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned from Attica, though summoned to come as soon as they could, did not accompany this first march.

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbor, Demosthenes detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succor; the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and prepared to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed—round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenes foresaw that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing; a purpose seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils which were but too obvious—and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore; the difficulty of effecting a landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.

With a fleet of forty-three triremes under Thrasymelidas, and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians

had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighboring coast on the main-land of Peloponnesus was both harborless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbor, by triremes lashed together from the island to the main-land, with their prows pointing outward: so that they would be able at at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenes closely blocked up on the rock of Pylus; where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphakteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the assault on the land-side we hear little. The Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskillful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigor of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenes had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult—and so narrow in dimensions, that the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defense, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving their ships close in shore for fear of staving them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their vessels when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the country: Lacedæmonians (he exclaimed) ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces: the Peloponnesian allies ought to be forward in sacrificing their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them. Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps, for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who **beat him back** and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted

away and fell back in to the bows (or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers); while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing. All these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next, were repulsed by Demosthenes and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations, that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land—and that too Lacedæmonian land—against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on ship-board, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honor of their success, erected a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, cast ashore by the waves.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asine in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenes on the side toward the harbor, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthus under Eurymedon, re-enforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbor, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prote, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbor; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical maneuver. The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbor to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbor with triremes closely lashed together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their precautions that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once, to attack them. Most of the Lacedæ-

monian triremes, afloat and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury. Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet, and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it—they marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants. We have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phormio near Naupaktus. Extraordinary daring and valor was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defense, and such was the clamor and confusion, that neither the land-skill of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea-skill of the Athenians, were of much avail: the contest was one of personal valor, and considerable suffering, on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point and saved all the ships ashore; none being carried away except those at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory—giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenes or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superior-

ity at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eruymedon and Demosthenes assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbor, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the like interval, but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in cakes ready baked, two kotylæ of wine, and some meat, for each hoplite—together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligations to send no secret additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well-aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic—they presumed that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom, prefacing their address with some apologies for that brevity of speech which belonged to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one—"Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favor, peace, with the alliance of Sparta." They enforced their cause by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly

admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position. They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power in Greece, were smitten by adverse fortune of war—and that too without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honor to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it—not to rely upon its permanence nor to abuse it by extravagant demands. Her own imperial prudence, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honor and gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment. But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish—a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel, peculiar to Sparta herself, would be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the goodwill and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as her act. And when once the two pre-eminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declarations of the Spartan Ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity for them from Athens—the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general Menedæus during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demostenes.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events, which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners (so

it was then conceived), and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power: thus giving a totally new character to the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence—the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch and in an attitude of humiliation—must have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as had probably never been felt since the reconquest of Samos. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Perikles himself might have hesitated what to recommend. But the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.

Of this reigning tendency Kleon made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading journals in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. On the present occasion he doubtless spoke with the most genuine conviction, for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of the dishonorable truce of Thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the times to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost—Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly to hear it. On being informed of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions; but to announce these concessions forthwith would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonoring them in the face of their allies.

Such dishonor would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpracticed in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defense for themselves; which Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task, the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys to meet the open debate of Athenian political life is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification: and the maneuver whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity—not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Laches, and other politicians of the same rank and color, would be the persons selected; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterward, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydides, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterward occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar measure.

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly.

Yet over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—an able despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England—have found success to the full as misleading. That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the demand was excessive, or by how much—is a question always among the most embarrassing for any government—kingly, oligarchical, or democratic—to determine.

We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it toward the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom. For while on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession, and must have been extorted by force from allies—on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the Thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Træzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pegæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy—would indeed have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies—this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphacteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach and destroyed the confidence between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus, twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce

made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply that there was no just ground for the refusal: though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Spakteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were re-enforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day; while at night the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea side of the island in stormy weather.

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water. They had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet: many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy—there being no other landing-place, and the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping.

At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to renew the request for capitulation. But no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant-vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo

ashore on the sea side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guard-ships could not be on the lookout. They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore; for ample compensation was insured them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, still there were others who eluded them. Moreover the rations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Eпитadas the commander had been able to economize, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender. The Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingencies of such violent weather as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenes began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighboring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that re-enforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose—making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament and the unpromising chances of simple blockade.

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to hear long before that Sphakteria had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt. They were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts. To which the latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theogenes, was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus. His mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence. Moreover he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenes, and to dispatch a re-enforcing armament. He accordingly altered

his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men* (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nikias, than Strategus), to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do if *I* were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for.

Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended. But so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias—"It is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I." Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address—"I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts brought from Ænos in Thrace, and 400 bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylus, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in the island." The Athenians (observes Thucydides) laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable—or if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken. The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenes to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylas at once that he was about to start with the re-enforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected

with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very different figure from that which history actually presents to us. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves. For the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realized to the letter—and realized too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favorable accident. To illustrate further what is here said, we have only to contrast the jesters before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find Aristophanes (in his comedy of the Knights about six months afterward) laughing at him as having achieved nothing at all—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenes, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and "the cake ready baked"—to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behavior of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents, proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair change for honorable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to insure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the re-enforcement asked for by Demosthenes was obviously

the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other Strategi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not theirs. His taunt—"This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general"—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realize. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not (as some historians would have us believe) because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry and that he would thus be ruined; perceiving this maneuver, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. "Why do not you try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? you will soon find that it is too much for you"—was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply—"Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honorably out of it, and we will stand by you." Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude (as Thucydides states it) divided in feeling. Friends as well as enemies thus concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most unparadoxically disgraceful are Nikias and his oligarchical supporters, who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state on an important emergency—but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow Strategi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria such as that at Thermopylæ: in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one "*bene ausus vana contemnere.*" And it seems probable that if he had not been thus forward in support-

ing the request of Demosthenes for re-enforcement—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward—Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honorable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenes with his re-enforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphacteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while landing at the skirt of the island and cooking their food. Under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenes this was an accident especially welcome: for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defense in the country. The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that the Lacedæmonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Eпитadas, with the main body, occupied the center of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded: an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore in the end of the island farthest from Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defense—was held as a post of reserve.

Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenes were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of the Athenian hoplites, 800 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little

before daybreak: the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain. At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board none but the thalamii or lowest tier of rowers, and reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether there could not have been less than 10,000 troops employed in the attack on the island—men of all arms: 800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenes kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 200 men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only 360 hoplites around him; for his outlying company of thirty men had been slain, and as many more must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear. Of the Helots who were with him, Thucydides says nothing during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow: moreover, the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible. He had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their opposition. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flanks, by the numerous companies of light-armed. Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites. Still they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced—had the advantage of difficult ground—redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers, as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks—and always took care to get ground to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones—raising shouts and clamors that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers—who at the same time were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from

the recently spread wood-ashes. Such method of fighting was one for which Lykurgian drill made no provision. The longer it continued, the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed hoplites become. Their repeated efforts, to destroy, or even to reach nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their own numbers were incessantly diminishing by wounds which they could not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet—but at any rate, the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defense of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them. Under this trying distress did the Lacedæmonians continue for a long time, poorly provided for defense, and in this particular case altogether helpless for aggression—without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear. But this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants became so clamorous and forward, that many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither in flank nor rear; though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the center, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenes and Kleon brought up their 800 Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the vantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenes, and intimated that they were now laboring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to

him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants. He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardor, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain—when Kleon and Demosthenes, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief; since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretes, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenes, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent a messenger of their own, inviting Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came—“The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful.” Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; 292 in number, the survivors of the original total of 420. And out of these no less than 120 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city. They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore, in order that they might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphacteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learnt that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners. For the terror inspired by their name, and the deepstruck impression of Thermopylæ had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphacteria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed—partially revealed in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by implication. It is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners—“Have your best men then been all slain?” The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line—“That would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man.” The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valor—“The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender.” Such impression was from henceforward, not indeed effaced, but sensibly enfeebled, nor was it ever again restored to its full former pitch.

But the general judgment of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphacteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenes returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphacteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus “the promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true”—observes the historian.

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days. No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatizes such an expectation as “insane.” Here are 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them—without the possibility of being re-enforced—without any regular fortification—

without any narrow pass such as that of Thermopylæ—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food—cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought 10,000 troops of divers arms, including 800 fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshaled by Demosthenes, a man alike enterprising and experienced. For the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenes are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon to command alone is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping a cautious and mistrustful estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenes and the assailants. The interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, was not extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Pylus. For the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If, then, we carefully consider this promise, made by Kleon to the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydides, of being a mad boast which came true by accident—it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future: reserving the only really doubtful point in the case—whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenes, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his seal to the engagement taken by Kleon.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides—that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgment which I have just been criticising—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter—I nevertheless look upon that judgment not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Nicias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis; so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who, when forced against his will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation—he selected Demosthenes as colleague and heartily seconded

his operations. Though the military attack of Sphacteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dexterous employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants—belongs altogether to Demosthenes; yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydides, Demosthenes would never have been re-enforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise, therefore, belongs jointly to both. Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenes (as Aristophanes represents in his comedy of the Knights), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him. But the real fact is that this history of the events of Sphacteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing disgrace to those opponents, and no inconsiderable honor to him; exhibiting them as alike destitute of political foresight and of straightforward patriotism—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their fellow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as Strategus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphacteria. If he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, as we shall find him afterward reasoning about the Sicilian expedition—but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.

The return of Kleon and Demosthenes to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them nearly 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially 120 Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenes in the preceding year from the Ambrakian Gulf, when he brought with him 300 Ambrakian panoplies, had probably been sufficiently triumphant. But the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from Sphacteria, with 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience. It is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be curious also to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well—contrasted with the silence or retraction of

Nikias and the other humiliated political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us—though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion. They resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace; but if at any time before that event the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, then to bring forth the prisoners, and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became further confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the Thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defense, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria doubtless as a subsidiary occupation. The Messenians, transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestral territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia: while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves (probably under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Sphakterian captives) to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive. We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterward: and they had reason to repent letting slip the opportunity. Perhaps indeed Perikles, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenes from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the

most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved, even in the estimation of impartial Greeks: much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover, the idea of a tide of good fortune—of the favor of the gods now begun and likely to continue—of future success as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Bœotia—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed (as we shall see in the coming chapter), yet there was nothing unreasonable in acting upon them. Probably the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike. Even Nicias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphacteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenes, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated (just as Thucydides observes about Brasidias on the Lacedæmonian side), can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanes called the Acharnians was acted about six months before the affair of Sphacteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the Knights about six months after it. Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter, running down the general character of Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the Acharnians—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphacteria was first blockaded, and when the Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer. The ascendancy of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphacteria, the influence of Kleon, though positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific offers and the continuance of the war. The general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavorable to Athens, so that

by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace. The truce for one year was then concluded. But even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager (and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter) for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached—that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria—the Athenians were sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory. He took with him 80 triremes, 2,000 Athenian hoplites, 200 horsemen aboard of some horse-transport, and some additional hoplites from Miletus, Andros, and Karystus. Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solygeia, about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth within the Isthmus, were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprised of the fact by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they dispatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbor of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to guard the port of Krommyon (outside of the Isthmus) in case it should be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochus of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly disputed hand-combat of spear and shield. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage. The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest

of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry—pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighboring hill and there took up a position. The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lykophon. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies and buried their own dead. The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to afford help. Re-enforcements also came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seems too, from the neighboring Peloponnesian cities—so that Nicias thought it prudent to retire on board of his ships, and halt upon some neighboring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty: for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.

From hence Nicias sailed to Krommyon, where after ravaging the neighborhood for a few hours he rested for the night. On the next day he re-embarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen. On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit. He then sailed home: but the post at Methana long remained as a center for pillaging the neighboring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nicias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophokles had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphacteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Istone, not far from the city. Eurymedon and the Athenians, joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istone; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. Abandoning altogether their mercenary auxiliaries, they only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighboring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition that if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens; where the honors of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided. And the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens. Their animosity against them being bitter in the extreme, they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyræans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyræan leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries,—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed, were about to hand them over to the Korkyræan people for destruction,—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshaled on each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed—ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter, abstaining from attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles upon the prisoners within; who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof: others hung themselves, either with cords from some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and

within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning all these wretched men had perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak the Korkyræans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 300. The women who had been taken at Istone along with these prisoners were all sold as slaves.

Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole war. It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution. They ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron to Sicily. What he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defense against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer; expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and re-peopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt. They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron, circulating among the maritime subjects, captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with dispatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his dispatches, which were at some length and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that

among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes. Such was the substance of the dispatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure—two parallel lines of hereditary kings; together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the dispatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the annual change of Ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them. Such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths.

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa; but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C., Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to

appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes, however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Ktesias, amid various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval. Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen the savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphacteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her

own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendancy in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas king of Macedonia—that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphacteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythera, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Pericæki, and administered by a governor and garrison of hoplites annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the Gulf of Gythium—the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia—the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea. Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autokles, conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with 2,000 Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies mainly Milesians.

There were in the island two towns—Kythera and Skandeia; the former having a lower town close to the sea, fronting Cape Malea, and an upper town on the hill above; the latter seemingly on the south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of Nikias: ten triremes and a body of Milesian hoplites disembarked and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythera, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had, indeed, secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythera for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asine, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defense of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythera, Nikias first ravaged the small

strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limera, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that neighborhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The Æginetans, with the commanding officer Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defense, and retired to the neighboring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphacteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing antipathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days. Had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigor.

The occupation of Kythera, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphacteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed from superiority and aggression abroad, to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that even Kythera itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphacteria had caused peculiar emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succor for their hoplites while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regen-

erated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythera opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race. The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay—confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, but organizing a force of 400 cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

The precautions which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots afford the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibit, moreover, a refinement of fraud and cruelty rarely equaled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the Ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call—probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphakteria. After being examined by the government, 2,000 of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial—with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly enfranchised Helots was made away with—no one knew how. A stratagem at once so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were, moreover, other parties, in the neighboring cities subject to Athens, who secretly favored the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to

be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command. He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valor, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valor, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his designs, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression—much less an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part—their affairs being so prosperous and promising, that parties favorable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the two chief strategi for the year, were men of energy, well qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece. They had been the chief cause of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that, too, with such destructive efficacy throughout its limited extent that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbor of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such

bad conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life. But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pegæ, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pegæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pegæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labor for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pegæ might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides—but it was also their feeling, that the exiles in Pegæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokrates and Demosthenes, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians; though Nisæa, the harbor of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls—for the purpose of holding Megara first to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which many persons must have been privy—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, 4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara; but Hippokrates and Demosthenes themselves went on ship-board from Peiræus to the island of Minoa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokrates concealed himself with 600 hoplites, in a hollow out of which brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minoa, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while Demosthenes, with some light-armed Platæans and a detachment of active young Athenians (called Peripoli, and serving as the movable guard of Attica) in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Ares, still closer to the same gate.

To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the conspirators within. Amid the shifts to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain supplies (especially since the blockading

force had been placed at Minoa), predatory sally by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was first carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa—then put to sea for some nightly enterprise—and lastly, brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minoa were complete masters of the harbor.

On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened to readmit it, Demosthenes with his comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, in order to facilitate his entrance. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open, until the 600 hoplites under Hippokrates came up, and got in to the interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them—confirmed too in such belief by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites—made at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara—as well as re-enforced by the larger force, which having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians. When once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians and facilitate their entrance—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. The plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulgation of one of their own comrades. Their opponents in the city, apprised of what was in contemplation, hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom

they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For such obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa which lay behind them; an acquisition, important not less in itself, than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to inclose Nisæa with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses, which formed a sort of ornamental suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this inclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals. After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian commander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were however required to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted state would certainly have fallen into their hands had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighborhood and energetic interven-

tion of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon when he first learnt the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of 2,700 Corinthian hoplites, 600 Sikyonian, and 400 Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pegæ, on the road over Mount Geranea; having first dispatched a pressing summons to the Bœotians, to request that they would meet him at that point with re-enforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he learnt that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of 300 men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city; entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case the exiles from Pegæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2,000 Bœotian hoplites and 600 cavalry; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Plataea. The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 6,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighborhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Bœotian cavalry; but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Bœotian officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack; and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side. Brasidas was well aware that if the Atheni-

ans refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands—which loss it was his main object to prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage—while if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed—he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace; while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians—the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pegæ and readmitted them into the city; binding them, however, by the most solemn pledges to observe absolute amnesty of the past, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A review, and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshaled and tutored as to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies—some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens. The men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of one hundred. The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government.

But they must probably have conducted it with vigor and prudence for their own purposes, since Thucydides remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians (to whom indeed they could have been of no material service), and leveled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining in part the durability of this new government, that the truce concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or democratical, in Megara.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas. It had moreover succeeded so far as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa—one of the posts which they had surrendered by the Thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid, Hippokrates and Demosthenes concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments—and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptæodorus. Demosthenes, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force—to sail into the inmost recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan Gulf—and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intelligences had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokrates engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Eubœan strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia on the borders of Phokis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenes sallied from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Æniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover the neighboring Agræans with their prince Salyn-

thus were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him. But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokrates and Demosthenes: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phokian of Phanoteus (bordering on Chæroneia) named Nikomachus—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians, and through them to the bæotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were immediately placed in so good a state of defense that Demosthenes, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favorable to him, but a formidable Bæotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokrates had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ. Under these circumstances, while Demosthenes was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon—all the expected internal movements in Bæotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bæotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokrates commenced his march from Athens to invade the Bæotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bæotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was however executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Bæotia, to the neighborhood of Delium, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Bæotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards being left behind for the city; but besides the really effective force of 7,000 hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000 light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march. The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the Strategi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition. As to light-armed, there was at this time no trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen constituted the whole effective force of the city. Indeed it appears that the Bæotians also were hardly less destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium

were in great part hired from the Malian Gulf. To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the "Persæ" of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow. It was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythera, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous custom, had begun to organize a regiment of archers. The effective manner in which Demosthenes had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Bœotian Delium, which Hippokrates now intended to occupy and fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated, overhanging the sea about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Oropus—a territory originally Bœotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name of the Deme of Græa. Oropus itself was about a day's march from Athens—by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendale, between the mountains Parnes and Phelleus, so that as the distance to be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, arms, and dispositions crowded to join the march—in part from mere curiosity and excitement. Hippokrates reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens. On the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed—all hands aiding, and tools as well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens—in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone and brick, to keep the work together and make it into a rampart of tolerable height and firmness. The vines round the temple, together with the stakes which served as supports to them, were cut to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the outer temple buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defense. But there was one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward out of Bœotia; halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Oropus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokrates, who still remained at Delium stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defense; while

the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their return-march to Athens. The position of the hoplites was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Oropus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia had time to muster at Tanagra. Their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. The contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Koroneia, Orchomenus, Kopæ, and Thespiæ: that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Bœotian confederacy as this time was vested in eleven bœotarchs—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy—and in four senates or councils, the constitution of which is not known.

Though all the bœotarchs, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas and Arianthides, the bœotarchs from Thebes—either in Pagondas, as the senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day. As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, and had already passed the border, all the other bœotarchs, except Pagondas, unwilling to hazard a battle on soil not Bœotian, were disposed to let them return home without obstruction. Such reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these bœotarchs were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas strenuously opposed this proposition, and carried the soldiers of the various cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of their separate leaders, in favor of immediately fighting. He called them apart and addressed them by separate divisions, in order that all might not quit their arms at one and the same moment. He characterized the sentiment of the other bœotarchs as an unworthy manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians, having just invaded the country, and built a fort for the purpose of continuous devastation, were not less enemies on one side of the border than the other. Moreover, they were the most restless and encroaching of all enemies; so that the Bœotians who had the misfortune to be their neighbors, could only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbors in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march onward and beat

these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Koroneia. The sacrifices were favorable to an advancing movement; while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Bœotian defense.

Finding his exhortations favorably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; moreover, the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshaled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the hoplites of Haliartus, Koroneia, Kopæ, and its neighborhood, were in the center: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to Thebes, obtained the second post of honor at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshaling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit. Thucydides specifies only the prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify—but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by 300 select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valor, and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbor by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs were termed the *Heniochi* and *Parabata*—charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in chariots in front of the common soldiers, but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning. This band, composed of the finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, was in after days placed under peculiar training (for the defense of the *Kadmeia* or citadel), detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the *Sacred Lochus* or *Band*: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military ascendancy of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about 7,000 in total number, were distributed 1000 cavalry, 500 peltasts, and 10,000 light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge. Hippokrates, on his side, apprised while still at Delium that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them; leaving 300 cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line—with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippokrates, after arriving on the spot and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers, who, as the battle was just on the Oropian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defense of Attica, to keep the Bœotians out of it; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Bœotian horse. He farther called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronides at Cœnophyta, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Bœotia. But he had scarcely half finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Bœotian pœan. Pagondas, after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word: the Bœotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running step.

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the armies: but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters; to the contact and pushing of shields against each other. On the left half of the Bœotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians, who in the ardor of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognizing them at the moment: some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Bœotian line was thus worsted and driven to seek protection from the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodig-

ious depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior : but apart from such superiority, if we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution on both sides, it is plain that when the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield—the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column—which was increased by Epaminondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty. We need not suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics—or suppose with others, that the great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with armor. Even in a depth of eight, which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement, and seemingly the usual depth in a battle—the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain—partly, to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become. Hence the Thebans at Delium as well as at Leuktra, found their account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree—a movement to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken—so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry ; who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardor of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to re-enforce the Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way ; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans : so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken and put to flight. The garrison of Delium, re-enforced by 300 cavalry whom Hippokrates had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them.

Flight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions. The right sought refuge at Delium, the center fled to Oropus, and the left took a direction toward the high lands of Parnes. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action; their peltasts also, and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites. Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction. As it was, however, the general Hippokrates, together with nearly 1600 hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain; while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 500 hoplites. Some prisoners seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Oropus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the stript warriors long remained to decorate the temples of Thebes, while the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege to the newly established fortress of Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always re-enforce the garrison by sea—he tried another means of attaining the same object. He dispatched to the Athenians a herald—who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium: wherein their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo and the gods inmates along with them, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them. Finally, the herald gave it to be understood, that unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury their dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect: The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible. Their object in taking pos-

session of it had been no evil sentiment toward the holy place, but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfill all customary observances to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions upon Attica—a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty of far greater impiety—in refusing to give back the dead except on certain conditions connected with the holy ground—than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an unseemly bargain. “Tell us unconditionally,” concluded the Athenian herald, “that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so, on condition of going out of Bœotia—for we are no longer in Bœotia—we are in our own territory, won by the sword.”

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive: “If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us.”

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had rested the defense of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian—Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest—and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Bœotians retorted, when they said—“If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (i. e., if you are *de facto* masters of it and are strongest within it)—you can of course do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands; you can bury your dead without a truce.” The Bœotians knew that at this moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army, and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission. But

since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing.

But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defense against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium—had confined himself to the main issue—he would have put the Bœotians completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead; to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bœotians sinned against the sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally. We may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively—and if he had not, by an unskillful plea in vindication of the right to occupy and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium—that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighboring population. On this ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in requiring the restoration of the place, as a peremptory condition to their granting the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa—who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Cætæans and Ætoliens, from the Maliac Gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the

hasty and awkward defenses by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways from end to end, sheathed most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves accurately together. From the further end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a large metal pot, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube, projected from the end of the interior channel of the beam, so as to come near to the pot. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Bœotians then applied great bellows to their own end of the beam, blowing violently a current of air through the interior channel, so as to raise an intense fire in the caldron at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders—who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting further resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenians slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently however arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce; which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium—a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokrates is to be numbered. His bravery, both in the battle and the retreat, was much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis; his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold, being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Laches were among those hoplites who in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiades also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokrates in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanes was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or toward the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have

already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above), Brasidas completed the levy of his division—1700 hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, toward the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliac Gulf.

To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted—and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with Lacedæmon. The federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.

To these men Brasidas sent a message at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia. Nikonidas of Larissa with other Thessalian friends of Perdikkas, assembling at Melitæa in Achaia Phthiotis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants—simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiotis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighborhood, offended at the proceeding, and unfriendly to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an independent territory, by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed further. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for

formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the furthest thing from their thoughts—and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. “He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him.” Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly, and he “passed through the country at a running pace without halting.” Leaving Melitæa in the morning he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterward into Perrhæbia—a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus (the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched) to Dium in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.

The Athenians were soon apprised of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas; but unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at a moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required.

Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army—but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still further strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace—who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas and marched along with the Macedonian army toward the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favor propositions

from Arrhibæus—wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise, admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: “he had not called in Brasidas as a judge to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary to put them down wherever he might point them out; and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him” (Perdikkas). Notwithstanding such remonstrance, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas loudly complained. He even contracted his allowance for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidike, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage—probably about the middle of September, when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. So important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him and to revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step. It was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly—so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterward. “For a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydides) he was no mean speaker.” If he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydides, such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless however the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history—partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy—partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavorably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

“Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war—that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us

for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town—nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed—astonishes me. We Lacedæmonians undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us. It would indeed be monstrous if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as against that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation—the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power: you need not apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or of the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation; and by such dealing we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians: we should at once violate our oaths, and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess toward me without actually joining—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty

if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the era of emancipation for Greece—save your own properties from damage—and attach an ever-honorable name to the community of Akanthus.”

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians—nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion (which he afterward repeated in other places besides) that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens. Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighboring city of Stageirus (a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was) soon followed the example.

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the care to protect individual independence of judgment by secret suffrage—the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen—all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens: the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect of severe impending loss and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens. Nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority, in a case where secret suffrage insured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now it is impossible that the scene

in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact—had the Akanthians felt that the imperial ascendancy of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation from which their neighbors, the revolted Chalkidians in Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt—they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expected and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse. They would have needed neither intimidation nor cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator—who, in his speech within the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience, evidently unwilling, by alternate threats and promises.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens—the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterward, whether they will ratify or reject; bringing in a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgment freely after ample discussion. The grounds of that judgment are clearly set forth to us, so as to show, that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities; as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylene, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary, and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens neither inspired hatred nor occasioned painful grievance to the population of her subject-cities generally. The movements against her arose from party minorities, of the same character as that Platæan party which introduced the Theban assailants into Platæa at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be such a scheme of plunder and oppression as Mr. Mitford and others would have us

believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interest, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies; except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed, sympathized with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the subject-allies—such Brasidas expected to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus, and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river—south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth—was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus. The adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighboring city of Amphipolis. The latter city had been established by the Athenian Agnon, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian Thracians called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437), after two previous attempts to colonize it—one by Histiaeus and Aristagoras at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 B.C.—both of which lamentably failed. So valuable however was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and Macedonia, that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Eukles was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Thucydides the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to

betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each tampered with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; while the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from its commencement. Its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who encouraged him to attempt the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arne in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel whereby the lake Bolbe is connected with the sea. From hence, after his men had supped, he began his night march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day. It was guarded only by a feeble picket—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the river; so that Brasidas, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor Eukles, the magistrates, and the citizens, were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents with their families and property around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had been no enemy within reach. Such of these as were close to the city succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving their property exposed—but the more distant became in person as well as in property at the mercy of the invader. Even within the town, filled with the friends and relatives of these victims without, indescribable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And so complete was the disorganization, that if Brasidas had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk, however, was too great even for his boldness—the rather as repulse would have been probably his ruin. Moreover, confiding in the assurances of the conspirators that the gates would be

thrown open, he thought it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls. Lastly, this process of seizure and plunder, being probably more to the state of his own soldiers, could not well be hindered.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry the majority along with them. As in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party minority. The greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Eukles and the few native Athenians around him in resolving upon defense, and in sending off an express to Thucydides at Thasos (the historian), the colleague of Eukles, as general in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. This step, of course, immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to make every effort for enticing the Amphipolitans to surrender before the re-enforcement should arrive; the rather as he was apprised that Thucydides, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines in the neighboring region, possessed extensive personal influence among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian squadron. He, therefore, sent in propositions for surrender on the most favorable terms—guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights—and granting to every one who chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his effects.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens—proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds. The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas. No one counted upon the speedy arrival of re-enforcement—and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position and procuring for them the means of escape, with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens—toward which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that

the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly—insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Eukles found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him. He could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydides and his forces were. The message dispatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis: but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived, indeed, only just in time to preserve Eion; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thucydides, putting the place in a condition of defense, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens was greater than had been ever before experienced. Hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, while excitement and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject allies. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success, sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphacteria. The loss of reputation, which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians; but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire. They knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of that general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor, had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens.

But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening—the personal ascendancy and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the boldness, the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers—which lent efficiency to that general; but also

his incorruptible probity, his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or corruption, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities—in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes, such as were deemed incredible before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence, and turned a tide of opinion, toward this eminent man, which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians. The anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power. Still her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace—which, if dispatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Perikles had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Strategus Hippokrates and 1000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites. The hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers; and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid success of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards to the points most threatened—thus leaving to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public; a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it their hopes of getting the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of Amphipolis—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Eukles and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom was confided the defense of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him (probably Eukles also) to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.

In considering this sentence, historians commonly treat Thucydides as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the calumnies of the demagogue, followed by the injustice of the people. But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together all the facts even as indicted by Thucydides himself.

At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydides was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty—as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos. He was sent as joint commander along with Eukles generally to Thrace, and especially to Amphipolis. Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defense of Amphipolis, with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter. Such nomination of two or more officers, co-ordinate and jointly responsible, was the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable—instead of one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him. If, then, Thucydides “was stationed at Thasos” (to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall), this was because he chose to station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion.

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydides did all that could be done, after he received the alarming express at Thasos (which is the part of the case that *he* sets prominently before us), but whether he and Eukles jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace—especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire.

They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel—and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded—or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion—and Amphipolis was safe.

Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed: both together would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in no way superior—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defense. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surpassing merit indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens—but without any chance of success, except from the short-comings of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydides and Eukles both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially. They knew that the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin, like that of Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew (and Thucydides himself tells us) that this Argilian population—whose territory bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connections in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of vigilant defense, Thucydides and Eukles withdraw, or omit, both the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested—precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard, and is caught so unprepared in every way, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, but at Thasos—an island out of all possible danger, either from Brasidas (who had no ships) or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their improvidence as commanders.

The presence of Thucydides on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family-connections, mining-property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis. This was one main reason why he was named. The Athenian people confide much in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command—looking to him even more than to his colleague Eukles for the continued security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Eukles admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thucydides. For it seems that Eukles had no paid force in Amphipolis; no other force than the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless these men found it

irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge. Eukles might fancy, that by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force—is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydides; who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos. We may be sure that the absence of Thucydides with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that “human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydides did *under the same circumstances*”—is true as a matter of fact, and creditable as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible not only for doing most “under the circumstances,” but also for the circumstances themselves, insofar as they are under his control. Now nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the Emperor Napoleon, or the Duke of Wellington, had lost by surprise of an enemy not very numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from the responsible officer in command—“Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day’s journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach. But the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also?” Does any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his vigor and bravery “under the circumstances?” They would assuredly reply that he had done right in coming back—that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man—and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgment and foresight, in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger—and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy’s officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbors (Argilus), plainly indicated that there *would* be, if the least opening were afforded—that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying

him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy miscalculation of this officer would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the irritation produced by the loss against an innocent object."

The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his calumnies" against Thucydides and Eukles, as having caused through culpable omission a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater loudness and acrimony. But it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling, than would be contained in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general, to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgment, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume Eukles to have been included) was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds—which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller Kleon—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own among the first and warmest. But in criticizing the conduct of Thucydides the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Thucydides the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known (like the Neapolitan historian Colletta), if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years; not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general has, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to comple-

tion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-hellenic, spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through a partial secession and renovation of inhabitants; being now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal polity as for its external defense. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river: but his most important step was to construct a palisade work, connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of the neighboring Edonian Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been recently assassinated by his wife Brauro and by some personal enemies. He had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of Galepsus and Cesyne also declared their adhesion to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Akte—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighborhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth. The long, rugged, woody ridge—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Sane, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf (called the Singitic Gulf) between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near the Xerxeian canal. The rest of the Akte was distributed among Bisaltians, Krestonians and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian name—Pelasgians or Tyrrenians, of the race which had once occupied Lemnos and Imbros—and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleone, Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Bras-

idas; but Sane and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torone, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Palene.

Torone was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighboring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lekythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay two Athenian triremes as guardships. A small party in Torone, without privity or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri (Kastor and Pollux) within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little before daybreak; sending forward 100 peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Toronæan partisans, some of whom were already concealed on the spot awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town—conducting with them seven determined men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief. Twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in the wall toward the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighboring postern gate, looking toward Cape Kanastræum, as well as the great gate leading toward the agora. They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen close under the walls. Some of these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward toward the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts—a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself conducted a portion of them to assure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Toronæans surprised and thunderstruck,

that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately garrisoned cape of Lekythus, whither they were followed by a portion of the Toronæan population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for person, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lekythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain. Brasidas granted them two days, which were employed both by them and by him, in preparations for the defense and attack of Lekythus; each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Toronæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors—for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lekythus, for their liking toward Athens: he wished them to come back freely, and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians, the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility; but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens—he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

On the expiration of the Two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lekythus, promising a recompense of thirty minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. Notwithstanding very poor means of defense—partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof—this garrison repelled him for one whole day. On the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at Delium, to set fire to the wood-work. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden platform, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the supports could bear, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious,—had not the noise, the cries, and the strangeness of the

incident alarmed those behind, who could not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defenses. Many of them accordingly took to flight, while those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable portion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow gulf to the peninsula of Pallene, by means of two triremes and some merchant-vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty minæ (which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in) to the goddess Athene for her temple at Lekythus. He, moreover, consecrated to her the entire cape of Lekythus; not only demolishing the defenses, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained, so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the Toronæans who had taken refuge at Lekythus, had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike generous and politic—we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude toward himself personally—a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendancy than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common—which lends to the short career of this eminent man, a romantic, and even an heroic, interest.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring. But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year, of the war, as Thucydides reckons—brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria toward the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amid humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it. Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover, a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone toward that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating re-enforcements—they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief men; who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labor for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas, as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners; without opening the chance of ulterior enterprises, which, though they might perhaps end in results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which was now secure. The history of the Athenians

during the past year might, indeed, serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners. Their pacific dispositions were especially incited by King Pleistoanax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the Thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years he lived in banishment close to the temple of Zeus Dykæus in Arcadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground. But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristokles kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction—"They must bring back the seed of (Herakles) the demi-god son of Zeus from foreign land to their own; if they did not, it would be their fate to plow with a silver plowshare." The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated, and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded honors—received with the same sacrifices and choric shows as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleomenes and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befell the state—the miscarriages of Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all, the unprecedented humiliation in Sphakteria—were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.

After the battle of Delium, the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Laches, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favor at Athens; while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other—each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more—tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter. The con-

tinual hope that these might be brought to a close, combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, toward the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we are not directly informed. He would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on terms more favorable than could be obtained. On this point his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace. And the policy of Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace. But the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties—and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year—desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year, together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to insure some peace which would liberate her captives. She calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.

In the month of March, 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara on the other. The Spartans, instead of merely dispatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther. In concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians.

The general principle of the truce was *uti possidetis*, and the conditions were in substance as follows:—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city.—The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians and Phokians. The Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phokians were no parties to the truce: accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and Phokians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.—This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favor of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythera, Nisæa, and Minoa, and Methana in the neighborhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythera and any portion of the main-land belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minoa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon—without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading-purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to 500 talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to insure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under color of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy, with suit-

able attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition—“If there be any provision which occurs to you, more honorable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come bring with them full powers to conclude—in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year.”

By the resolution which Laches proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Strategi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days after the important fourteenth of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skione revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skione was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies which, in the want of an acknowledged mother-city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallene (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidike branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian colony Mende. The Skionæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the Gulf into Pallene, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel—while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skione was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallene with the main-land was occupied by the town of Potidæ—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow that the wall of Potidæ barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallene was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land force from the continent, like the towns

previously acquired by Brasidas. The Skionæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself, their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torone; disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all the hazards of islanders, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom, without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force toward what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted—and he should assign to them the very first post of honor among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon."

This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation—appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city-autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it—had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skione it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. It worked even upon the feelings of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement. It produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skionæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete," says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics, and probity of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion toward him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece toward a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps, of all others, the most wide-spread and Pan-hellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation common to the whole nation—while politics tended rather to disunite the separate cities: it was farther a senti-

ment at once familiar and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skione, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Skionæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallene a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defense of Skione, but also with the intention of surprising both Mende and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta—one of the three Spartans who had sworn to the treaty; Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith—but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallene to Torone.

The case of Skione however, immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners, who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallene. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skionæans had not revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce. Accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skione in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skione, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce.

Violent was the burst of indignation when the news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens. It was nowise softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, dispatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skione—or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favor of the first revolting islanders. They

resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skione; and further, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally. The state of feeling on both sides tended to this result—that while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.

Fresh intelligence soon arrived—carrying exasperation at Athens yet further—of the revolt of Mende, the adjoining town to Skione. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners. But they saw that he retained his hold on Skione, in spite of the provisions of the truce; and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being moreover only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them—they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skione. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them. The government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them; professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear—which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defense both of Mende and Skione against the attack which was now rendered more certain than before; conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus, and sending thither as garrison 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 300 Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.

Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defense of Mende and Skione—an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he

even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallene and the superiority of Athens at sea: but his absence made their ruin certain.

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa; fifty triremes, ten of them Chian—1000 hoplites and 600 bowmen from Athens—1000 mercenary Thracians—with some peltasts from Methone and other towns in the neighborhood. From Potidæa they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mende. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 300 Skionæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, 120 Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position—while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skione, ravaged the neighboring land; Nikias on the ensuing day carried his devastations still further, even to the border of the Skionæan territory.

But dissensions so serious had already commenced within the walls, that the Skionæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mende had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skione and the other revolted towns. Had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops, whom he had sent to Mende, were mere instruments to sustain the newly-erected oligarchy, and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally toward them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mende which opened toward Potidæa. In the neighborhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshaling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take

part in the contest." Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the rather as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert however existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town: and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.

Mende being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume the former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told: but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation, round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends—and left a force to guard it—the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skione, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once and were more fortunate than they had been before Mende; for they carried it by assault, compelling the offenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mende got into Skione at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skione was in no long time completely inclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mende or to relieve Skione, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torone. Nikias, however, without attacking Torone, returned soon afterward with his armament to Athens, leaving Skione under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way. Nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of 3000 Grecian hoplites—Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian—with 1000 Macedonian and Chalkidian horse—and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here a few days, awaiting—before they

pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain. At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mende during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other—when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valor, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night, and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him: the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia—general as well as soldiers—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline; the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the center, for the retreating march. Youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy; while Brasidas himself, with 300 chosen men, formed the rear-guard.

The short harangue which (according to a custom universal with Grecian generals) he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honorable title of “Peloponnesians.” Reassuring them against the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior numbers of the advancing enemy—he invokes their native, homebred courage. “Ye do not require the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery—nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves—having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle.” Next, Brasidas tried to dissipate the *prestige* of the Illyrian name. His army had already vanquished the Lynkestæ, and these other barbarians were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of

arms and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. "They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post. Flight and attack are with them in equally honorable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretense for running away."—"Repel ye their onset whenever it comes, and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety; and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes—while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger."

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal individual courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian era, when this truth was recognized only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbors, Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed—having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war. Both Epirots and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. It is not merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers. He gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded; a theory of large range, and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment, in each individual man's bosom, of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform—combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbors as well as of his own self-reproach if he shrinks back—but at the same time essentially bound up with the feeling, that his neighbors are under corresponding obligations toward him—this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as the principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the Thracian Sitalkes or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him. The Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of

his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty—but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied, or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble—who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation—whose honor or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand. At present I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice: he tells his soldiers—“Courage is your homebred property: for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and conquest by their ancestors.” First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addresses, consisted of Helots—the conquered race, not the conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power, and as an honorable and ennobling recollection by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable character. We shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists—upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him with all the confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself with his rear-guard of 300 was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkestæ and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigor—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops—that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdik-

kas, who had fled before—partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lynkestis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it. Several of them were already on the summits, and more were ascending to re-enforce them; while a portion of them were moving down upon his rear. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen 300, to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerously occupied—not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their flanks. The retreating army, thus master of one of the side hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to drive away the Lynkestian and Illyrian occupants. Having got through this narrow outlet, Brasidas found himself on the higher ground. His enemies did not dare to attack him farther: so that he was enabled to reach, even in that day's march, the first town or village in the kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, who had fled on the first news of danger without giving them any notice—that they seized and appropriated all the articles of baggage, not inconsiderable in number, which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a nocturnal flight. They even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of the baggage carts.

Perdikkas keenly resented this behavior of the troops of Brasidas, following as it did immediately upon his own quarrel with that general, and upon the mortification of his repulse from Lynkestis. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesian, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skione. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions; and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.

The relation between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. In Thrace, war was prosecuted by mutual understanding, and with unabated vigor; but everywhere else the truce was observed. The main purpose of the truce, however, that of giving time for discussion preliminary to a definite peace, was completely frustrated. The decree of the Athenian people (which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce), for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, seems never to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians dispatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas; probably at his own request,

and also instigated by hearing of the Athenian armament now under Nikias in Pallene. But Ischagoras, the commander of the re-enforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off; which was far more easily executed, and was gratifying to the feelings of Perdikkas himself, as well as an essential service to the Athenians.

Ischagoras however—with a few companions but without his army—made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas. This was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom—that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. This mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts—for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis—another, Pasitelidas, of Torone. It is probable that these inspecting commissioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas. Moreover the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time—and that too, more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia—about January or February, 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling-ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night)—when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.

In the absence of actual war between the ascendent powers in and near Peloponnesus, during the course of the summer, Thucydides mentions to us some incidents which perhaps he would have omitted had there been great warlike operations to describe. The great temple of Here, between Mykenæ and Argos (nearer to the former, and in early times more intimately connected with it, but now an appendage of the latter; Mykenæ itself having been subjected

and almost depopulated by the Argeians)—enjoyed an ancient Panhellenic reputation. The catalogue of its priestesses, seemingly with a statue or bust of each, was preserved or imagined through centuries of past time, real and mythical, beginning with the goddess herself or her immediate nominees. Chrysis, an old woman who had been priestess there for fifty-six years, happened to fall asleep in the temple with a burning lamp near to her head; the fillet encircling her head took fire, and though she herself escaped unhurt, the temple itself, very ancient and perhaps built of wood, was consumed. From fear of the wrath of the Argeians, Chrysis fled to Phlius, and subsequently thought it necessary to seek protection as a suppliant in the temple of Athene Alea at Tegea: Phaeinis was appointed priestess in her place. The temple was rebuilt on an adjoining spot by Eupolemus of Argos, continuing as much as possible the antiquities and traditions of the former, but with greater splendor and magnitude. Pausanias the traveller, who describes this second edifice as a visitor near 600 years afterward, saw near it the remnant of the old temple which had been burnt.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantinea and Tegea—each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed. Each party erected a trophy—each sent spoils to the temple of Delphi. We shall have occasion soon to speak farther of these Arcadian dissensions.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March. But they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delpian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendancy of the Thebans over some of the inferior Bœotian cities. The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespie, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of *atticising* tendencies. How far this suspicion was well-founded, we have no means of judging. But the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless—having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above-mentioned.

But the month of March (or the Attic Elaphebolion) 422 B.C.—the time prescribed for expiration of the One year's truce—had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed. Brasidas in Thrace had disregarded it from the beginning. Both the contracting powers had

tacitly acquiesced in the anomalous condition, of war in Thrace coupled with peace elsewhere. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. There was nothing except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties—always excepting Thracian affairs. Moreover the Athenians were to a certain degree soothed by their success at Mende and Skione, and by their acquisition of Perdikkas as an ally, during the summer and autumn of 423 B.C. But the state of sentiment between the contracting parties was not such as to make it possible to treat for any longer peace, or to conclude any new agreement; though neither were disposed to depart from that which had been already concluded.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things. The truce had expired: either party might renew hostilities; but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians there was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the One year's truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing toward the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce therefore had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different. Kleon and his supporters renewed their instances to obtain a vigorous prosecution of the war, and renewed them with great additional strength of argument; the question being now open to considerations of political prudence, without any binding obligation.

“At this time (observes Thucydides) the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war—the latter because he thought that, if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others.” As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable. It would be wonderful indeed, if he, in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth *his* position in Thrace con-

stituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

But the coloring which Thucydides gives to Kleon's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations—which tended infallibly to place ascendancy in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendancy. Matter of crimination against others (assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood) could hardly be wanting either in war or peace. And if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals, who would certainly outshine him and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man, we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens (of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon) expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: “Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them: though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you—if there be peace, you will have command over me.” This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thucydides pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokrates far more warlike. The former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add, that Kleon himself had not been always warlike. He commenced his political career as an opponent of Perikles, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war.

But further—if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war—it will still remain to be considered, whether at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Perikles as the best judge of policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points—1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, “keeping their subject-allies well in hand,” submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged; 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war.—Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Perikles, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere

vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests. Had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Perikles. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed. It was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it—who encouraged the Athenians, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise, and for the express purpose, of checking the further conquests of Brasidas; also with the further promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace, and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March, B.C. 423, at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized, while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of *uti possidetis*, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere, had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions—so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the dispatch of her armament to Skione and Mende had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallene.

Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was to recover the lost possessions in Thrace—especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens. His connection with Sparta would enable him to announce her professions even upon authority. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience:—“If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape per-

formance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners, on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from further conquest. Much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skione and Mende. And you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon."

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas. Much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the One year's truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Perikles, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative—nay, without even indicating their existence—merely tells us that "Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloak dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination"? We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgment of Thucydides, that it is harsh and unfair toward Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It breathes not that same spirit of honorable impartiality which pervades his general history. It is an interpolation by the officer whose improvidence had occasioned to his countrymen the fatal loss of Amphipolis, retaliating upon the citizen who justly accused him. It is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgment in the matter of Sphakteria.

Rejecting on this occasion the judgment of Thucydides, we may confidently affirm that Kleon had rational public grounds for urging his countrymen to undertake with energy the reconquest of Amphipolis. Demagogue and leather-seller though he was, he stands here honorably distinguished, as well from the tameness and inaction of Nikias, who grasped at peace with hasty credulity, through sickness of the efforts of war, as from the restless movement, and novelties, not merely unprofitable, but ruinous, which we shall presently find springing up under the auspices of Alkibiades. Perikles had said to his countrymen, at a time when they were enduring all the miseries of pestilence, and were in a state of despondency even greater than that which prevailed in B.C. 422—"You hold your empire and your proud position by the condition of being willing to encounter cost, fatigue, and danger: abstain from all views of enlarging the empire, but think no effort too great to maintain it unimpaired.—To lose what we have once got is more disgraceful than to fail in attempts at acquisition." The very same language was probably held by Kleon when exhorting his countrymen to an expedition for the reconquest of Amphipolis. But when uttered by him, it would have a very different effect from that which it had formerly produced when held by Perikles—and different also from that which it would now have produced if held by Nikias. The entire peace-party would repudiate it when it came from Kleon—partly out of dislike to the speaker, partly from conviction, doubtless felt by every one, that an expedition against Brasidas would be a hazardous and painful service to all concerned in it, general as well as soldiers—partly also from a persuasion, sincerely entertained at the time though afterward proved to be illusory by the result, that Amphipolis might really be got back through peace with the Lacedæmonians.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria—the eighth year of the war: a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period, we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair

—reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the Strategi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphacteria. Nikias doubtless opposed the expedition as much as he could. When it was determined by the people, in spite of his opposition, he would peremptorily decline the command for himself, and would do all he could to force it upon Kleon, or at least would be better pleased to see it under his command than under that of any one else. He would be not less glad to exonerate himself from a dangerous service, than to see his rival entangled in it. And he would have before him the same alternative which he and his friends had contemplated with so much satisfaction in the affair of Sphacteria; either the expedition would succeed, in which case Amphipolis would be taken—or it would fail, and the consequence would be the ruin of Kleon. The last of the two was really the more probable at Amphipolis—as Nikias had erroneously imagined it to be at Sphacteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavorable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army; so that the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armor. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance. An ignorant general with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas. But had Nikias or the Strategi done their duty and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss—certainly very different as to dishonor.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently toward the beginning of August, with 1200 Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and 300 horsemen—troops of excellent quality and condition; besides an auxiliary force of allies (number not exactly known) and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis; for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian re-enforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skione, from which place he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across

the Gulf from Pallene to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbor of the Kolophonians near Torone. Having here learnt that neither Brasidas himself nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison were present in Torone, he landed his forces, and marched to attack the town—sending ten triremes at the same time round a promontory which separated the harbor of the Kolophonians from Torone to assail the latter place from seaward.

It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torone, had broken down a portion of the old wall and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall inclosing the proasteion or suburb. This new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defense. Pasitolidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw the ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbor, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defense of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Brasidas, who was not far off, rendered aid with the utmost celerity, but was yet at five miles' distance from the city, when he learnt the capture and was obliged to retire unsuccessfully. Pasitolidas, the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Toronæan male population, were dispatched as prisoners to Athens; while the Toronæan women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis with his whole forces; and to Polles, the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas. The local influence of the banished Thucydides would no longer be at the service of Athens—much less at the service of Kleon. Awaiting the expected re-enforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic Gulf, which was repulsed; next upon Galepsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the re-enforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdyllion, on the western bank of the river, communicating with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides. But the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which

they had brought out from Athens against their general, "whose ignorance and cowardice (says the historian) they contrasted with the skill and bravery of his opponent." Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it. And Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement; which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city, and a demonstration to escape the appearance of doing nothing—being aware that it was impossible to attack the place with any effect before his re-enforcements arrived.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a south-westerly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a south-easterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point north-east of the town where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkitis—ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus—and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town—thus being, as it were, a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon. It was thus visible without any intervening wall to spectators from the side of the sea (south), as well as from the side of the continent (or west and north). At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge, a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylium. In fact the course of the Strymon is here determined by these two steep eminences, Kerdylium on the west and the hill of Amphipolis on the east, between which it flows. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall. But during the intervening eighteen months he had erected a palisade work (probably an earthen bank topped with a palisade) connecting the two. By means of this palisade the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city; so that Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylium, could pass over whenever he chose into the city without impediment.

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge (which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus) in order to survey the city and its adjoining

ground on the northern and north-eastern side, which he had not yet seen; that is, the side toward the lake, and toward Thrace—which was not visible from the lower ground near Eion. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march—the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylium. Moreover the gates of Amphipolis were all shut—not a man was on the wall—nor were many symptoms of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array. Having reached the top of the ridge, and posted his army on the strong eminence fronting the highest portion of the Long Wall, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay toward Thrace—or toward Myrkinus, Drabeskus, etc.—thus viewing all the descending portion of the Long Wall northward toward the Strymon. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him. It seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied that if he had brought battering engines, he could have taken it forthwith. Impressed with the belief that there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim—some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas, knowing that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness and apparent fear, he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement, of which advantage might be taken. His station on Mount Kerdylium enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the long wall of Amphipolis, he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle. For his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment; in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

Having offered the battle sacrifice at the temple of Athene, Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not

prepared for it—when their courage was not wound up to battle pitch—and when, after carelessly mounting the hill to survey the ground, they were thinking only of quietly returning to quarters. He himself at the proper moment would rush out from one gate, and be foremost in conflict with the enemy. Klearidas, with that bravery which became him as a Spartan, would follow the example by sallying out from another gate; and the enemy, taken thus unawares, would probably make little resistance. For the Amphipolitans, this day and their own behavior would determine whether they were to be allies of Lacedæmon, or slaves of Athens—perhaps sold into captivity, or even put to death, as a punishment for their recent revolt.

These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy. Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, to the Athenian scouts without. Moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Athene, and Brasidas with its ministers around him performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognized. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally. He himself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of the circumstance: we must recollect that there was no defender on the walls, nor any danger from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his re-enforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organized. For he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun—not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank toward Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and center actually in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy—when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small detachment ready marshaled near him, burst out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder of their array. “These men will not stand us: I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their heads. Men who reel about in that way never stand an assailing enemy. Open the gates for me instantly, and let us sally out with confidence.”

With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade,

and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown open, and Brasidas with his 150 chosen soldiers issued through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road toward Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged their central division on the right flank. Their left wing had already got beyond him on the road toward Eion. Taken completely unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at the boldness of their enemy—the Athenians of the center were seized with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement he was mortally wounded and carried off the field unobserved by his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden danger, had thus a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and form on the hill. Klearidas here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon; who, more astounded than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once; but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus, and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to flight; the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the retreat, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe. When they at last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but 600 Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.

So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. Great and bitter was the sorrow which his death occasioned throughout Thrace, especially among the Amphipolitans. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honor of interment within their city—the universal habit being to inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. All the allies attended his funeral, in arms and with

military honors. His tomb was encircled by a railing, and the space immediately fronting it was consecrated as the great agora of the city, which was remodeled accordingly. He was also proclaimed *Ækist* or Founder of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honor. The Athenian Agnon, the real founder and originally recognized *Ækist* of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honors and expunged from the remembrance of the people; the buildings, which served as visible memento of his name, being destroyed. Full of hatred as the Amphipolitans now were toward Athens—and not merely of hatred, but of fear, since the loss which they had just sustained of their saviour and protector—they felt repugnance to the idea of rendering farther worship to an Athenian *Ækist*. It was inconvenient to keep up such a religious link with Athens, now that they were forced to look anxiously to Lacedæmon for assistance. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous alterations in the city which this important change required, together with the erection of the trophy, just at the spot where Brasidas had first charged the Athenians; while the remaining armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without farther operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest—consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration. But the criticism passed by Thucydides on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus—in the blind confidence that no one would resist him. Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious—realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. The remarks here made by Thucydides on that affair are not more reasonable than the judgment on it in his former chapter; for it is not true (as he here implies) that Kleon expected no resistance, in Sphakteria—he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his re-enforcements should arrive—and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness—the latter

quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thucydides.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitering the ground, was not in itself ill-judged. It might have been accomplished in perfect safety if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be out-generaled and overreached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practiced with success against inexperienced generals; who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach—much more when there *is* positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydides himself and his colleague Eukles a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis; not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unpracticed, in a military sense; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear. An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites—taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement; nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done—or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and pre-

pare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add, however—and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment to the judgment as well as boldness of Brasidas—that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day (perhaps not even Demosthenes, the most enterprising general of Athens) would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generaled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself to the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honor, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgment.

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydides that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best and the best-armed hoplites in Athens—that they came out unwillingly under Kleon—that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any error, despising him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in awaiting the arrival of expected re-enforcements—when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former artifices respecting the attack of Sphacteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to the wishes of these adversaries. They could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

Had Perikles been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been; with the full force, and the best generals, that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no defense on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be

approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The armament of Kleon, even if his re-enforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Perikles would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralyzed by the contentions of political party. He would have seen as clearly as Kleon that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side, which he had first shown to be practicable. With him the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, alike disappeared. The Athenian generals Phormio and Demosthenes had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles. All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion—we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination “of every sort of practical excellence”—valor, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing—which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens; and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favorable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realize. At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified, perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might

have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methone to the last at Amphipolis—not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different senses, the causes of his banishment. He never mentions the latter except in connection with some proceeding represented as unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practice in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reached their maximum in the propositions against Mitylene and Skione: both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians—equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens—we find Thucydides mentioning the deed without naming the proposers.

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticising this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgment, as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria—2. After the capture of the island—3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions, he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklean—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death—how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace—how Nikias and Alkibiades together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydides is reserved and even indulgent toward the errors and vices of other statesmen—harsh only toward those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evi-

dence. There exists, indeed, a portrait of him drawn in colors broad and glaring—most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the “Knights” of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, so replete with comic genius throughout, the “Knights” is the most consummate and irresistible—the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and odium. Dean Swift could have desired nothing worse, even for Ditton and Whiston. The old man Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people—Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master’s ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself—the Knights or chief members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the chorus of the piece as Kleon’s pronounced enemies—the sausage-seller from the market-place, who instigated by Nikias and Demosthenes along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favor of Demos—all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libelous comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenæan festival (January, B.C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphacteria), with Kleon himself and most of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigor and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence—at least not permanently. For not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone toward this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanes as a witness against him; though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivaled comic merit of the “Knights” of Aristophanes is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon.

We have means too of testing the candor and accuracy of Aristophanes by his delineation of Sokrates, whom he introduced in the comedy of "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights." As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights:" as a picture of Sokrates, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may, indeed, perceive single features of resemblance; the bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both: but the entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokrates, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Perikles by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact—as, for example, where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly robbed Demosthenes of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphacteria.

In the prose of Thucydides, we find Kleon described as a dishonest politician—a wrongful accuser of others—the most violent of all the citizens. Throughout the verse of Aristophanes, these same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are also superadded—Kleon practices the basest artifices and deceptions to gain favor with the people, steals the public money, receives bribes, and extorts compositions from private persons by wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretense of zeal for the public treasury. In the comedy of the "Acharnians," represented one year earlier than the "Knights," the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled "to disgorge:" a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens (if we may believe Theopompus) for the purpose of procuring a remission of their tribute, and which the Knights, whose evasions of military service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanes, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other. For an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydides; not Kleon as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylænæans as given to us by the historian), but Kleon as a man of

violent temper and fierce political antipathies—a bitter speaker—and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato—"the universal biter, whom Persephone was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death"—was characterized at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thucydides was to Kleon. In Cato such a temper was not inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon, as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanes: a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs") represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes, in the attire of Herakles and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripides. Among the incidents, Xanthias in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult toward two hostesses of eating-houses; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which the women, having no other redress left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery. This passage shows us (if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons, who had been wronged, to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Antipho or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus, who would thus extend their own popularity, by means very similar to those practiced by the leading men in Rome.

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty, was indispensable for the protection of the city; otherwise the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been

merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1000 drachmas. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. There was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals: but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination—and the orators constantly do so guard themselves, in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thucydides fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited; from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective, and from his position both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question upon which a candid judgment turns—we have no means of deciding, either in his case or in that of Cato. “To lash the wicked (observes Aristophanes himself) is not only no blame, but is even a matter of honor to the good.” It has not been common to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation, though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanes. For the attacks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defense nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply or even to retort—and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as to furnish proof of it—so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanes is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet in the senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the “*Babylonians*,” exhibited B. C. 426 at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens; especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute. And as the “*Babylonians*” (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanes, was full of slashing ridicule not only against individual citizens, but against the functionaries and institutions of the city, Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens

was then in the midst of an embarrassing war—that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted—that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Kleon might see plausible reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor indeed, had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him, except to the extent of a small fine. They could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself, however, seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the peace of Nikias (the “Acharnians,” the “Knights,” and the “Wasps”), were represented at the Lenæan festival, in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless much incensed with the play of the “Knights,” and seems to have annoyed the poet either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising freeman’s rights without being duly qualified (since none but citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions), or by some other means which are not clearly explained. We cannot make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an apology without intending to be bound by it. Certain it is, that his remaining plays subsequent to the “Knights,” though containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate plan of attack against him.

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens, too, was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiery. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Laches, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration

of Plataea; but the Thebans replied that Plataea was theirs neither by force nor by treason—but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Plataea, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Solium which they had taken from Corinth. To insure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—about the end of March, 421 B.C.—shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or visit to the festivals. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming.—[The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war].

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory.—[This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phokian confederacy to the management of the temple; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty years' truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phokians were in the ranks of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretense.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilaus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeides. Any citizen of these cities (Amphipolis as well as the others) who may choose to quit them shall be at

liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sane, and Singe, shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Acanthians.—[These were towns which adhered to Athens and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus and Akanthus, against which this clause was intended to insure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, Atalante—with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skione.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sernylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens—the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words—"I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud." The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged. They were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries—on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately after the urban Dionysia; Pleistolas being Ephor eponymus at Sparta, and Alkæus Archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing are included the two kings, Agis and Pleistoanax—the Ephor Pleistolas (and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know)—and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn are comprised Nikias, Laches, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

Such was the peace (commonly known by the name of the peace of Nikias) concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions being put to the vote at Sparta in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority accepted them; which, according to the con-

dition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy, made it binding upon all. There was, indeed, a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or heroes. Saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even though enforced by the strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself—when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians and Corinthians all refused to accept it.

The Corinthians were displeased because they did not recover Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies—but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, the great Peloponnesian War, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits in many respects, such as were not anticipated by either of the concluding parties, will be seen in the following chapters.

CHAPTER LV

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90.

MY last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March, 421 B.C., between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war—yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection

with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace—that is, Argilus, Staigeirus, Akanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so—but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeides, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skione, Torone, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythera, Methone, Pteleon, and Atalante; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skione.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred pan-Hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterward occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace—and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates—still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them, moreover, took common offense at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper. Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had, indeed, made application to Argos for renewing it, through

Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear, therefore, that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot:—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and dispatching Ischagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Ischagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition; and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done: if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the

double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laonian sentiment of the leaders Nicias and Laches. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace—awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nicias or Laches, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfill her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be canceled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylus, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides: with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed—and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath. Moreover, the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns; one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athene in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan Ephors and Nicias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquies-

cent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiades was competing with Nicias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots—and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best—without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring; whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfillment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay more—in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications, Nicias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, peace, together with our alliance.” At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favor, and a strong

concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her—but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit—and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterward proved unproductive in reality? The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thucydides himself admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydides states on more than one occasion—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens. He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter—for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythera, and Methone. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public recommendation of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiades concurred. Probably the Spartan Ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away—replaced only by an inferior successor, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus—and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes—there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence—“Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives.”

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they

had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphacteria. Yet it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis, if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed. The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was (they said) all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens, for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus—or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place—leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until further progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been performed—

none even seemed in course of being performed; so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives. Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephellania, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders, who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydides and Eukles: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unbinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fullness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides; while her military force was just now further strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens. To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention toward Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing

that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they choose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy. And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterward, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as savior of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy—and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defense, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterward—was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia,

were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive battle. Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so—though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphacteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta—especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy. Moreover the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as

involved some offense to Gods or Heroes." Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies—Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace, etc.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace—viz. that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium: since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest—next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretense at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. "It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens, and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present." With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative—being requested to come again at the next conference.

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new Argeian confederacy, and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part, doubtless, by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof—for the open consummation of this revolt, apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings—but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion toward the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta. They were linked together by communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back

from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began, and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which, Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly, the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began—to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success, we are not told. The mere fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same; and so it proved—for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all further extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens, with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted—but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were further entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days's armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing conditions of peace de facto, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæ-

monians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defense and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis. These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commanders, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused 2,000 of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body, and of course greater fear of the bravest.

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger (real or supposed) from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any real cowardice or military incompetence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men would be looked upon as more or less degraded; or at least there would be enough to make them fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors, contracting suspicions of their designs, condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post; placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale. This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it—the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms what we know directly from Thucydides, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state; and the Ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment (justly pointed out by modern historians), would not weigh much with the Ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skione at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently

accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skione and its territory was made over to the Plataean refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions—were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles. They further lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—King Pleistoanax as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B. C. 421) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobulus and Xenares) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent. And we may here remark that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobulus and Xenares, together with many of their partisans, originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private

underhand maneuvers for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was further essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos—for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.

Such were the plans which Kleobulus and Xenares laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for on their road home they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the Bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors and the wishes of these Argeians. The Bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians"—bodies of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent, that the Bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly. They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace—for mutual defense, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties named was the same—all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed further afterward, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The maneuver, skillfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates

the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobulus and Xenares, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phyle, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phyle—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians. A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to surrender Pylus. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognized import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum—while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobulus and Xenares desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretense of some ancient oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants—as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably sur-

prised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion—no way unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they dispatched Eustrophus and Æson—two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city—to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was eminently acceptable—the very event which they had been maneuvering underhand to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that, about 120 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined.

The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece. Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panaktum) of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylus. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedes and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiations about Panaktum (at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta), they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless Andromedes proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners were thus *restored* (he pretended)—for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylus in exchange.

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylus had been brought to a close. Both the alliance and the demolition of Panaktum excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedes—that demolition of the fort, being tantamount to restitution and precluding any further tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still further by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed amidst frequent notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase):

nevertheless not one of the conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number)—while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedes, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.

Even Nikias, Laches, and the other leading Athenians, to whose improvident facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy—if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiades son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the Ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakes and Ajax—and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens—that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomache to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Perikles, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroncia, having already served with honor in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiades, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him. But even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Perikles and his brother Aripbron. His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of pre-eminence, and insolence toward others, were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person, both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women—and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration

and indulgence—amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiades. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hipparete, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents: when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiades violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiades. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer—he strikes Taureas, a rival choregus, in the public theater, while the representation is going on—he strikes Hipponikus (who afterward became his father-in-law), out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterward appeasing him by an ample apology—he protects the Thasian poet Hegemon, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called Metroon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial. Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiades to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness which marked his private life—a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amid the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited—and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech which Thucydides ascribes to Alkibiades before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved,

it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amid such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiades stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokrates, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterward, Alkibiades also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokrates by protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him: expensive duties, which (as we might expect) he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiades in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the Ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.

To a young man like Alkibiades, thirsting for power and pre-eminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers—Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all, that of Sokrates. His intimacy with Sokrates has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiades (like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokrates by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation—his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations—his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination—his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners,

while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack of Sokrates, and to copy his formidable string of interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiades, who not only owed his life to the generous valor of Sokrates at Potidæa, but had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship. But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokrates with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodikus, and Protagoras not less than Sokrates; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokrates was a sophist as well as the others: and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiades and Kritias, such society was highly useful. It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including mental accomplishments as well as political success: it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded: it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private:—it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.

Alkibiades, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokrates most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiades attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued

were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokrates was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiades and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiades came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in execution—not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all, was his extraordinary flexibility of character, and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistokles—whom he resembled as well in ability and vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means—Alkibiades was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens. But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from meddling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem to any one; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: “the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him”—was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet—while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him—“You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city at all; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behavior.” Athens had to feel the force

of his energy, as an exile and enemy; but the great harm which he did to her was, in his capacity of adviser—awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy; rapacious, uncertain perilous aggrandizement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiades now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength, nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Perikles, were democratical. His grandfather Alkibiades had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterward publicly renounced an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiades himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment—doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias, and with Thessalus son of Kimon, who afterward became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta—Alkibiades thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is no way astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Laches, whose prudence would commend, if it

did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiades yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course, he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiades had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiades, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such acquisition rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much however the inclination toward Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argæian plans of Alkibiades. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedes arrived at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylus,—when it further became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Bœotians without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiades that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen the discontent against Sparta, he at the same time dispatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace: having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies, to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them

of alliance with Athens—a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and dispatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian and Mantineian. The alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate, by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party—though Corinth had refused all concern in the second.

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedes, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens—Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos—to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens—and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylus should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiades became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Lacœonian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuver. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families. This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of the senate; so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain nothing by

intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alkibiades) would speak emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylus—a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel. The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions, and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta, only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party, under all circumstances: if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiades, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy, and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting, but without even warning, Nikias—which was exactly what Alkibiades desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced; upon which Alkibiades himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came? what powers they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which their declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary; the assembled people, who, made aware of that previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips; lastly, most of all, Nikias himself—their confidential agent and probably their host at Athens—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their case before the assembly—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equaled their astonishment. There was an unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiades himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all: he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed his invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys

should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydides. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiades through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's *Jonathan Wild*. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanes heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equaled, the impudence of this descendant of *Æakus* and *Zeus* in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said—and a treachery toward their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must

show it forthwith—1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobulus and Xenares, the anti-Athenian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos—the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that, too, as a personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiades was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city) from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.

The words of this convention, which Thucydides gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire. [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis toward Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purpose of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim

that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities—and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”

“The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance concluded between

themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies toward Sparta.

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad or 420 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May. That festival was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Panhellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or *Theories*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games. Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica, the visit of the Athenians was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. No small curiosity was entertained to see what figure the *Theory* of Athens would make as to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiades took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian *Theory*, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession. But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiades himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four,

which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiades was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation (it seems) was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against—not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian Theors provided for their countrymen visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent which Alkibiades himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterward, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiades maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens; dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself (which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life were aggravated by such a stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favor.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians acting as arbitrators in the

case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions—after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined that the behavior of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation; for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites—thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition, being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly, on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly, the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from

attendance in the form of sacred legation called Theory, occupying a formal and recognized place at the solemnity.

As all the other Grecian states (with the single exception of Lepreum) were present by their Theories as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan Theory "shone by its absence" in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed, was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken—so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster—that they were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their Theors into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid 1000 hoplites from Martineia, as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack; while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival, to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot-racing. Lichas, a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum, and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows. Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption. The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiades, and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers,

in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially the Thes-salians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenares the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops; dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather toward Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the other.

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiades, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Perikles.

After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce—at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiades, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amid the center of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold (insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokrates) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before, and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and re-enforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiades exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—a spectacle at that moment new and striking. He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to

undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, dispatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ. Yet the march of Alkibiades doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina, now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum (the south-eastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighboring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs. The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the north-west, toward Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies. But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavorable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an outmarch as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argei-

ans prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the 26th of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the 26th of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the 26th, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was further facilitated by the circumstance that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies, who however had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace: perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiades. What other deputies attended, we are not told: but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted, even at the opening of the debates, upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavorable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiades, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join

the Argeians. But before he arrived the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded: so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.

The Epidaurians were re-enforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighboring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbor of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylus, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion Alkibiades, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way. The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile maneuvering, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage, yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus, the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.

Toward the month of June (B.C. 418), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under King Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Philasians, etc.—were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies was very con-

siderable—for we hear of 5,000 Bœotian hoplites, and 2,000 Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also 5,000 light-armed, 500 horse-men, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as 3,000 Elian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Plateæ, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself, next to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point: while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Tretus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians: but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Tretus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favorable to their defense. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and

the Tretus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians, hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, was found nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshaled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Tretus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry, too, would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea seem to have possessed any horsemen: a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatience for battle; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front which appeared to be inclosed between them and their city—and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger: and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them—and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike

unexpected and unwelcome. For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read, with no small astonishment, that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasylus, whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offenses and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasylus that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated,

Very shortly afterward the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Laches and Nikostratus. Alkibiades came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasylus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiades even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiades contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void; since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join

him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus; the Argeians, also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were, however, in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea—to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance—and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleians contended strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbor Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter—incomparably the more important enterprise of the two: but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favorable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta, when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by dispatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid succor. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ or about $27\frac{3}{4}$ Attic talents. He urgently entreated that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred: if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been, before, a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea—the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head—the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers. When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defense—the oldest

as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phokians, and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such re-enforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos—which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion or temple of Herakles, from whence he began to ravage the neighboring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground—and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshaled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasylus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding “to heal mischief by mischief.” So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat—though actually within distance no greater than the cast of a javelin, from the enemy.

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but inclosed plain, drained only by katabothra or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water toward the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem, however, was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt—next retreat—and lastly disappear—their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same

with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of his march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honor, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites with their dependent allies of Kleonæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience. But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis* or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognized. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority—"commanders of commanders"—each of whom had his special duty in insuring the execution of orders. Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the Polemarchs (each commanding a Mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the Lochagi, or colonels of the respective Lochi. These again gave command to each Pentekonter, or captain of a Pentekosty; lastly, he

to the Enomotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision called an Enomoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the Enomotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his Enomoty; but the Pentekonter and the Lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enomoties, and the lochus four pentekosties—at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military maneuvers were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained, with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Pericæki, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness. Next to the Skiritæ, who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the center of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalians, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honor. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity, we cannot determine, as he was an exile

from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were 600 in number—the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 448 men; each enomoty having four men in front. In respect to depth, the different enomoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ); each lochus comprised four pentekosties—each pentekosty contained four enomoties. Multiplying 448 by 8, and adding the 600 Skiritæ, this would make a total of 4184 hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantinea should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was—or or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbor. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their army in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect, which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover, various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or

wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy; who, having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious, fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straightforward, but somewhat aslant toward the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right-hand neighbor. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honor, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion; even the Lacedæmonian discipline being no way exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lochi in the center, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practiced evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order. Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristokles and Hipponoidas, who had their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the center, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from

their own center. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian center, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-wagons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the wagons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Manteneians and their comrades thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian center and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan Lochi, found himself in front conflict with the center and left of the enemy—with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi—with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance—indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape. While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians—and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharak, enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy. There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Laches and Nikostratus; and 200 Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the

defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a re-enforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned home.

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June, 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honor of Sparta. The disaster in Sphacteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The maneuver of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs; but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinea any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and center, so that they might have taken the center in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised—the troops in the center, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristokles and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards on their return to Sparta.

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3,000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of

Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Perikles at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation. Shortly after the defeat, the 3,000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a re-enforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even dispatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle—and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success—now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished; but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Here was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion—their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very center of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat at Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiades, had aspired to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defense against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian center. They had thus reaped positive glory, and doubtless felt contempt

for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and re-enforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiades, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos—and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men hostages from the Mænali. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken.

Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves. Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus—and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business.”

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibades at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea—and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment. If any allied city shall quarrel with another

allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution."

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty—that of insuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies. And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter—according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos. The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled further with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum (through the Brasidean settlers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon (about November or December, 418 B.C.) had still further depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were dispatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens. In further pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly

by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Demosthenes to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place. Having no intention, however, of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the peace of Nikias.

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1000 hoplites from each city (the first joint expedition under the new alliance), against Sikyon, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyonian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyon: yet that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably, therefore, that joint enterprise against Sikyon was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyon had been accomplished. Thus re-enforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.

This revolution (accomplished about February B. C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alkibiades thither two years before—accordingly she now remodeled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favor Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to make them suspicious and probably cruel. Such cruelty, moreover, was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens—such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigor of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual license to themselves. The behavior and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanor of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep: a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as co-existent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnopædiæ* was in course of being solemnized at Sparta—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth

the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march toward Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed; but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months, from February to June, 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities, who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favorable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still, the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause,—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and re-enforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardor; while Alkibiades brought assistance from Athens—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defense, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea, required a long time. Moreover, the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the

oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection. Accordingly, about the end of September (417 B. C.), king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiaë, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighboring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.

The close neighborhood of such exiles—together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiades was dispatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 300 marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party (B. C. 416). Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices (always offered previous to leaving their own territory) so unfavorable that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so—to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape. Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices—entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part)—and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ; from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian re-enforcement.

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterward be extended, of an anti-Laonian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens; very different from the splendid hopes

which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea—hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—nevertheless, neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus, during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.), the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylus became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians. Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation. Nor was the license of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis—now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiades, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the center of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could

readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Perikles. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so as, if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails—partly through his own incompetence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nicias, Laches, and Alkibiades, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceeding which display as much silly credulity in Nicias as selfish deceit in Alkibiades, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nicias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manuevered by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiades begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nicias—the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiades in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nicias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nicias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nicias and Alkibiades combined: for by singular misfortune she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420–416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiades. The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiades was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Chremes, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiades. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanes as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx: if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydides does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nikias. Thucydides only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, “one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city.” This sentence of Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus: for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiades, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to; the last example having been that of Perikles and Thucydides son of Milesias, the latter of whom was ostracized about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover there was now full confidence in the numerous Dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals—thus abating the necessity as conceived in men’s minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote

of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party-dispute, the friends of Alkibiades probably accepted the challenge of Nicias and concurred in supporting a vote of ostracism: each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, preferring to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always however perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs or Hetæries, and according to some accounts, the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hyperbolus. By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognized by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydides himself distinctly implies this: for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth; nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterward. It had been extremely valuable in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders: but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiades had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

It was in the beginning of summer 416 B.C., that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Melos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thera, which was not already included in their empire. Melos and Thera were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth

year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomedes and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian, and two Lesbian—1200 Athenian hoplites, and 1500 hoplites, from the allies—with 300 bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

It was a practice frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed, Thucydides professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydides is in far larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian prisoners of military age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand; in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians—or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances,

since they know as well as he, that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it. To this the Melians reply, that (omitting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even toward those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as a lesson to others. "We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta—it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the meantime let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us."—"Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?"—said the Melians. "No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power."—"But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?"—"They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea."—"But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies."—"We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us—but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you, or already in our empire and discontented with the restraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril."—"We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged)

how terrible it is to contend against your superior power and your good fortune; nevertheless we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the Gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice—and as to our inferior power we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us.”—“ We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favor. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the Gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the Gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue forever—and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behavior toward others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honorable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety.”

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval, were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words—“ We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves—relying on that favorable fortune which the Gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable.” — “ Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and with your all you will come to ruin.”

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation,

distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Philokrates. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydides does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiades was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community; apparently not as *kleruchs*, or out-citizens of Athens, but as new Melians.

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians toward Melos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigor of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after-times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted—and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to

a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations, thus dramatizing the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers; as Dionysius of Halikarnassus long ago remarked, intimating his suspicion that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretenses, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry* where their purpose needs it. Now the language of the envoy at Melos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession (falsely called a school) named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness—a disdain not merely of sophistry in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued as if “*the good old plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can*”—had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists: whereas the true purpose and value of sophists, even in the modern and worst sense of the word (putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called Sophists at Athens), is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification—so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this “good old plan as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Melos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory: and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Melos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian

envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea if he can—a false plea, or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention—what might have been said with perfect truth as matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification—that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment—*Μήλου Ἀλωσις* (The Capture of Melos)—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus—“The Capture of Miletus.” And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucydides will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Melos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterward, and dispatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on, in the main, declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydides, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the envoys at Melos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxes into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation—impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch’s insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydides—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and

confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation; not those of the Athenian envoy—still less, those of the Athenian public—last of all, those of that much calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY.

IN the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461–416 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and provided settlements for numerous immigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messene, partly in the re-established city of Kamarina, in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.

But though peace was thus re-established, these large mutations of

inhabitants, first begun by the despots—and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness. The wonder, indeed, rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the westward) by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast: next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos: Messene, on the strait adjoining Italy. The center of the island, and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans; on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Egesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the scepter of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment. Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meager abstract given by Diodorus—and especially to know the precautionary secu-

rities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenes at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or petalism) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phayllus was dispatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apelles being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty.

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the pretty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities (with the exception of Hybla) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighboring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki. As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighborhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palike, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had

appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna: Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon, as the Syracusans believed—insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens earnestly recommending mild treatment toward a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of “Save the suppliant.” Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future: the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted. If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess, so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a

year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kale Akte on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace. The discord between the two cities however had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kale Akte, and to make some progress in re-establishing his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island—regaining his former conquest, Morgantine, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia, after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed. Whether any, or what steps were taken to realize her designs, our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power—indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially, appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of

Sicily, particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was renowned—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures, with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing, that such prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the Gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenides and Zeno. Empedokles of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedokles and Polus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation. The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Empedokles, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretense to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras. The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini; whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have

never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town—much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference—were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messene—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy. Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbor, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433–432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterward. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that moment Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such re-enforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of 500 ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from

any immediate declaration against Athens until their fléet should be ready. Of such expected succor, indeed, little was ever realized in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta show that here, as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample re-enforcements from Syracuse and the neighboring towns—a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realized we are not distinctly told: and we find Hermokrates the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterward (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy. But it is easy to see that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterward to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of dispatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbors, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse—and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succor as allies and Ionians—and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that

this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece, though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Laches and Charœades, —with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Laches did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse. Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighborhood of Rhegium and Messene, his colleague Charœades being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messene, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities. He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Eggesta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex: after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inessus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss. Laches concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodorus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under Eurymedon and Sophokles, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Laches insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther re-enforcements—at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophokles started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenes on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which,

in conjunction with the land forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylus, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war—the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphacteria. But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodorus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Laches at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messene; which had surrendered to Laches a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messene, to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favorable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succor from Rhegium to Messene. The latter town now served as a harbor for the fleet hostile to Athens, which was speedily re-enforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory—in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at cape Pelorus near Messene, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium—each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme. This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under cape Pelorus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbor of Messene, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time

beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbor the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesines near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels was seen descending the neighboring hills to succor the Naxians, upon which, the latter, elate with the sight and mistaking the new-comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back to Messene, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection under Demomeles, while the Leontines and Naxines, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messene however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodorus. Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind—the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Sphacteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Kythera, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island. The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighboring city of Gela; at which

latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokrates, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all pecuniary corruption, and clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country; but at the same time of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokrates impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretense of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them—but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example; without that foolish over-valuation of favorable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbors, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.

This harangue from Hermokrates and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanor for

the future. Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantine to Kamarina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money. The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians. They next acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. These generals had no choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities; with liberty of access reciprocally for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophokles and Pythodorus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated, we are not informed. This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained, in his conduct as recounted by Thucydides, is—that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September, 425 B. C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigor or success in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means intrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrollment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these newcomers. But the aristocracy of the town, upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands,

forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos. While these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighboring strong post called Brikinnies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrollment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens: and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the pacification of Gela had now disappeared; while on the other hand the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse.

All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination that the Kamarinæans, neighbors of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messene to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messene after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterward to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiades carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Melos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens pressing their entreaties for aid; which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighboring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Eggesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connection. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Eggesta to considerable

straits by land as well as by sea. Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Laches ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defense, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterward she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage, thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbors.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B. C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Melos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favorable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly, together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiades, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous; and that a considerable party sustained Nicias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nicias himself could not resist. Special envoys were dispatched to Egesta—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfill its assurance of defraying the costs of

war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners dispatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans:—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egæta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphrodite on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.

They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes and goblets, of Egæta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighboring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive entertainment every Egestæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property—the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created of the large number of wealthy men in Egæta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by fraud. To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B. C., about three months after the capture of Melos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egæta, and presented the sixty talents (one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes) as a small installment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone—when the dis-

gress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers—Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Eggesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable. Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Eggesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiades and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias, who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith—and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he labored under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favor. Accordingly, his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance. But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterward, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed, the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

“Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war no way belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honorable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall

now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you, then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name, indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as co-operating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present: for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favor of Lacedæmon—but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans: they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonor: their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly acquired strength for our own purpose, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily.”

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning toward Alkibiades: “If any man, delighted to be named to the command, though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of making good his extravagances—do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own—and that this

latter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly—and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach: in the conviction that few plans ever succeeded from passionate desire—many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition—maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egæstæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens. Nor be thou afraid, Prytanis (Mr. President) to submit this momentous question again to the decision of the assembly,—seeing that breach of the law in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgment.”

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression; since it completely re-opened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiades rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nikias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus; yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiades started up forthwith—his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

“Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander (for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here) and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Theury at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honor to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed

with jealousy by my rivals here; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us—in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous; or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way attained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to certain extent with others also; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely—and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honor. It is this glory which I desire; and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day: a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

“Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine: but so long as I possess it in full vigor, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way.”

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiades went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens, than they were now: they were not more desperate enemies now, than they had been in former days, they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies? To be sure *they* could bring no help to Attica in return:

—but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinizing such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily; at least she would humble Syracuse: in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that aspiring readiness of enterprise, which, having become ingrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiades to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more, however, decidedly, in favor of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also, those Athenians who had visited Eggesta stood forward again to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a maneuver, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free—well prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Katana, from their kindred

with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet, indeed, must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and insuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing. If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardor and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiades, the Egestæans, and the Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiades had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good for-

tune, piety, and favor with the gods—that his opposition to their favorite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.

It was thus that Nicias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardor beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain; others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region; others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nicias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nicias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that, speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than 5,000—Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrollment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle—fatally interrupted, however, by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, for-

warded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egæta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egæstæans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Upon the result of that mission from Egæta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favor of the former, the party, thus strengthened, thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counselor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect maneuver of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.


Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his skepticism about the reports from Egæta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiades. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in


regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiades is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Perikles had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus—we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiades, and the destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must forever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire, and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nikias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiades draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending—is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiades asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily; the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!—so notice the honor which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea, which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the maximum of her credit as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria. There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with rash, misleading, and fallacious counsels as this harangue of Alkibiades.

As a man of action, Alkibiades was always brave, vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands—a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Melos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects: for we ought not to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was than the largest island in the *Ægean*. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias. Moreover we shall see presently that even the armament which was dispatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiades: though I cannot bring myself to believe that even he (as he afterward asserted) really looked beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. It was not merely ambition which he desired to gratify. He was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphacteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiades as here described—we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen that the vices of Alkibiades, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.







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